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 I 
Abstract	  
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the main component of core Internet connectivity, 
suffers vulnerability issues related to the impersonation of the ownership of IP prefixes for 
Autonomous Systems (ASes). In this context, a number of studies have focused on securing 
the BGP through several techniques, such as monitoring-based, historical-based and 
statistical-based behavioural models. In spite of the significant research undertaken, the 
proposed solutions cannot detect the IP prefix hijack accurately or even differentiate it from 
other types of attacks that could threaten the performance of the BGP. This research proposes 
three novel detection methods aimed at tracking the behaviour of BGP edge routers and 
detecting IP prefix hijacks based on statistical analysis of variance, the attack signature 
approach and a classification-based technique.  
The first detection method uses statistical analysis of variance to identify hijacking behaviour 
through the normal operation of routing information being exchanged among routers and 
their behaviour during the occurrence of IP prefix hijacking. However, this method failed to 
find any indication of IP prefix hijacking because of the difficulty of having raw BGP data 
hijacking-free. 
The research also proposes another detection method that parses BGP advertisements 
(announcements) and checks whether IP prefixes are announced or advertised by more than 
one AS.  If so, events are selected for further validation using Regional Internet Registry 
(RIR) databases to determine whether the ASes announcing the prefixes are owned by the 
same organisation or different organisations. Advertisements for the same IP prefix made by 
ASes owned by different organisations are subsequently identified as hijacking events. The 
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proposed algorithm of the detection method was validated using the 2008 YouTube Pakistan 
hijack event; the analysis demonstrates that the algorithm qualitatively increases the accuracy 
of detecting IP prefix hijacks. The algorithm is very accurate as long as the RIRs (Regional 
Internet Registries) are updated concurrently with hijacking detection. The detection method 
and can be integrated and work with BGP routers separately. 
Another detection method is proposed to detect IP prefix hijacking using a combination of 
signature-based (parsing-based) and classification-based techniques. The parsing technique is 
used as a pre-processing phase before the classification-based method. Some features are 
extracted based on the connectivity behaviour of the suspicious ASes given by the parsing 
technique. In other words, this detection method tracks the behaviour of the suspicious ASes 
and follows up with an analysis of their interaction with directly and indirectly connected 
neighbours based on a set of features extracted from the ASPATH information about the 
suspicious ASes. Before sending the extracted feature values to the best five classifiers that 
can work with the specifications of an implemented classification dataset, the detection 
method computes the similarity between benign and malicious behaviours to determine to 
what extent the classifiers can distinguish suspicious behaviour from benign behaviour and 
then detect the hijacking. Evaluation tests of the proposed algorithm demonstrated that the 
detection method was able to detect the hijacks with 96% accuracy and can be integrated and 
work with BGP routers separately. 
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Chapter	  :	  1 Introduction	  
BGP version 4 is currently the standard protocol for core Internet interconnection. The BGP 
was initially designed without security in order to make the Internet faster and more effective. 
Together with its popularity, the BGP also has a number of drawbacks linked to its early 
adoption and age, particularly drawbacks linked to peer-trust and policy-based routing. 
However, its flexibility allows attackers to exploit its flaws by compromising the BGP and 
path selection decision policies [1]. If the vulnerabilities are classified in the BGP, they are 
found in the area of open message and update message. However, update message is special 
because it is considered the heart of routing table changes in the BGP. The first part of the 
BGP update message issue is related to misconfiguration, while the second refers to 
manipulating a sequence of operations applied on the BGP, such as selection routing 
processes and BGP route export policy, which is considered a flexible feature for engineering 
purposes.  
There are some inherent design principles that make BGP vulnerable: lack of integrity 
validation, freshness and origin authentication of messages, and no validation of AS authority 
or path authenticity [2]. Nevertheless, the BGP remains the protocol of choice for core 
Internet interconnectivity because it is considered the strongest and most flexible routing 
protocol in terms of functionality. However, its flexibility also makes it vulnerable to attack 
from untrusted routers.  
Although a number of BGP security issues have been identified for almost two decades, the 
protocol is still vulnerable to IP prefix attacks [3]. These issues facilitate serious attacks and 
open the door to other types of attack, such as spam attacks [4], traffic interception and DDoS 
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[5]. Direct financial benefit has also been a motive for attacks: In February 2014, Valadon 
and Vivet claimed that an attacker redirected some cryptocurrency miners to their own 
mining pool [6]. Moreover, route leaking occurs when a peer incorrectly advertises a varying 
degree of prefixes from its RIB (Routing Information Base) [7]. Power outages and cable cuts 
are not attacks, but they do affect routing stability and can also impact network infrastructure. 
For example, the Moscow blackout damaged the whole European and Asia-Pacific region. 
Conversely, cable cuts can cause more specific problems, such as the disabling of the critical 
egress links of a given region [7]. The BGP is also susceptible to worms, which affect the 
stability of routers. The Code Red worm, which affects the stability of routers as in [8], is 
considered the most effective type of worm attack. For prefix hijacking, attacks happen when 
a speaker infiltrates a BGP prefix announcement by impersonating the original ownership of 
others’ ASes (Autonomous Systems). Finally, a hijacker can impersonate ownership of an IP 
prefix, which is the main area of this research. 
Different prevention-based solutions anticipated to secure the BGP and detect IP prefix 
hijacking. However, Vervier et al. indicate that prevention solutions that use ASes and BGP 
speaker authentication and verification are still facing large-scale deployment issues [5]. Due 
to several reasons, issues on large routing systems or impractical approaches like S-BGP [9], 
threats continue to exist [10]. Moreover, Wubbeling et al. pointed out that security based on 
origin authentication and asymmetric encryption is not feasible because the required 
underlying mechanisms are not yet implemented broadly [10]. In addition, the RPKI 
(Resource Public Key Infrastructure) system is one of the IP prefix hijacking security systems 
put into place to prevent BGP route hijacking. The system is based on tracing the hierarchical 
relationships of the address space, which are given by the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority), RIRs and big ISPs to customers, to AS origins. The system checks the origin 
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ASes or authorised origin ASes to announce specific IP prefixes. The system uses ROAs 
(Route Origin Authorisations), which contain IP prefixes and their authorised ASes. ROAs 
provide the means for verifying if an IP prefix holder has authorised an AS to originate one 
or more IP prefixes. ROAs are cryptographically signed and published in repositories [11]. 
Routers can download these repositories using a trusted tool and then upload them into 
routers [12]. 
A traditional solution such as using rule-based, prefix-owner-centric, origin-set monitoring, 
origin ASes and authentication-based IP prefixes, was employed by prior research to detect 
IP prefix hijacking based on originality authentication [13], [14], [15] and to monitor the 
stability of the encompassing routers. However, Vervier et al. noted that solutions based on 
monitoring anomalies to detect IP prefix hijacking still suffer from high false positive rates 
[5]. Other solutions analyse routing tables (table-based) in order to detect IP prefix hijacking, 
but some organisations refuse to provide their routing tables; therefore, these solutions 
encounter some difficulties in evaluating their experiments [16]. In addition, some solutions 
based on anomaly detection have been used to detect different anomalies, including IP prefix 
hijacking. However, these solutions cannot reliably distinguish IP prefix hijacks from normal 
events, such as power cut offs and submarine cable cuts [7].  
1.1 Aim and objectives  
The aim of the this thesis is to design, investigate, and benchmark a set of novel approaches 
for detecting IP prefix hijacking attacks based on statistical analysis of routing 
communication between routers, combined with attack signature and connectivity-related 
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metrics for suspicious ASes. To achieve this aim, the following research objectives were 
identified: 
a) To identify the state of the art in the architecture, policy, communication, 
vulnerabilities, and built-in security of BGP. 
b) To investigate the concept of IP prefix hijacking, particularly focusing on past 
incidents and their impact on the network, their footprint on the exchanged BGP 
update messages, and the connectivity between participating or affected routers. 
c) To review the current state-of-the-art research in the area of IP prefix hijacking 
prevention and detection. 
d) To investigate how BGP update messages and statistical analysis of router behaviour 
can be used as inputs for detecting IP prefix hijacking incidents.  
e) To improve and expand on the method proposed by cross-validating the results with 
the content of RIR databases. 
f) To investigate how the accuracy of IP prefix hijacking detection can be improved by 
using the outputs of the methods proposed under objectives 4 and 5 and classifying 
corresponding BGP update packets as benign or malicious. 
g) To evaluate the efficiency of the developed detection methods based on data from 
historical IP prefix hijacking incidents.  
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h) To conceptually integrate the proposed methods into a BGP routing architecture based 
on collaborative work to alleviate the impact of a IP prefix hijacking incident onto the 
wider Internet.   
1.2 Thesis contents  
This thesis discusses flaws related to the BGP update message, specifically focusing on 
detecting IP prefix hijacking, and then proposes the appropriate methods to detect IP prefix 
hijacking while achieving the objectives discussed in section 1.1. Chapter 1 reflects the 
content and weakness of the BGP and then points out the two methods that have been 
proposed to detect the IP prefixes. The chapter also discusses the aim and objectives that has 
to be achieved by the end of the research. In addition, Chapter 1 presents the results of the 
methods. Chapter 2 describes the background of the BGP, its contents, how it works, and its 
vulnerabilities; it then talks about already built-in security mechanisms. Furthermore, the 
chapter briefly discusses IP prefix hijacking that has already affected the BGP and then 
explains the process of IP prefix hijacking, giving an example to clarify the picture. Chapter 2 
also discusses previous solutions that have tried to secure the BGP based on prevention and 
detection techniques and evaluates their methodology and results. The aim of the chapter is to 
review the previous literature and propose a proper, novel method based on their limitations 
to secure the BGP. The chapter divides security solutions into two types: prevention and 
detection. The detection solutions aim to detect IP prefix hijacking after it occurs, while the 
prevention solutions try to prevent IP prefix hijacking before it takes place. For example, the 
RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) and the combination of rule-based and packet-
based techniques are categorised in the first type of solutions, while sBGP, soBGP and 
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psBGP are categorised in the second type of solutions. These solutions will be discussed in 
detail in the chapter. 
In consideration of the advantages and limitations of previous solutions, Chapter 3 discusses 
a detection method using statistical analysis of variance to detect IP prefix hijacking. In other 
words, the chapter performs data processing and an analysis of BGP updates to determine the 
most appropriate method that can be used to avoid the mistakes, which occurred in the 
previous solutions. This chapter illustrates the data sources that were used and the reasons for 
selecting specific sources. Moreover, raw data from BGP updates need some preparation and 
organisation to suit the methodology of the detection method. The chapter surveys and 
studies the data that can be used to secure the BGP, especially for detecting IP prefix 
hijacking and applying the data in two-dimensional graphs.  
Chapter 4 proposes a novel self-checking, signature-based and RIR verification-based 
method to detect IP prefix hijacking. As a case study, BGP update messages will be collected 
from February 24, 2008, when Pakistan Telecom intended to restrict local access to 
YouTube, but the advertised BGP update messages blocked access to YouTube [17] for 
approximately two hours [18]. BGP update messages are downloaded from different routers 
in the Route Views Archive Project [21]. The detection method traces origin ASes and their 
actual IP prefixes per 15-minute time slots. It is composed of two parts: the first part receives 
downloaded updates, searches for the signature of hijacking, and then passes the results as 
suspicious events on to the RIRs verification-based part to judge the BGP announced packets. 
The self-checking signature-based method is based on data reduction technique and a binary 
search algorithm and aims to improve the processing speed for detecting IP prefix hijacking 
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events. The results of the detection method are explained and evaluated at the end of the 
chapter. 
Chapter 5 discusses the second method used in this thesis, which is composed of two main 
components: self-checking signature-based and connectivity-based. The self-checking 
signature-based component traces the suspicious ASes existing in BGP updates and sends 
them as inputs to the connectivity-based component. The method uses a classification 
technique to detect IP prefix hijacking. The connectivity-based component extracts features 
based on the connectivity behaviour of suspicious ASes that it receives from the signature-
based component. In other words, the method will have a dataset based on the behaviour of 
suspicious AS connectivity. The similarity behaviour of benign ASes and malicious ASes is 
calculated independently, and the difference in behaviour between the two classes of ASes is 
also calculated in order to probe the quality of the data and predict the classifiers’ results. The 
behavioural dataset is given to five leaning classifiers (J48, k-Nearest Neighbours, Naïve 
Bayes, Classification And Regression Tree and Random Forest) based on its characteristics. 
Each classifier creates a classification model based on the extracted features and the values of 
the classifiers’ parameters. As a result, unseen cases of hijacking will be detected based on 
the model created by classifiers during classifications.  
In Chapter 6, a proposed architecture for how the three detection methods have to be linked 
to the BGP to activate collaboration between routers instead of relying on centralised 
functional structures is discussed. The chapter starts by presenting the architecture method 
and then discusses the functionality of the proposed detection methods after they are linked to 
the BGP collaboratively. Finally, the chapter also describes the responsibility of the network 
operators when they receive an alarm with a hijack. In other words, removing the hijacking is 
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the responsibility of the network operators, not the detection method. However, this thesis 
suggests the most appropriate way to prevent the bogus routes from spreading out.  
The last chapter summarises how the three proposed detection methods work and discusses 
their advantages and disadvantages. The chapter also discusses difficulties that the detection 
methods face. Finally, the chapter compares the detection methods with previous BGP 
security solutions.  
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This chapter discusses the BGP in terms of its architecture and security. First, the chapter 
provides an overview of the BGP, including its architecture and communication of BGP 
messages, weaknesses that threaten its security, and the already existing BGP security 
mechanisms designed to protect router privacy, such as filtering BGP updates coming from 
unknown neighbours (routers). After presenting a general background on BGP architecture 
and security, the chapter will focus on the more significant vulnerabilities that threaten the 
security of the BGP – namely, IP prefix hijacking. This type of attack will be studied from 
two angles: its history and occurrence. The chapter will talk about the proposed solutions for 
securing or detecting IP prefix hijacking, such as sBGP, spBGP, the rule-based method and 
the historical-based method. The solutions will be discussed from different aspects: 
mechanism, experiment (if the solution is practical not theoretical), result and finally 
evaluation. At the end, the proposed approaches the solutions are based on will be compared 
in terms of their strengths and weaknesses.   
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 presents the BGP’s background, including 
BGP architecture and communication, vulnerabilities and security; section 2.2 gives a brief 
history and discusses the process of IP prefix hijacking; section 2.3 is allocated to previously 
proposed security solutions for securing the BGP, while section 2.4 talks about the previous 
detection solutions used to detect IP prefix hijacking in the BGP; section 2.5 compares the 
two security approaches, prevention-based and detection-based, to select the most appropriate 
one used in the thesis to detect IP prefix hijacking; lastly, section 2.6 provides a summary of 
the chapter. 
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2.1 BGP background 
This section discusses the BGP from three perspectives: components and functionality, 
vulnerabilities and built-in security mechanisms. Section 2.1.1 focuses in particular on BGP 
messages and their functions to establish connections and update the routing tables among 
routers. The section will also discuss some parts that routers consist of and how the 
information could be used to support IP hijack detection. Section 2.1.2 talks about the events 
that can affect the BGP, while section 2.1.3 concentrates on built-in security methods, such as 
using MD5 and filtering out received packets.  
2.1.1 BGP architecture and communication  
The BGP4 (Border Gateway Protocol) is an inter-domain protocol that connects different 
ASes so they can work together as one big network. In other words, it is used to connect 
routers over the Internet. This protocol consists of four messages: open, keepalive, 
notification, and update. The open and keepalive messages are used to establish BGP sessions 
using the TCP and to monitor the live connection between two connected routers. The 
notification messages are used for the notification of errors, while the update messages are 
used for populating and updating routing tables. Each message consists of different fields 
plus header fields. The header fields have Marker, Length and Type of specific messages. 
Marker is used to detect loss of synchronisation between a pair of BGP peers and to 
authenticate incoming BGP messages, while Length and Type to carry the size and the type 
of the message The open message has six unique, independent fields: (1) Version, which 
shows the version of the currently used BGP; (2) My Autonomous System Number, which 
indicates the Autonomous System Number (ASN) of the sender; (3) Hold Time, which 
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carries the value of connection repose in seconds – if a receiver does not accept the 
connection in 3 seconds as a maximum period, it will be rejected; (4) BGP Identifier, which 
is responsible for storing the identification of the sender; (5) Optional Parameter Length, 
which shows the total length of optional parameters carried in the announcement by a sender; 
and (6) Optional Parameter, which dictates the optional parameters themselves. The BGP 
uses the TCP while establishing BGP sessions to send and receive BGP packets to and from 
neighbours. As a result, the BGP inherits all weaknesses available in the TCP. However, the 
TCP and other three messages fields are out of the scope and the most important fields to this 
research are the ones belonging to the update message, because data in these fields are 
exchanged periodically between routers (direct and indirect neighbours) and are directly 
related to IP prefix hijacking. These fields include Unfeasible Route Length, Withdrawn 
Routes, Total Path Attribute Length, Path Attributes and Network Layer Reachability 
Information. Unfeasible Routes Length indicates the total length of withdrawn routes. 
Withdrawn Routes contains a list of IP address prefixes for the routes being withdrawn from 
service. Total Path Attribute Length includes the total length of attributes sent in the update 
message, while Path Attributes contain the attributes themselves. Network Layer Reachability 
Information contains a list of IP address prefixes that can be reached. 
The BGP is classified as a path vector protocol, but it can work with a distance vector and 
link state routing protocols. Routers that have the BGP protocol can speak to each other and 
update their routing tables via update messages within or outside of ASes using either a 
EBGP (External Border Gateway Protocol) or IBGP (Internal Border Gateway Protocol) 
path.  The RIB (Routing Information Base) is the repository where all routing protocols 
place their received routes. The RIB has three databases: Adj-RIBs-In, Adj-RIBs-Loc and 
Adj-RIBs-Out. Routes are stored in Adj-RIBs-In whenever a routing protocol learns a new 
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route. When a destination becomes unreachable, the route is marked unusable and later 
removed from the RIB. Adj-RIBs-Loc contains local routing information. Speakers (routers) 
apply local BGP policies to routing information already located in Adj-RIBs-In and store it in 
Adj-RIBs-Loc as the valid and best routes. The routing information is taken and stored in an 
Adj-RIBs-Out storage until ready for advertisement. This process is based on what is known 
as the BGP Decision Process [22].  
2.1.2 Vulnerabilities  
The BGP is vulnerable to traffic interception and DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) 
attack because it uses the TCP while establishing neighbouring sessions with speakers (edge 
routers) [4], [5]. Routers in different ASes but connected to each other are called edge 
routers. Routers with BGP use the TCP when they want to establish BGP sessions and 
connect to other routers. As a result, the BGP is weak because its infrastructure for 
establishing BGP sessions is based on the TCP. In other words, any weaknesses related to the 
TCP will be automatically inherited by the BGP. For example, DDoS attacks can happen to 
both the TCP and the BGP. However, the BGP does not need to flood the bandwidth or 
resources of a targeted system directly; but when a hijacker impersonates other IP prefixes, 
routers automatically search for the best path and try to reach the destination, which impacts 
the routing table routes at the same time. The BGP can also be affected by worm attacks, 
such as Nimda, Slammer and Code Red [7]. Worms can only affect the stability of the routers 
and make the network very slow. All weakness issues existing in the TCP can be inherited in 
the BGP, but these issues and worm attacks are outside of the scope of this thesis. 
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IP prefix hijacking is considered the most serious issue to threaten the BGP because it 
encroaches on the rights and privacy of others. IP prefix hijacking attacks occur when a 
speaker (hijacker) injects a BGP prefix announcement that impersonates the original owner of 
other ASes (victims). Prefix hijacking affects the stability of the routers, as worm attacks do, 
and controls traffic flows, which lead to false traffic redirection. The hijacker performing an 
IP prefix hijacking attack can also withdraw active routes and make a specific network 
unreachable without the victim’s knowledge. IP prefix hijacking can also result in the 
blocking of services on other servers such as the incident of YouTube and Pakistan that 
occurred in 2008. Attackers can use this type of attack for illegitimate operations when they 
want to hide their identities. The most significant vulnerability of the BGP is that when a 
victim router receives a fake route, it cannot detect the impersonation. The attacker can also 
withdraw the routes of other organisations, which leads to blocking services that are provided 
by service providers. 
Moreover, route leaking can happen when a peer incorrectly advertises a varying degree of 
prefixes from its RIB [7]. Attackers can use redirected BGP traffic in order to steal money. In 
February 2014, Valadon and Vivet admitted that an attacker had redirected cryptocurrency 
miners to their own mining pool [6].  
2.1.3 Built-in security  
The BGP includes its own methods for controlling communication between and privacy 
among routers; such methods, such as router hardening, generalised TTL, route dampening, 
maximum prefix limiting, limiting AS_PATH length and prefix filtering [23], and MD5, are 
gradually modified and added to the BGP. Cisco uses inbound route filtering within its route 
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policy filtering [24] to secure the BGP and control the receiving of updates from untrusted 
routers. Filtering routes allows the network operator to determine which neighbours to trust 
and accept advertisements from. However, this technique is not feasible because BGP routers 
do not have knowledge of how their direct neighbours filter their indirect neighbours or to 
what extent indirect neighbours trust each other. In other words, indirect neighbours could 
affect the routers not linked to them directly because routers work collaboratively with both 
direct and indirect neighbours but filtering only controls direct connections among routers. 
As a result, implicit trust among connected ASes might result in the indirect injection of 
invalid routes, which can in turn reach other ASes [10]. This filtering affects the 
communication flexibility of the BGP and only controls incoming and outgoing data between 
neighbours. The BGP also inherits security techniques used in the TCP, such as MD5. 
However, the problem of using MD5 is that it only provides peer authentication (BGP open 
message), not BGP update message authentication. 
2.2 IP prefix hijacking  
IP prefix hijacking is considered a serious issue that threatens the security and stability of the 
BGP when a neighbour impersonates ownership of other routers’ IP prefixes. Any router on 
the Internet can announce fake routes and claim ownership of them. This approach is called 
IP prefix hijacking of other routers’ prefixes. This section has two subsections, 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2, which summarise the history of the BGP in the context of previous incidents and how 
attacks could happen. The explanation of how attacks could happen is based on the analysis 
of the 2008 YouTube Pakistan incident, which is going to be used as the case study for 
clarifying the occurrence of IP prefix hijacking. The aim of this section is to give an overview 
of how IP prefix hijacking occurs and where the issue lies within BGP updates. 
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2.2.1 History of IP prefix hijacking  
This section briefly discusses the history of BGP attacks during the past two decades. 
Generally, attacks can occur in different parts of BGP messages. However, this research 
focuses on hijacks that can take place by exploiting update message flaws, such as in IP 
prefix hijacking. There have been several IP prefix hijacking events since 2000, but this 
section expands on the six worst Internet routing attacks from this period, as mentioned in 
[18]. The organisations subjected to attack as well as corresponding dates are explained as 
follows:  
1 Yahoo, May 2004 
DataOne (a Malaysian ISP) tried to hijack Yahoo’s Santa Clara data-centre prefix in 
May 2004. According to network security experts, the incident was malicious [18].  
2 TTNet took over the Internet, December 2004 
On December 24, 2004, the Turkish TTNet ISP took over the Internet; the full table of 
Internet routes was sent by TTNet, which claimed that it had the best path for routing 
everything on the Internet, according to BGP expert Renesys. As a result, all traffic 
from different sites, such as Yahoo, Microsoft, Amazon and CNN, shifted to TTNet 
[18].  
3 Con Edison hijacked a large portion of prefixes, January 2006 
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The normal way that ISPs route traffic to their larger customers is to wait for other 
customers to announce networks; then, the ISPs just propagate the announcement. 
However, at 05:05:33 UTC on January 22, 2006, Con Edison announced a number of 
prefixes pretending they are owned by their customers. A large number of 
announcements/propagations were made over the following several minutes, 
indicating the instability of the routers and that something wrong had happened. The 
routers continued to accept announcements until 05:22:29 UTC, when the networks 
started moving back to their real owners. However, At 8:23:12 UTC, Verio (aka NTT 
America, AS2914) started accepting some of the same fake routes that other affected 
routers were already spreading [25]. 
4 Pakistan blocks YouTube, February 2008  
YouTube blocking is one of the most well-known IP prefix attacks occurred in 2008 
by Pakistan Telecom. On Friday, February 22, 2008, Pakistan Telecom received an 
order to prevent people from accessing some videos on YouTube. Therefore, it 
impersonated the IP prefix and blocked YouTube for several hours. Pakistan Telecom 
is managed by the APNIC (Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre), while the 
victim is managed by the ARIN (American Registry for Internet Numbers), which 
means they are in two different regions. The YouTube website was completely 
inaccessible on Sunday, February 25, 2008, from 10:48 to 12:51 UTC [26]. On 
February 26, 2008, the bogus advertisement was withdrawn at the request of the 
government, but the ban was left in place to prevent Pakistanis from accessing 
YouTube [27]. As a result, the fake route was removed from all routers’ routing 
tables.  
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5 Chinese ISP hijacked many different ASes, April 2010 
AS23724 (CHINANET-IDC-BJ-AP IDC) is one of the data centres operated by China 
Telecom. Normally, AS23724 only originates 40 prefixes; however, on April 8, 2010, 
the ISP originated about 37,000 unique prefixes in 15-minute. Popular websites like 
dell.com, cnn.com, www.amazon.de, www.rapidshare.com and www.geocities.jp 
were affected. In addition, a large number of networks impacted Chinese websites 
belonging to Chinese Telecom, including www.joy.cn, www.pconline.com.cn, 
www.huanqiu.com, www.tianya.cn and www.chinaz.com. The incident was detected 
globally in The Netherlands, the UK, Russia, Italy, Sweden, the US, Japan and Brazil. 
This highlights the impact of hijacking on networks over a large area on the Internet 
[28].   
6 BGP hijacking for monetary gain, August 2014  
A message was sent by a user named ‘Caution’ in the bitcointalk.org forum which 
stated that suspicious activity was occurring on mining systems connected to the 
wafflepool.com mining pool. Some users in this forum and other cryptocurrency 
forums observed similar activity: mining systems unnoticeably redirected to an 
unknown IP address that answered with the Stratum protocol. Once connected to this 
IP address, miners continued receiving work but no longer received block rewards for 
their mining efforts. Hijackers exploited miners‘ hashing power by redirecting 
legitimate mining traffic allocated for well-known pools to a malicious server 
masquerading as the legitimate pool. Normally, miners continuously connect to a 
legitimate pool for tasks. However, in this case, when miners tried to connect to the 
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legitimate pool, a new BGP route directed their traffic to a pool belonging to the 
hijackers. Miners noticed that something wrong had happened to their transactions; 
therefore, the hijackers avoided the already hijacked traffic. Instead, they convinced 
the miners to connect to different malicious pools other than the first suspicious pool, 
which had already been hijacked. Miners redirected to the hijackers’ pool continued 
to see tasks and perform work, but were not compensated; while miners who were not 
redirected remained unaffected. The hijacking continued for months as the hijackers 
repeated the process in short bursts [29]. 
From the above listed examples, it is clear that big organisations cannot protect themselves 
from the effectiveness of IP prefix hijacking that are performed by untrusted organisations 
because the connection among routers is global. For hijacked routers with many neighbours, 
their best path connection to direct and indirect neighbours is affected more than routers with 
fewer neighbours, as the number of withdrawing or changing routes is too high. However, 
organisations do not detect the hijacking because of a lack of security among the routers. If 
the organisations try to stop hijacking events occurring via direct neighbours by filtering 
incoming announcement routes, it would become very difficult to avoid hijacking from 
indirect neighbours, as routers with filtering do not check ASPATH lists if they have 
untrusted routers in between. 
2.2.2 Process of IP prefix hijacking  
This section discusses the process view of IP prefix hijacking and its impact on the end user. 
The purpose of the discussion is to help trace the main reasons behind the occurrence of IP 
prefix hijacking without victims’ knowledge and then to identify the appropriate data needed 
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to disclose this attack. Along with studying the BGP’s raw data during the building of a 
proposed system to secure or detect IP prefix hijacking, this section will also give a useful 
demonstration of the most appropriate methodology for solving IP prefix hijacking.  
With respect to providing AS numbers and IP prefixes to routers, the IANA (Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority) distributes IP prefixes and ASNs to five RIRs – ARIN, RIPE 
NCC, APNIC, LACNIC and AfriNIC – and other large organisations, which in turn distribute 
these IP prefixes and ASNs to smaller organisations. Afterwards, any router having these two 
data (IP prefixes and ASNs) can join the Internet and start routing information to its 
neighbours. In the beginning, each two directly connected routers establish a BGP session 
and trust each other to send and receive updates. However, any router on the Internet can be 
configured badly, either maliciously or due to human error, and impersonate other 
neighbours’ IP prefixes. In normal operations, any router linked to the Internet and speaking 
the BGP language has three tasks – to announce, propagate or withdraw routes – to update 
other routers’ routing tables through the sending and receiving of update packets from direct 
or indirect neighbours. The difference between announcing and propagating routes is that 
announcers who announce routes own them, while propagators only propagate the routes to 
their neighbours to inform them that the announcers can take them to a specific network.  
After giving brief information about the needed data (e.g., AS numbers and IP prefixes) and 
the normal work of routers, the process by which IP prefix hijacking can occur without 
victims’ awareness will be explained hypothetically as in Figure 2.1. This figure consists of 
seven ASes: The edge router (RTA) in AS100 represents the real owner (the announcer) of 
the prefix 1.1.1.0/24, while the router (RTD) in AS300 aims to hijack 1.1.1.0/24; the 
remaining edge routers, AS400, AS200, AS600, AS500 and AS700, work as propagators to 
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1.1.1.0/24 which anticipate the spreading of a bogus route. The edge router (RTG) in AS700 
is a propagator but is in a different region (e.g., ARIN), while the other six ASes are in one 
region (e.g., APNIC). Edge router RTD in AS300 is the hijacker, while edge router RTE is a 
propagator in the same autonomous system. Every router that speaks the BGP language and 
is connected to other routers in a different autonomous system is called an edge router. 
 
Figure 2.1 Prefix hijacking process 
Edge router RTA in AS100 announces the IP prefix 1.1.1.0/24 to router RTC that is located 
in AS200, which, in turn, propagates it to AS600. There is no direct connection between 
AS300 and AS100. AS300 announces the same IP prefix to AS200 and AS500 either before 
or after AS100. Although both AS100 and AS300 announce the same IP prefix 1.1.1.0/24 to 
AS200, AS200 cannot detect the hijacking; however, it will probably spread it out to AS600 
based on the filtering policy among neighbours. In addition, AS300 announces the same 
prefix, which it does not originally own, to AS500, then further to other national or 
international ASes. Moreover, AS300 announces IP prefix 1.1.1.0/24 directly to AS400, 
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which would perhaps announce it to the real origin AS (AS100). However, the real owner 
will not detect that it had been hijacked because the BGP lacks origin authentication. In this 
case, some edge routers would assume that AS300 could forward traffic for 1.1.1.0/24 via a 
route with a lower cost than the one offered by AS100. Consequently, edge routers would 
redirect their routes and use AS300. If the case is applied to extremely popular organisations 
like YouTube, Google and Yahoo, denial of service will have an immediate impact on end 
users. 
2.3 Securing the BGP 
This section discusses a number of BGP security solutions that have been proposed to prevent 
IP prefix hijacking in BGP version 4, such as sBGP, soBGP, psBGP and RPKI (Resource 
Public Key Infrastructure). These solutions were proposed theoretically and are based on 
nearly similar mechanisms to authenticate BGP update messages and authorise ASes that can 
advertise a specific IP prefix. Each solution is described according to the security techniques 
used and methodologies followed for processing and structuring data. The solutions are 
evaluated based on different, important features of the security system (solution), such as 
computational complexity, deployment susceptibility and quality. 
2.3.1 secure Border Gateway Protocol (sBGP)     
sBGP is a protocol proposed to satisfy BGP security requirements. This protocol uses 
common security mechanisms, such as the PKI, attestations and IPsec to prevent illegal 
operations among routers.  The main purpose of the protocol is to prevent IP prefix hijacking 
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through the authentication of BGP update messages and the authorisation of ASes to deliver a 
particular IP prefix, as well as by verifying that received messages are sent by owners. 
2.3.1.1 sBGP mechanism  
sBGP uses three techniques to secure itself and prevent serious attacks like IP prefix 
hijacking. First, sBGP uses PKIs as its primary technique; this technique is based on 
cryptographic key management, whereby private keys and public keys are managed by a 
trusted root certificate authority such as the IANA or ICANN (Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers). These keys can be delegated to RIRs in order to distribute 
them over the ASes. During the sending of a BGP packet, the ASes use private keys to sign 
update messages and, upon receiving these messages, routers verify them using the public 
keys of the senders [13], [19].   
The second technique that sBGP depends on is called attestations. This approach is used so 
that sBGP can encapsulate authorisation information in an UPDATE message; then, the 
information is signed digitally to ensure the authenticity and integrity of data provided in the 
update message. By using attestations, the sBGP allows each AS to check the authority of 
advertising an IP prefix to other ASes along the path, and to verify that the advertising AS 
was authorised by the owners themselves [19].  For example, in route (100,200,300,400), 
AS400, which is the owner, needs to give authority to all ASes (300,200,100) in the path to 
propagate a specific IP prefix. Similarly, each AS in the route must give authority to the next 
one in order to propagate the same IP prefix. 
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The last security technique utilised in this solution is IPSec; this protocol can secure point-to-
point communication between speakers. In other words, it works on an OPEN message level 
not on an update message level. IPSec includes many services related to security which could 
be applied to the BGP, such as access control service, connectionless data integrity service, 
data origin authentication service and data confidentiality service. The ability to manipulate 
the order of AS numbers in the ASPATH attribute is called a modification and deletion 
attack. This manipulation can happen either by withdrawing a valid route or intercepting the 
ASPATH. Attackers could apply these attacks by deleting particular ASNs or modifying 
specific paths to redirect packets, or by causing DoS attacks by making a specific network 
unreachable [13].  
2.3.1.2 Benefits and limitations 
In terms of advantages, the sBGP is considered a very concrete solution because it has the 
ability to sign, verify and validate ASes and IP prefixes dynamically and simultaneously. 
However, sBGP routers must give authenticity to their neighbours to propagate a specific IP 
prefix, but the sBGP routers cannot guarantee that trusted neighbours do not themselves 
claim the ownership of the IP prefix. As a result, preventing IP prefix hijacking would be 
very difficult in the sBGP. The protocol depends on a hierarchal structure of multiple levels 
of trusted certificate authorities for signing ASNs and has a complicated management process 
Due to the need for cooperation among routers to deliver update packets, any trusted routers 
can act up and falsify the ASPATH attribute values. It is true that their effectiveness would 
be limited because only trusted routers can falsify the ASPATH, but hijacking can still be 
achieved. Moreover, attestations are used in the sBGP to verify the ability of ASes to 
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propagate IP prefixes by limited ASes [19]. Similar to this aim is already available in BGP 
community filtering commands which allow using no-export attribute to propagate IP 
prefixes by specific ASes [30]. As pointed out by Aiello et al. [31], it is exceptionally 
difficult to approximate an IP address delegation graph for the Internet. Therefore, it might be 
impossible to build centralised PKI mirroring such as a complex and unknown delegation 
structure. Although the sBGP includes all IPSec services, these services are not fundamental 
requirements for inter-domain routing itself.  
2.3.2 secure origin Border Gateway Protocol (soBGP) 
The soBGP (secure origin Border Gateway Protocol) aims to secure the traditional BGP, 
specifically by preventing IP prefix hijacking. The protocol secures the BGP based on four 
certificates: AS Policy Certificates (ASPolicyCerts), Authorisation Certificates (AuthCerts), 
Entity Certificates (EntityCerts) and Prefix Policy Certificates (PrefixPolicyCerts). 
ASPolicyCerts are used to assert routing policy for an AS, while AuthCerts binds ASes to 
their IP prefixes to assert the authorisation of an AS to advertise a specific prefix. EntityCerts 
assert mapping between ASes and their public keys, while PrefixPolicyCerts are responsible 
for mapping ASes to one or more prefixes [15]. All of these certificates have a similar 
mechanism but work on different entities (e.g., AS number, AS policy and prefix policy).  
The soBGP is based on three common security techniques: authentication, verification and 
the web-trust-model. Authentication is used to authenticate policies in the routing system, 
such as AS policy and prefix policy, while verification is used to verify them. In the 
authentication phase, the soBGP uses the web-trust-model, which is a technique for 
authenticating ASes and linking them to their public keys. In the verification phase, the 
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soBGP uses AS public key signatures so they can validate each other [13]. Section 2.3.2.1 
will detail the authentication and verification mechanisms. 
2.3.2.1 soBGP mechanism   
In the authentication phase, as explained in section 2.3.2, EntityCert certificates are generated 
by the CA (Certificate Authority), which bind AS numbers with their public keys. These 
certificates are signed digitally by Tier-1 ISPs or well-known authentication service providers 
such as VeriSign. To achieve trust among routers, a small number of ‘root public key 
certificates’ are distributed among them using out-of-band mechanisms. An AS with a trusted 
AS public key certificate, already signed by a trusted CA, might use its private key to issue 
and sign a further public key certificate (EntityCert) for another AS in a hierarchical structure 
that will naturally form a web-of-trust model. The other three certificates mentioned in 
section 2.3.2 are issued among ASes with no involvement of certificate authorities. 
Afterwards, these three certificates are distributed over BGP routers while routing 
information in the update messages [13]. 
In the verification phase, when a router receives an update message, it checks both the 
advertisement authority of each BGP router through the sender’s public key signature 
available in the EntityCert and the IP prefix ownership via the signatures in the AuthCerts. 
The other two certificates, ASPolicyCerts and PrefixPolicyCerts, are used by routers to check 
the policy of ASes and IP prefixes in order to avoid false positives that routing policies, such 
as address aggregation and AS confederation, could result in during the verification of an IP 
prefix ownership. For example, in a case where router A carries four certificates and wants to 
exchange routing information with router B, router B will not trust router A until it already 
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has all four certificates’ public keys of router A; it then checks its signatures before the 
announcement is used and stored in the routing table or propagated to another neighbour [19]. 
2.3.2.2 Benefits and limitations  
In terms of authentication, the soBGP uses four certificates to authenticate ASes and IP prefix 
routing polices which lead to an increase in accuracy and a reduction in false positives. The 
web-of-trust model is used by the soBGP and has strong proponents for authenticating user 
public keys within the technical PKI community [39]. With respect to IP prefix ownership 
verification, the soBGP makes use of a strictly hierarchical structure, and prefix delegation 
structures might be simplified in the soBGP by using ASes instead of organisations.  
Using the web-of-trust model with the soBGP is suitable for authenticating AS public keys, 
which are identified by AS numbers strictly controlled by the IANA; thus, it is questionable 
whether any entity other than the IANA should be trusted to sign AS public key certificates. 
Kranakis et al. suggest that the soBGP, like the sBGP, also faces difficulties tracing changes 
of IP address ownership in a strictly hierarchical way [13]. In addition, it is not clear whether 
it is practical to use hierarchical structure since IP addresses are usually delegated to 
organisations, not to ASes [2]. Any peer could join the Internet, work as a trusted entity, and 
then misbehave; in this case, all mechanisms will be ineffective. Finally, the soBGP does not 
have a mechanism for identifying invalid certificates (expired certificates); therefore, this 
makes the soBGP less secure. 
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2.3.3 pretty secure Border Gateway Protocol (psBGP) 
The pretty secure Border Gateway Protocol (psBGP) is a combination of practical solutions 
using the best features of the sBGP and soBGP which aims to secure the BGP [32]. The 
psBGP consists of two models: the centralised trust model and the decentralised trust model. 
The protocol uses the centralised trust model for authenticating AS numbers and BGP 
speakers, and the decentralised trust model for verifying IP prefix ownership and ASPATH 
[33]. The mechanism of this protocol will be explained in the context of five main security 
goals: The first and second goals are related to data origin authentication for ASNs and BGP 
speakers, while the third goal is concerned with data integrity that does not add any additional 
security to the BGP because it is achieved implicitly when the BGP establishes TCP peering 
sessions with neighbours. In other words, the TCP already has IPSec, which performs the 
same task; therefore, this section will not talk about the data integrity goal. The fourth and 
fifth goals focus on a way to verify prefix origination and ASPATH during the exchange of 
routing information [32]. The objective of the psBGP is to explore alternative policies and 
trade-offs to provide an acceptable balance between practicality and security. 
2.3.3.1 psBGP mechanism  
It would be useful to start by explaining the architecture of the two trusted models on which 
the psBGP is based for authenticating ASNs and BGP speakers and asserting ownership of IP 
prefixes and ASPATH; then the mechanism for and verification of these data to prevent IP 
prefix hijacking could be demonstrated. As mentioned above, data integrity will not be 
discussed in this subsection because it does not add any direct security contribution to the 
components of inter-domain protocols. 
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First, the centralised trust model uses RIRs as the root of trusted certificate authorities like 
big ISPs. In general, RIRs generate public key certificates and sign them for association with 
ASNs.  When an organisation applies for an AS number, the RIR will bind the AS number to 
a certificate to issue another certificate called the ASNumCert. ISPs follow the same 
procedure with customers applying for the ASNumCert. This distributes the effort of 
providing ASNumCerts among AS number providers (e.g., RIRs and ISPs). ASes also need 
to keep their private keys, which correspond to their issued public keys, to prove the 
authenticity of their specific ASNumCert to the RIR when they need to modify the certificate 
or for any other reason. In terms of authenticating BGP speakers, the psBGP uses the same 
model. An AS with a certified ASNumCert issues an operational public key certificate shared 
by all BGP speakers within the AS – namely, the SpeakerCert. BGP speakers need to have 
the private keys that have already been issued and which correspond to the public keys of the 
ASes with ASNumCerts to sign the SpeakerCert [32]. 
To verify AS numbers, the psBGP assumes that BGP peers on the Internet have already been 
provided with all neighbours’ ASNumCerts through out-of-band mechanisms, taking into 
account the fact that the ASNumCert is revoked when the corresponding AS number is not 
used or reassigned to another organisation. While changing BGP update messages between 
BGP peers, each AS sends its ASNumCert, which has been issued and granted by a RIR, in 
the BGP update message so peers can verify its AS number. Peers in turn verify every 
received announcement based on the ASNumCert attached to the BGP update message. If the 
verification is successful, peers accept the announcement; otherwise, it is rejected.  
To verify the BGP, speakers use SpeakerCerts already issued in the authentication phase. 
SpeakerCerts are distributed among BGP speakers upon sending and receiving update 
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messages. SpeakerCerts are used for establishing secure connections with peers and for 
signing BGP messages. Assuming that BGP speakers have their peers’ public keys, when a 
BGP speaker receives an update message from its peer, it will use its public key to verify the 
identification based on the SpeakerCert, which includes the signature of the peer. 
Second, the psBGP uses a decentralised trust model for verifying the propriety of IP prefix 
ownership and ASPATH. The architecture of this model is based on lists of ASNs bound with 
their IP prefixes. In other words, each AS creates a prefix assertion list (PAL) that consists of 
a number of bindings of AS numbers and prefixes. The first assertion in the PAL is allocated 
for the AS itself, and the other assertions belong to the peering ASes where the assertions (the 
endorsements of an AS’s peers) are ordered based on the ASNs [13]. 
In terms of verifying the origination of a specific prefix to an AS, the AS’s peers utilise the 
architecture of the decentralised trusted model. Generally, each peer on the Internet needs to 
have prior knowledge of some level of due diligence offline to determine what IP prefixes are 
delegated to each of its peers [32].  Based on that delegation knowledge, peers will have the 
origination of prefix endorsements (assertions) of an AS. When the AS wants to announce a 
specific prefix, peers on the other side will check the consistency of peers’ assertions in the 
PALs to verify its ownership to the prefix [13]. If at least one peer asserts that the AS owns 
the prefix, the BGP packet will be accepted; otherwise, it will be rejected. 
ASPATH is a BGP attribute that consists of a list of AS numbers and is always sent with 
update messages. To verify ASPATHs, the psBGP uses a bit vector data structure in the PAL 
to make the operation very quick. The PAL structure in ASPATH verification is devolved to 
take triple format, {prefix, [P1, P2, P3, ..., Pi], Vi[ni]}, instead of duple format,{fi, [P1, P2, 
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P3, ..., Pi]}, where fi is endorsed prefixes, Pi is peers of an AS, Vi is a bit vector, and ni is the 
corresponding length. A bit vector is a data structure array that compactly stores bits. psBGP 
speakers use digital signatures to sign the new structure of PALs and, based on the the 
signature, verify each other. For example, [P1, P2, P3] represents a list of an ASPATH; 
however, P3 will not accept an update message from P2 until it has the digital signatures of 
{f1, [P1], v1[n1]}P1, {f1, [P1, P2],v2[n2]}P2  from P2 [32]. 
2.3.3.2 Benefits and limitations 
Compared to the sBGP, the psBGP signs ASN certificates received from RIRs or trusted 
authorities directly, consequently reducing the certificate management burden, while the 
sBGP depends on a hierarchal structure of multiple levels of trusted certificate authorities for 
signing ASNs and has a complicated management process. Another advantage of the psBGP 
solution is that it can address uncoordinated, misconfigured and malicious BGP routers [33]. 
The psBGP is able to distribute the difficult task of tracing IP address ownership across all 
ASes on the Internet by making each AS verify its peering ASes based on the PALs [33]. The 
third advantage of the psBGP is that it includes a method for describing IP prefix engineering 
such as IP address aggregation [32], which increases the accuracy of the protocol and reduces 
false positives during the verification of prefix origination and ASPATH.  
The psBGP also has two serious drawbacks with regard to verifying the ownership of IP 
prefixes when it uses the decentralised trusted model. First, some ASes could have only one 
neighbour AS, which would in turn mean that their PALs would only have one prefix 
assertion. In this case, peers of these ASes would not be able to check or compare the 
consistency of the assertions because they would receive a PAL with only one assertion from 
 31 
these kinds of ASes. Second, some ASes leave their entry in the PAL empty or null, which 
means no endorsement was given by those ASes to their peers [13]. In other words, the 
psBGP would not be able to stop ASes that have null assertion entries from achieving IP 
prefix hijacking or affecting the robustness of the protocol.  
2.3.4 Preventing IP prefix hijacking using the RPKI  
The RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) is a framework proposed by the IETF 
(Internet Engineering Task Force) to secure the inter-domain routing system. This framework 
uses three security techniques to secure the BGP and prevent IP prefix hijacking: the PKI, 
signatures and positive attestations [12].  The PKI is used to allow ASes to generate their own 
private and public keys, while signatures are allocated to use these keys for signing ASes and 
IP prefixes and for verifying routes. Positive attestations are used to allow a RP to validate 
ROAs within the RPKI. Substantively, the RPKI tries to find a way to make the hierarchical 
structure delegation of the prefixes and ASNs more secure [34]. The main purpose of this 
technique is to address misconfigurations and hijacking by identifying the real owner of a 
particular IP address. The following subsection discusses the mechanism of the RPKI and 
how to protect a specific address space. 
2.3.4.1 RPKI mechanism 
The RPKI is an approach for building formally verifiable documents, including IP addresses 
and their origin ASes. In other words, the RPKI uses the special structure of linking origin 
ASes and their IP prefixes and puts them in special documents for route validation; these 
 32 
documents are called ROAs (Route Origin Authorisations) [24]. The aim of ROAs is to give 
authorisation to the ASes to announce their IP prefixes [11].  
In the beginning, ASes generate their own private and public keys to sign ROAs and validate 
routes, respectively. The signed objects are saved in an RPKI cache and must be refreshed 
periodically by BGP speakers [24]. Each AS uses its private key and digitally signs the linked 
AS with its IP prefixes and publishes the public key to be used for verifying its signature. On 
the other side, ASes that receive the announcement will wait for a RP (replying party) to 
validate the routes. A third party will use the announcer’s public key to check if the AS is 
authorised to originate the IP prefixes [24].  
The RP assumes that it has full access to the ROAs to check the validity of a route. Generally, 
the RP is a server which provides access to a secure software application. This server is set 
logically between routers to check the origination of the routes in the ROAs using their origin 
Ases’ public keys. If a route does not pass the validation phase, it will be interpreted by the 
RP as ‘invalid’ and the router will not be able to originate the desirable IP prefixes [34][12].  
The RPKI proposes that routers accept and refuse routes based on three validation states: not 
found, valid and invalid. Not found means the checked route prefix does not exist among 
ROAs, while valid means at least one ROA matches the route prefix; finally, invalid means 
that at least one of the ROAs matches the route prefix, but in the validation no one matches it 
[24]. 
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2.3.4.2 Benefits and limitations 
In the context of router functionality, IP address aggregation and AS confederation operations 
are used for specific engineering purposes, such as announcing an IP prefix on behalf of other 
ASes. However, these operations could make following the origination of specific IP prefixes 
very complicated. In other words, some ASes do not or might forget to describe all router 
policies regarding engineering IP addresses, which could lead to many false positives. 
Another drawback of the RPKI is that some attackers can inject multiple valid ROAs. Since 
the third party (e.g., RP) matches received announcement routes with the objects in the ROAs 
but does not check if there is more than one AS claiming the same IP prefixes in the RPKI, 
the injected valid ROAs will make the RP exceed the validation.  
Wählisch et al. built a system in [12] to prevent IP prefix hijacking that uses the RPKI to 
detect IP prefix hijacking. They tried to determine the reasons that making the 
announcements invalid to pass the route validation to compute false negative and false 
positive. In other words, they could not compute the false positives and negatives accurately. 
However, the authors indicate that hijacking often happens because of unallocated address 
spaces, which were not addressed in the RPKI. 
The RPKI uses three validation states to accept or refuse announcements, valid or invalid or 
not found [24], but the problem with validation states is that they cannot determine the main 
reason for invalid announcements. If an operator misses more specific prefixes to add to 
ROAs, the system will fail to prevent hijackings [12]. In other words, the RPKI requires that 
all ASes provide their associated origin ASes with IP prefixes and describe them accurately 
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in ROAs. If some legitimate ASes do not provide their ROAs to the RPKI, then the RPKI 
framework will not be able to know the accurate cases of the announced route prefix. 
2.3.5 Limitations of existing prevention solutions  
Prevention hijacking solutions to authenticate the identity of the routers are usually based on 
security techniques such as the PKI, attestations and digital signatures. These techniques are 
very strong and useful for individual tasks such as accessing an account in a specific server 
but not for exchanging BGP packets among routers because of the large size of the packets 
being exchanged. In addition, prevention solutions are not yet deployable and are subject to 
some false positives, as explained in section 2.3.4 for the RPKI. Some of the other proposed 
prevention solutions were mentioned in [9], [35], [36]. Moreover, if an attack takes place, 
these solutions, due to the fact that they are based on authentication, would not be able to 
detect it at all. As a result, a more effective approach would be to use anomaly detection 
techniques, which will be explained in section 2.4. Although prevention techniques are very 
important, detection techniques are more feasible because they can trace the hijacking 
continuously and keep secured systems up to date. However, security solutions do not 
achieve these features; if an attack passes authentication, such solutions will not be able to 
detect or remove it. 
2.4 IP prefix hijacking detection 
This section discusses a different way to secure the BGP by detecting IP prefix hijacking 
before it spreads out. This is a different technique from the one discussed in section 2.3. 
Generally, there are many anomaly detection techniques regularly used to detect anomalies 
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that threaten networks, such as rule-based, finite state machines, statistical analysis and 
pattern matching [37]. However, this section will be limited to five examples of anomaly 
detection techniques that have already been applied to the BGP in order to reflect their 
effectiveness for detecting IP prefix hijacking. These examples should cover most of the 
methods that have been used to detect hijacking in the BGP. Other solutions will be omitted 
because they are either not directly related to detecting IP prefix hijacking but rather more 
general events such as worms, blackouts and misconfiguration [38], or they follow the same 
detection methods. Discussing the resources of the previously proposed detection solutions 
based on the detection of IP prefix hijacking would be a good place to begin, followed by an 
explanation of the detection methods or solution mechanisms.  
Previous, different solutions are summarised in five detection approaches: (1) rule-based, 
which concerns information that can be used to explore and check a specific issue in the BGP 
such as unallocated IP prefixes (found in the IANA and RIRs) that can be exploited to cause 
disruption in networks or MOAS (Multiple Origin Autonomous System) conflicts, which 
make data flow in ASes invalid and prefix hijacking achievable [16]; (2) monitoring-based, 
which focuses on tracking network reachability among transit networks by using lightweight 
prefix-owner-based and active probing to detect IP prefix hijacking [20]; (3) origin changes 
monitoring-based, which is concerning with following up on the changes of the origins of a 
specific prefix [39]; (4) historical-based, which applies to how to construct a set of recently 
seen data (prefix, origin AS, time) in a historical window [40]; and finally (5) multiple events 
monitoring-based, which concentrates on the changes that occur to BGP routing during the 
occurrence of an event such as spam and suspicious MOASs [38]. These five detection 
techniques will be discussed from four angles: detection mechanisms, experiments used, 
detection results, and evaluation of the solutions. 
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2.4.1 Accuracy and challenges of accessing BGP resources  
Selecting accurate data resources is an important factor for solutions trying to secure the 
BGP; therefore, this section is allocated towards investigating the accuracy and availability of 
the data collection resources used by previous solutions before the discussion of detection 
methods or mechanisms begins. First, BGP-related resources are divided into two categories 
from which IP prefix hijacking detection solutions can collect their data: registry-based and 
trace-based. The trace-based category represents active routing information, while the 
registry-based category concerns registered routing information. Routing information can be 
obtained from routing tables and update messages, while registered routing information is 
included in RIRs and IRRs (Internet Routing Registries). Routing tables and update messages 
are available in the BGP routers themselves. However, registered routing data can be 
obtained from five different global registries: the African Network Information Center 
(AfriNIC), the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN), the Asia-Pacific Network 
Information Centre (APNIC), the Latin America and Caribbean Network Information Centre 
(LACNIC) and Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) [41]. The 
investigation of these resources is needed to evaluate previous work and choose the most 
appropriate information to be used with the proposed detection methods discussed in Chapter 
Chapter : 3, Chapter : 4 and Chapter : 5. 
2.4.1.1 Routing tables and BGP update messages 
BGP update message information is considered the main generator of information stored in 
routing tables. BGP update messages contain seven types of information shared in all BGP 
packets: the time and date the BGP packet was sent at and on, message type, sending from 
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and receiving to routers, and source and destination ASes. BGP update messages have 14 
discretionary and mandatory BGP attributes. Based on this information, BGP routers build 
their routing tables from exchanged routing information, such as ASes, prefixes, router IDs 
and so on. Routing tables and update messages can be collected from Route Views, which is 
available on [21]. 
In terms of accuracy, update messages are very accurate and are considered real-time data. 
Routing tables contain voluminous routing entries, which leads to great cost during the 
checking of routing tables. In the meantime, the routing table is relatively stable such that it is 
not worth checking it repeatedly. It also would be very difficult to detect short-lived 
anomalies (e.g., prefix hijacking). In the context of challenges, some organisations are not 
willing to provide their routing tables to researchers because of privacy considerations [16]. 
Therefore, routing tables are not a good choice for detecting IP prefix hijacking.  
2.4.1.2 Regional Internet Registries and Internet Routing Registries 
RIRs are online databases that are typically used to retrieve specific information such as AS 
numbers, IP prefixes and organisation names; while IRRs, such as the Reseaux Internet 
Protocol Europeans-Routing Information Service (RIPE-RIS), are looking glass databases 
that extract their registered information from RIRs and make them available to the research 
community. Both databases can be used for avoiding problematic issues between ISPs and 
globally to help network operators debug routing tables and configure routers properly. In 
addition, RIRs and IRRs can be used as mechanisms for allowing the validation of BGP 
announcement message content or mapping an origin AS number to a list of IP prefixes [42].  
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Nemecis (NEtwork ManagEment and Configuration System), which is a tool used in [43] to 
evaluate the accuracy of registered routing information resources, has also been used with IP 
prefix detection solutions, such as IRRs. As in [44], Nemecis verifies the existence and 
consistency of ASes and prefix registration objects against BGP updates by matching various 
attributes such as organisation, maintainer, email handle, etc. Because the asynchronous 
changing among active update messages and information is stored in the IRRs, the algorithm 
in principle generates alerts if the checks fail, i.e., when there is a lack of a full or partial 
consistency check. A full consistency check, for example, occurs when the route object is 
consistent with the prefix and the autonomous number; whereas a partial consistency check 
occurs when the route object is consistent with only the prefix or the autonomous number. 
Based on the results of Nemecis, the authors in [43] claim that IRRs are not accurate. 
In terms of challenges, RIRs cannot be linked to research in a programmable way like IRRs; 
both resources need to be concurrent and up to date with any detection methods based on 
them; otherwise, the methods could be subject to false positives.  
2.4.1.3 Comparing between registered and routing information  
Even though IRRs are trusted sources, according to [43], they might be inaccurate based on 
[44]. Therefore, IRRs are not reliable for use as data resources with IP prefix hijacking 
detection solutions. IRRs store irregularly updated registered routing information, but BGP 
security tools need to debug and validate them. The contents of BGP update messages are 
changed both periodically and continuously. Thus, BGP update messages should be 
combined with registered-based information to detect IP prefix hijacking.  
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2.4.2 Using rule-based and packet-based approaches with prefix relationships  
Rule-based approach can be used in problem solving to detect unexpected events. This 
approach was mentioned in [37], [16], [45]–[49] as one of the detection methods that can be 
used to detect anomalies in communication networks, including IP prefix hijacking. The 
packet-based approach is a method of checking real-time data received from routers. Wang et 
al. proposed in [12] a novel model that combines packet-based and rule-based approaches. 
This model obtains routing information from various AS edge routers so that it can come up 
with more effective detection. The rule-based approach is used to check the contents of 
routing packets through the RIS (Routing Information Service) or RIDB (Routing 
Information Database) [50] (e.g., Internet Routing Registries), which include the registered 
routing information of organisations. The RIS project is a service that provides a collection of 
global routing information.  
This model consists of four main components: (1) The RIS Server, where the model collects 
registered routing information from; (2) the Data Collector, which is a PC responsible for 
receiving routing packets from different ASes; (3) the RIS Adapter, which is used to gather 
registered routing information from different sources and then put it in corresponding and 
structured databases; and finally (4) the Detection Server, which is allocated to detect 
anomalies in the BGP based on the seven suggested rules [16]. Figure 2.2 shows the 
architecture of these four main components.  
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Figure 2.2 The architecture of the model [16] 
The model uses six rules to detect different anomalies in the BGP, including IP prefix 
hijacking. These rules are summarised as Prefixes of reserved and unallocated IP blocks, 
MOAS conflicts, private and unallocated ASes in ASPATH, repeated ASes in ASPATH, AS 
loops in ASPATH, ASPATH’s violation against hierarchy, and finally illegal links to foreign 
ASes in ASPATH. The first and third rules were discussed in detail in [4]. From the proposed 
rules, the combination model tries to solve seven issues, along with IP prefix hijacking, 
which face the BGP. It is apparent from Table 2-1 that the rules are taken from two fields, 
ASPATH and IP prefix. The rules are based on ASPATH and are allocated to track data flow 
of invalid ASes (e.g., traffic leaks, unexpected ASes to appear in ASPATH, low efficiency of 
the Internet-looped packets, ASes in lower degree should not forward traffic for more than 
one high-degree ASes and AS links between different countries should not be arbitrary and 
should be authorised) while the one rule related to the IP prefix is specified for detecting 
disruptions in the network. However, this section will only focus on how to use the MOAS 
conflicts rule because it is considered related to IP prefix hijacking. MOAS means that two 
different ASes announce either one super-IP prefix or the sub-IP prefix of the other. This 
operation reflects the signature of IP prefix hijacking. By the end, the combination model will 
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use the MOAS conflicts rule, exploiting the observation of AS prefix relationships to detect 
IP prefix hijacking. The subsections below discuss the use of the detection model in detail. 
NO Rules Data category  
1 Prefix of reserved and unallocated IP blocks PREFIX 
2 MOAS conflicts ASPATH and PREFIX 
3 Private and unallocated AS in ASPATH ASPATH 
4 Repeated ASes in ASPATH ASPATH 
5 AS loop in ASPATH ASPATH 
6 ASPATH’s violation against hierarchy ASPATH 
Table 2-1 Detection rules of the model  
2.4.2.1 Data collection 
The Data Collector is a PC that collects BGP routing information from different ISPs or 
ASes. The Data Collector needs to be connected to BGP routers directly and acts as a speaker 
using routing emulation software such as Zebra [51]. Zebra is installed on the PC and 
establishes a dummy BGP session with real neighbours to collect basic data from them, such 
as AS numbers, prefixes of organisations and allocated and reserved IP blocks, and routing 
control information. The PC has many different data collectors so it can collect a large 
volume of routing information from different ASes.  
The RIS Server is a machine in which registered routing information is stored. The registered 
information is basically stored in a RIDB (Routing Information Database) and is available to 
the public, including network operators, to debug misconfigurations that could happen by 
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mistake; it is also available for community research. However, the model can benefit from 
this information for verifying the proposed anomaly detection rules. Since the routing 
information of the proposed anomaly detection rules are not available in one source, the 
information in the RIDB is taken from different sources. For example, AS information is 
obtained from statistical reports from the CAIDA Corporation. However, prefixes of 
organisations are collected from implemented RIR Whois servers, which only provide 
prefixes in their own region; but with the collaboration of the Completewhois server, prefixes 
can be provided for different regions. Moreover, allocated and reserved IP blocks are taken 
from the IANA and, finally, information about specific ASes is obtained from AS 
administrators. Since RIDB information is taken from different sources, the model has a host, 
called the RIS Adapter, which is linked to the RIS Server to put gathered data in 
corresponding and structured databases. 
2.4.2.2 Detection mechanism  
In order to apply the MOAS conflicts rule, the Detection Server starts by receiving routing 
information, which is collected by Zebra to check update packets through the adapted 
registered routing information. Based on four observed relationships among IP blocks, the 
detection engine (Detection Server) verifies the ownership of ASes to a specific IP prefix. 
These relationships are summarised as any two IP blocks that might be disjointed, 
intersected, coincided, or subsumed within another. The first two relationships are not related 
to IP prefix hijacking, while the last two relationships can disclose IP prefix hijacking. 
Therefore, the detection engine uses coincided relationships to detect super-IP prefix 
hijacking, and one IP prefix is included by another relationship to detect sub-IP prefix 
hijacking. The detection engine checks each update packet collected via the Data Collector, 
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based on the adapted database. For example, if there is a newly announced prefix, the 
detection engine checks its relationship with the IP prefixes of all ASes in the database, 
which are previously prepared and adapted by the RIS Adapter; and if it coincides with or is 
included by other AS prefixes, the detection engine considers the announcement an IP prefix 
hijacking. 
2.4.2.3 Experiment  
The authors in [16] used the 2008 YouTube Pakistan IP prefix hijacking as a case study to 
evaluate the proposed model. A sample of the routing packet from the day (February 24, 
2008) that the IP prefix hijacking occurred was taken, exactly between 13:07 pm and 21:19 
pm UTC [52]. This sample was sent as an input to the Detection Server, which was already 
prepared with the detection rules, including MOAS conflicts, and the structured, adapted 
RIDB. The Detection Server observed that the IP prefix hijacking caused unexpected 
instability of the routers. As a result, many MOAS conflicts, along with four other events, 
were considered anomalies by the model: AS loops, private and unallocated ASes, violations 
of hierarchy and repeated ASes were detected in only five minutes.  
2.4.2.4 Results 
The rule-based and packet-based model proposes seven rules to detect different anomalies in 
the BGP. This section will briefly mention the final results of detecting the anomalies in the 
BGP, including MOAS conflicts, which affect the stability of BGP routers; these results are 
shown in Table 2-2. The majority of anomalies found are related to repeated ASes, while 
reserved and unallocated IPes are the lowest detection because they have 
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Violation of hierarchy and private and unallocated ASes are considered the second highest 
anomalies detected by the model. AS loops are listed as the second-to-last violation among 
the six anomalies that could threaten the stability of the BGP. In terms of the detection of 
MOAS conflicts, the model could detect 4159 cases out of the 520 173 received in five 
minutes.  
No Rules Detected anomalies  
1 Reserved and unallocated IPes  0  
2 AS loop  47 
3 Private and unallocated ASes  203 
4 Violation of hierarchy 817 
5 MOAS conflicts (prefix hijack) 4159 
6 Repeated AS 80 287 
Table 2-2 Results of anomaly detection of the rule- and packet-based models 
2.4.2.5 Benefits and limitations of rule- and packet-based models  
On the one hand, the authors in [16] claim that their model can achieve three main purposes: 
It is based on real data, the results of the model show up every five minutes, and it is effective 
for monitoring large-scale networks because it receives BGP packets from many different 
ASes. Moreover, due to collecting routing information from several ASes, Cao et al. in [16] 
indicate that their model is very accurate. In addition, getting routing information from 
different resources ensures the reliability of the Routing Information Database. Lastly, the 
detection engine, already installed on the RIS Server, can check unseen ASPATHs and their 
prefixes with the adapted database. 
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On the other hand, the combination of the rule-based and packet-based models has four 
serious limitations that have not been taken into account. First, the proposed model might be 
subject to false positives because it is only based on the relationship between IP blocks, yet 
one organisation can announce their super- and sub-prefixes with two different AS numbers. 
In this case, the model would consider the announcement an anomaly or a hijacking. Second, 
since the model (RIS Adapter) gathers information from different sources (RIDBs) and 
adapts them, it would have difficulty following registered routing information updates 
concurrently with the adaptive database. Third, the model needs to check the accuracy of the 
RIDBs with every announcement being checked, but doing so costs a great deal of time, 
which, by the end, can result in a delay of the detection.  
2.4.3 Using monitoring network reachability-based approach   
The iSPY is a system proposed as one of the solutions that can detect IP prefix hijacking in 
the BGP. This system is based on the observation of the reachability among ASes. Thus, the 
iSPY needs to implement a framework to monitor network reachability from transit networks 
to one’s own specific network, which will generate a prefix-owner view. In section 2.4.3.1, 
the iSPY applies active probing to ASes using different IPes collected from different sources. 
Active probing can be performed through different network tools, such as traceroutes and 
TCP pings. Using traceroutes to generate a prefix-owner’s view will help to build vPaths 
(victim paths).  
The vPath represents the paths from the victim to different ASes. These paths need to be 
taken before and after the hijacking. The vPath will also show the size of unreachability to 
ASes, which will guide the iSPY to detect IP prefix hijacking. In section 2.4.3.1, an 
 46 
experiment will be performed [20] involving the injection of IP prefix hijacking into three 
ASes located in different regions: Seattle, London and Japan. The experiment will be 
conducted to evaluate the methodology of using monitoring network-reachability-based 
approach. The last subsection will discuss the efficiency of the iSPY during the detection of 
IP prefix hijacking. 
2.4.3.1 Data collection and detection mechanism 
The iSPY collects potential live IPes from three different sources: Route Views routing 
tables, DNS server logs and web server logs of a university. In the first phase, the iSPY stores 
the IPes in a database (file) for active probing. Afterwards, the iSPY uses the traceroute tool 
to probe ASes on the Internet using their IPes in order to return with the reachability among 
these ASes through the levels of ASPATH. The iSPY also utilises ICMP pings and TCP 
connections at port 80 to check the liveness (reachability) of IPes and filter out their 
unresponsive parts. Each transit AS (can forward traffic) needs to own at least one active IP. 
 In the data analysis phase, the iSPY uses BGP routing tables in Route Views to generate IP-
to-AS mapping to link the IPes to their ASes and put them in a database. While probing ASes 
through IPes in the database, the iSPY lately observes that one IP can have multiple ASes, 
but these cases are ignored because the infrastructure of the system was based only on 
monitoring the consistency of ASes reachability. In addition, the traceroute sometimes 
returns with *, which indicates unreachability to some ASes. Moreover, the traceroute 
occasionally cannot return with the AS number (or organisation name) of specific IPes. In the 
last two critical cases, * and no information corresponding to propping IPes, the iSPY has its 
own special mechanism to deal with them. If * appears between the same two AS numbers 
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(e.g., [1239 * 1239]), the iSPY considers the IP to belong to AS1239 and then collapses them 
into one AS; otherwise, it is just marked unmapped. IPes that do not have corresponding 
information regarding the name of the organisation are also marked unmapped. Berkeley 
University traced its route to the CNN organisation and published the snapshot in [53], which 
can give a picture of the two cases as shown in Table 2-3. More specifically, hop 7, 8 and 11 
are going to be marked as unmapped hosts by the iSPY during the implementation of the AS-
level.  
Hops    IPes                        Organisation  
  
 1         169.229.62.1           inr-daedalus-0.CS.Berkeley.EDU    
 2         169.229.59.225       soda-cr-1-1-soda-br-6-2  
 3         128.32.255.169       vlan242.inr-202-doecev.Berkeley.EDU 
 4         128.32.0.249           gigE6-0-0.inr-666-doecev.Berkeley.EDU 
 5         128.32.0.66             qsv-juniper--ucb-gw.calren2.net 
 6         209.247.159.109     POS1-0.hsipaccess1.SanJose1.Level3.net 
 7         *                              ? 
 8         64.159.1.46             ? 
 9         209.247.9.170         pos8-0.hsa2.Atlanta2.Level3.net 
10        66.185.138.33         pop2-atm-P0-2.atdn.net 
11        *                              ? 
12        66.185.136.17         pop1-atl-P4-0.atdn.net 
13        64.236.16.52           www4.cnn.com 
Table 2-3 Traceroute from Berkeley (169.229.62.1) to www.cnn.com (64.236.16.52) [53] 
To implement the AS-level traceroute path, the iSPY maps different IPes into the same AS, 
as shown in Table 2-4, based on the data available to the Route Views routing tables. This 
process is called resolving AS-level path to IP-level paths. Table 2-4 shows the last format 
that can describe the reachability of Berkeley University to CNN. Based on the cases in 
which the ASes are marked unmapped, hosts in hop 7, 8 and 11 are considered reachable 
because they are located between the same previous and next ASes. However, any cases 
different from the ones shown in hop 7, 8 and 11 are considered unreachable, and based on 
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this reachability percentage, the iSPY decides if the event is a hijacking. The format of the 
vPath is drawn like the one shown in Table 2-5, which shows that there is no hijacking 
between Berkeley University and the CNN organisation. In section 2.4.3.2, three IP prefix 
hijacking will be performed onto three different organisations to evaluate prefix-owner-based 
active probing efficiency.  
Hops    IPes    
 
1          169.229.62.1 
2          169.229.59.225 
3          128.32.255.169 
4          128.32.0.249 
 
5          128.32.0.66 
 
6          209.247.159.109 
7          * 
8          64.159.1.46 
9          209.247.9.170 
 
10        66.185.138.33 
11        *  
12        66.185.136.17 
 
13        64.236.16.52 
ASes 
 
AS25 
AS25 
AS25 
AS25 
 
AS11423 
 
AS3356 
AS3356 
AS3356 
AS3356 
 
AS1668 
AS1668 
AS1668 
 
AS5662 
Organisation  
 
 
Berkeley  
 
 
 
Calren 
 
 
 
Level3 
 
 
 
GNN 
 
 
CNN 
Table 2-4 IP-to-AS mappings [53] 
[25, 11423] 
[25, 11423, 3356] 
[25, 11423, 3356, 1668] 
[25, 11423, 3356, 1668, 5662] 
Table 2-5 vPath of Berkeley University reachability to CNN [53] 
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2.4.3.2 Experiment  
The authors in [20] performed an experiment to evaluate the idea of monitoring reachability 
among ASes to detect IP prefix hijacking. This experiment consisted of three hosts in three 
different locations: Seattle, London and Japan. Each host was connected to three BGP routers 
in order to establish a BGP session with their neighbours and perform hijacking. The host in 
Seattle was connected to Verio (an ISP) through AS2914, while the host in London was 
linked to ClaraNet (an ISP) via AS8426; finally, the host in Japan was linked to JPNIC (an 
ISP) through AS2497. Each of the routers, linked to the hosts, can perform hijacking on other 
routers. This means that routers represent both attackers and victims at the same time.  
Based on the concept of AS-path level analysis, which was generated in section 2.4.3.1 by IP-
to-AS mapping that can observe the reachability to other ASes, iSPYes are installed on the 
three hosts. Afterward, The AS-path levels will construct vPaths like the one presented in 
Table 2-5 but with the path of the victim. The three hosts graph the prefix-owner’s view 
(vPath) of the victim path before and after hijacking so that the iSPY can detect IP prefix 
hijacking. This view has to disclose the difference of unreachability among ASes both when 
and before an IP prefix hijacking occurs. Based on these differences and the size of 
unreachability to ASes, the iSPY will decide whether or not a hijacking has occurred.   
2.4.3.3 iSPY benefits and limitations 
Zhang et al. indicate in [20] that the iSPY has many features summarised in the following 
points: real-time, accurate, lightweight, easily and incrementally deployable, as well as robust 
in terms of victim notification. Moreover, the iSPY is accurate with a false negative ratio 
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below 0.45% and a false positive ratio below 0.17%. The iSPY can also probe a large number 
of ASes and detect hijacking events within a few minutes.  Finally, the authors in [20] claim 
that the iSPY can differentiate between hijacking and link failures based on the size of the 
cuts (unreachability) caused by the two different events.  
The iSPY IP-to-AS mapping approach links IPes to their ASes. However, [54] mentioned 
that accurate IP-to-AS mapping is a challenging problem due to the lack of a uniform way of 
numbering router interfaces. In addition, the iSPY uses a BGP routing table to map ASes to 
their IP prefixes. However, [16] points out many issues involved in getting routing tables 
from companies, which could make the iSPY undeployable because it cannot be applied. The 
iSPY could be subject to false positives because it does not have a mechanism for mapping 
IPes announced by multiple ASes; instead, they will be left unmapped. In addition, iSPY 
needs to build network reachability to all ASes on the Internet but that is potentially not 
possible. Comparing to the third proposed method in chapter 5, false negative ratio below 
45% and a false positive ratio below 17% are too high as the MOAS conflicts have not been 
taken into account. The iSPY also does not have a way to differentiate between IP prefix 
hijackings and link failures. In other words, there is no method to distinguish between 
unreachability signatures of hijacking and link failures. The authors in [55] point out that it is 
very difficult to differentiate hijacking form other events based on monitoring the instability 
of routers. Some middle organisations might prevent access to other ASes by setting up 
access restrictions on individuals or organisations. In this case, the ICMP will return with 
several *, but these unreachability marks do not mean the target has been hijacked.  
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2.4.4 Using origin changes monitoring-based approach 
The PHAS (Prefix Hijack Alert System) is an attack detection system proposed to detect IP 
prefix hijacking in the BGP based on unexpected changes to IP prefix ownership. This 
system collects its data from Route Views and RIPE and monitors the prefixes of owners 
when their origin ASes are changed and reports any potential announcement to victims. The 
PHAS consists of three components: a registration server, origin monitor and local 
notification filter, as shown in Figure 2.3. The first component is responsible for receiving 
registration information (e.g., email addresses and AS numbers, but not prefixes) from users 
who want to be notified when their IP prefixes have been hijacked. The second component is 
in charge of monitoring the origin sets for registered prefixes. Origin sets are a combination 
of ASes that users can use to announce one IP prefix. The monitoring of ownership of an IP 
prefix is presented in a special notification format; this format will be described in section 
2.4.4.2. The notifications are used to send potential hijacking to victims in real time. The 
users utilise the last component for verifying ownership of a particular origin set (ASes). The 
notification filter is named local because the filtration is performed by users. This component 
was added to make the system more user-friendly by observing that not every change in the 
origin set is necessarily a hijacking [39]. The subsection 2.4.4.1 will discuss the connectivity 
of these components and explain their functionality in detail. 
2.4.4.1 Data collection and detection mechanism   
In the first step, users need to register in the PHAS system with unique account. This system 
is already linked to a server provided with a web-based registration service. This server is 
allocated for users to register in the system so they can ensure their ownership of the IP 
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prefixes and be provided with hijacking notifications. Users need to create email addresses 
and open accounts on the server to communicate with the system in real time. Each user has 
to have access to the server and update his or her origin set regularly. In addition, the PHAS 
server supports the PKI service to authenticate and verify users’ identities upon sending 
notifications and checking ownership of an IP prefix. This service is not the core of the 
mechanism and was discussed thoroughly in different solutions in section 2.3; therefore, it 
will not be discussed in this section.  
In the second step, it was already mentioned in section 2.4.4 that the PHAS is composed of 
four main components. However, this section discusses the connectivity and functionality of 
these components as shown in Figure 2.3. First, the origin monitor needs to be connected to 
Route Views and RIPE RIS (Routing Information Service) BGP data sources to receive 
update messages. The origin monitor starts by monitoring changes in the ownership of IP 
prefixes in the BGP updates. The origin monitor uses a time-window-based mechanism to 
reduce the repeated reporting of origin change events. Based on the rule of monitoring the 
changing ownership of a specific IP prefix, the PHAS considers the following conditions 
anomalous: (1) If an IP prefix appears under another origin AS in an update message, and (2) 
if an origin AS announces a more specific sub-prefix of another origin AS [39]. Upon finding 
a potential hijacking, the origin monitor sends, via email, the event in a signed notification 
message to the user in order to use the local notification filter and confirm that all origin sets 
(ASes) claiming ownership of an IP prefix are either correct or incorrect. In a circular motion 
between the PHAS server and the local notification filter, the prefix owner has to ensure 
ownership of a specific IP prefix before the filter makes the final decision to send a malicious 
notification. The purpose of using a local notification filter is to reduce the number of false 
positives sent to the prefix owners because users can have more than one AS but use them to 
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announce one IP prefix [39]. In other words, the local notification filter checks any change in 
origin against a locally configured set of valid origins, and only reports an alarm to the user 
when an unexpected origin change occurs.  
 
Figure 2.3 PHAS Architecture [39] 
2.4.4.2 Experiment 
Prefix 60.253.48.0/24 was chosen as an example to monitor its gained and lost ASes in the 
origin set lists. Parameters ORIGIN-GAINED and ORIGIN-LOST were used to register the 
changes. The monitoring of 60.253.48.0/24 was conducted between December 21, 2004 and 
December 28, 2004 [39]. A sample of the notification format was seen by the origin AS 
monitor as shown in Table 2-6. The origin AS monitor observed three origin ASes, AS31050, 
AS29257, and AS23918, claiming ownership of 60.253.48.0/24. This fluctuation indicates 
the signature of an IP prefix hijacking, which requires the PHAS to send an alarm to the 
owner of the prefix. However, these claims were considered legitimate changes [39].  
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<TYPE=gain, GMT-TIME=20041221 04:44:45, PREFIX=60.253.48.0/24, 
NEW-SET={23918, 31050}, ORIGIN-GAINED=31050> 
<TYPE=gain, GMT-TIME=20041221 12:52:33, PREFIX=60.253.48.0/24, 
NEW-SET={23918, 31050, 29257}, ORIGIN-GAINED=29257>  
<TYPE=loss, GMT-TIME=20041221 13:52:49, PREFIX=60.253.48.0/24, 
NEW-SET={29257, 31050}, ORIGIN-LOST=23918> 
 <TYPE=loss, GMT-TIME=20041221 13:53:56, PREFIX=60.253.48.0/24, 
NEW-SET= {29257}, ORIGIN-LOST=31050> 
Table 2-6 Notifications observed by the origin AS monitor 
Since the prefix owner knew all of these three legitimate origin ASes, the PHAS needed to 
use the local notification filter to reduce the unfriendly alarms and ignore such notifications 
using the simple rules shown in Table 2-7. The prefix owner was responsible for accurate 
filtration so that the PHAS could precisely detect the IP prefix hijacking. 
IF <ORIGIN-GAINED EQ ANY {23918, 31050, 29257} >  
THEN REJECT  
IF <ORIGIN-LOST EQ ANY {23918, 31050, 29257} >  
THEN REJECT 
Table 2-7 Rules of filtering legitimate changes 
After setting up the rules, the prefix owner would only receive an alarm when the origin 
changes passed both rules. At  9:30:29 AM on December 24, 2004, such an alarm happened 
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because the notifications in Table 2-8, were realised by the filter that AS9121 was not in the 
list {23918, 31050, 29257} and suddenly showed up. Another alarm was generated to inform 
the owner that AS9121 stopped announcing the prefix [39]. 
<TYPE=gain, GMT-TIME=20041224 09:30:29, PREFIX=60.253.48.0/24, 
NEW-SET={23918 9121}, ORIGIN-GAINED=9121> 
<TYPE=loss, GMT-TIME=20041224 11:35:02, PREFIX=60.253.48.0/24, 
NEW-SET= {23918}, ORIGIN-LOST=9121>  
Table 2-8 IP prefix notification alarm 
• PHAS benefits and limitations 
On the one hand, the PHAS avoids running complex data processing at BGP data collectors; 
therefore, it can be quickly implemented and run with little overhead at the data collectors. 
By automating the email processing at the user end, the PHAS provides network operators 
with real-time alerts in case of the occurrence of potential prefix hijacking. The PHAS is light 
on the authentication of users because its information is derived from publicly available data; 
it is also light on data filtering because it does not provide notifications of potential IP prefix 
hijacking to users after ensuring their ownership of the suspicious IP prefixes. Due to these 
features, the PHAS is considered very easy to deploy [39].  
On the other hand, verifying the correct contact address for each prefix is a challenging 
problem with no immediately deployable solution [39]. The authors in [39] only mentioned 
using the PKI but did not describe how it can be linked to the PHAS. As a result, the PHAS 
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can be considered not to have a mechanism to prevent users from claiming ownership of 
ASes. In other words, a hijacker can register in the PHAS server and claim that he or she 
owns a specific origin set. Second, the authors in [38] pointed out that the PHAS does a fine 
job detecting two different AS numbers claiming one IP. However, it fails to filter out many 
valid reasons why a network would be a MOAS. Third, a limitation of the PHAS is that it 
needs to be connected to all BGP data sources on the Internet to protect the IP prefixes of 
random applicants (users). However, this costs the PHAS server a high computation and a 
need of infrastructure modification because it does not have a way to predict where the 
applicants can get the AS number and IP prefix from. Fourth, it is considered centralised 
detection-based but that will lead to having a difficulty for tracking the changes of IP prefix 
ownership, in the update messages, in all BGP data sources. Finally, using email to 
communicate with users in case there is a hijacking is not feasible because the hijacking can 
happen while the user is away from the Internet or email to confirm the ownership of an 
origin set. Any detection solution intended to detect IP prefix hijacking has to be 
decentralised and automated in accordance with the nature of the routers’ work.  
2.4.5 Using historical-based approach  
The PGBGP (Pretty Good BGP) is a developed protocol of the classic BGP proposed to 
detect IP prefix hijacking in the BGP based on a window of historical routing data. The 
PGBGP uses two types of information, BGP update messages and the RIB (Routing 
Information Base), to create the historical window. Routing information from both resources 
are collected from a developed BGP simulator called the BSIM. The implementation of the 
PGBGP has two main tasks: first, to construct a set of recently seen data (prefix, origin AS, 
time) in the historical window; second, to imitate the configuration of BGP operations and 
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apply a modified decision process of the PGBGP for selecting the best route for each 
destination prefix [40]. These two tasks will be used to detect prefix and sub-prefix hijacking 
as described in section 2.4.5.2. Finally, the evaluation of the PGBGP will be discussed in the 
last section (2.4.5.3). 
2.4.5.1 Detection mechanism   
The PGBGP uses two sources to detect IP prefix hijacking: BGP update messages and 
routing tables, which both exist in the RIB and can be generated by the BSIM simulator 
mentioned in the main section (section 2.4.5). The RIB contains a collection of the best 
selected routes that can be used by routers to deliver BGP packets to neighbours [22], while 
BGP update messages contain three important types of information the PGBGP can be based 
on: the origin AS, which is taken from the last location of the ASPATH attribute; the prefix 
associated with each update message; and the time each update is received. These two 
sources are used to constitute a historical window that can show the ownership of every IP 
prefix. The PGBGP considers the first data received in the window from the two sources as 
normal. The length of the historical period of the window is represented in days (e.g., 3 days). 
The historical period should not be very short because that would make many valid origin 
ASes look suspicious (false positive), or very long because that would allow a repeated prefix 
hijacking attack to become trusted [40]. The historical window is considered a verification 
source that can be used in order to check new BGP updates that are announced among 
neighbours. The historical window is periodically updated with new BGP updates that can 
pass the check. Any suspicious update message trying to change the state of normal 
behaviour of the historical window will be quarantined and only accepted after a specific 
period of time (suspicious period: 1 day) if it is still in the RIB; otherwise, it will be ignored.  
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If an origin AS and its IP prefix no longer show up in the RIB, they have to be removed from 
the historical window as well.  
New incoming BGP updates are compared to the historical data; if an update message does 
not pass the examination, it will be considered a hijacking. More specifically, if a new IP 
prefix in the update message does not have an origin AS existing in the historical window, it 
will be reported as a hijacked prefix. For detecting sub-prefix hijacking, the PGBGP 
compares any new prefix in the update message to the recently seen prefixes already saved in 
the window [40]. 
2.4.5.2 Experiment  
A BGP simulator was developed in [40] to imitate the real functionality of the BGP; this 
simulator is called the BSIM. The simulator represents the AS topology, route selection and 
propagation.  The PGBGP needs to be integrated with the simulator, which will have 62 core 
nodes to simulate the action of prefix and sub-prefix hijacking in order to evaluate the 
accuracy of the detection.  The simulator needs to configure five parameters: historical period 
equal to 3 days, suspicious period equal to 1 day, either a random or core + random 
deployment type, an attack type which can be a prefix or sub-prefix hijacking, and finally, the 
number of running the simulation is given 500 times. The first and second parameters are 
allocated to determine the historical period of collecting data in the historical window, which 
is explained in section 2.4.5.2, while the third parameter determines the period at which a 
route is considered suspicious before adding it to the historical window or excluding it. 
Random deployment is used to enable the PGBGP to work on a random set of nodes, whilst 
core + random is utilised to enable the PGBGP to function on 62 main nodes plus randomly 
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chosen nodes. In terms of simulating prefix hijacking, an AS is randomly chosen to originate 
a prefix and, at the same time, another AS is randomly picked to originate the same prefix. 
With regard to simulating sub-prefix hijacking, the same scenario for simulating prefix 
hijacking will be taken, except that the attacking AS will announce a sub-prefix of a victim 
instead of announcing a super-prefix. Finally, the simulator runs with every simulated attack 
instance and registers the efficiency of the PGBGP for detecting that attack. With respect to 
the results, the PGBGP can detect most prefix hijacking attacks but requires large-scale 
deployment to detect sub-prefix hijacking [40]. 
2.4.5.3 PGBGP benefits and limitations 
The PGBGP is incrementally deployable because it is compatible with the current BGP 
protocol, requiring changes only to a router’s decision rules. Individual ASes have an 
incentive to adopt the PGBGP, as it provides immediate benefits even when other ASes have 
not deployed it [40].  
In terms of drawbacks, Sriram et al. in [44] claimed that the PGBGP still has some 
deficiencies because it considers any two different ASes announcing the same IP prefix as 
malicious; however, this is not true as some organisations have more than one AS. Due to this 
condition, the number of false positives will be increased in this protocol. In rare 
circumstances, if an ISP transfers a block of its old provider’s address space to a new 
provider, the PGBGP will treat the routes as suspicious. Determining the AS-level topology 
of the Internet is a difficult problem [40]. In addition, the PGBGP considers the first collected 
data in the window as normal in the simulation, but that cannot be applied in reality because 
it is difficult to predict data that does not include IP prefix hijacking. Using simulati
 60 
software (BSIM) instead of the main protocol (BGP) is also not a good choice to detect IP 
prefix hijacking in the BGP because simulations cannot cover or imitate all routing policy 
conditions and business relationships, like the ones which exist in real BGP update messages 
among routers. 
2.4.6 Using multiple events monitoring-based  
Authors in [38] proposed a system based upon monitoring some factors that could affect the 
routing of the BGP; based on their effectiveness, the system will try to detect IP prefix 
hijacking. These factors are summed up as follows: In suspicious MOAS, spam that is sent to 
attack a specific IP and announcement authorisation. The system chooses a known IP prefix 
hijacking or used to spam a network and then begins monitoring the change of routing (AS 
paths). All observations of routing changing that are affected by the factors are correlated to 
determine if a hijacking is benign or malicious. This section also discusses an experiment 
applied based on the mechanism; the details of the mechanism will be explained in section 
2.4.6.1 and the experiment. The system also bases the detection on different data sources 
collected by different tools such as traceroute and netflow [56]. Finally, this section ends with 
displaying the benefits and limitations of the system. 
2.4.6.1 Detection mechanism  
By looking at the traffic generated by the hijacked prefixes in different sources and using 
different analytical tools, the authors in [38] expect that their system can detect IP prefix 
hijacking precisely. The proposed system collects its information from four sources as 
depicted in Figure 2.4. Based on the changes of network information that spams, suspicious 
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MOAS, suspicious spamming networks, malicious activities and announcement authorisation 
make it, the authors in [38] expect that there will be changes in routing (AS paths). First, the 
system performs monitoring of AS paths (within BGP updates) during an IP prefix hijacking 
and filters the suspicious MOAS into benign and malicious MOAS output. Similarly, the 
system receives live spams from spam traps and monitors the changes in routing of the BGP 
before and after spam that uses a specific hijacked IP prefix. In other words, from the 
reachability to a particular hijacked and spammed destination, the system monitors the 
changes of BGP routing using traceroute. The system also uses netflow, which can give a 
wide array of information about malicious activities that could affect routing, such as large-
scale spam campaigns and other scam activities. The authors claim that they expect to 
observe at least some portions of spam originating from hijacked networks [38]. Finally, the 
system utilises RIR to notice the announcement authorisations of legitimate ASes that can 
announce specific IP prefixes. Any one of the five factors can help to detect and distinguish 
benign from malicious hijacking, but the aim of the system is to correlate all five 
observations to increase the accuracy of the detection. It is likely that more than one factor 
can also detect the hijacking of a specific prefix.  
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Figure 2.4 System architecture 
2.4.6.2 Experiment  
The experiment will use the control plane (e.g., in the routing tables and BGP updates) and 
the data plane to collect desirable data. The control plane provides BGP AS paths, while the 
data plane can give end-to-end probing information, such as traceroute paths [57]. Routing 
tables and BGP updates will be collected from a RIPE RIS collector in Amsterdam [58], 
while traceroute paths will be collected by traceroute. The experiment takes into accounts two 
factors before detecting real hijacking: normal situations for which multiple ASes can 
announce the same IP prefix and the analysis time of the traceroute. In other words, before 
trying to detect a malicious MOAS, the experiment needs to investigate any benign MOAS 
that can act similarly to a malicious MOAS. Afterwards, the experiment will use active 
traceroute measurements and start with monitoring BGP AS-level links among ASes in order 
 63 
to detect real IP prefix hijacking. All normal situations that indicate multiple ASes 
announcing the same IP prefix need to be removed so they do not turn out to be false 
positives.  Namely, all benign MOAS occurrences need to be removed completely from the 
monitoring data before using the data to detect a malicious MOAS.  
Based on the shared patterns of malicious AS paths, which can be found in BGP updates and 
in active probing paths (e.g., traceroute paths), the experiment detects real IP prefix hijacking. 
This method is used especially to reduce the number of false positives that many solutions 
suffer from during their detection of IP prefix hijacking. With respect to the results, it was 
observed that about 75% of MOAS events were due to BGP peering relationships, which 
mean benign MOAS events. The authors in [38] claim that multiple origins of a prefix is not 
necessarily a sign of a malicious hijacking as they can share a direct AS-level link. The 
experiment also found that benign MOAS events compared to malicious MOAS events are 
considered long-lived events. According to what was described in [40], if the threshold of a 
suspicious MOAS is large enough, the owner of a prefix has enough time to notice the 
hijacking and take appropriate actions against fake announcements. Instead of using one day 
for suspicious MOAS events, the authors in [38] used two days as a threshold in order not to 
limit the time of active probing during the monitoring of suspicious networks. It was also 
noticed that 14% of non-peering MOAS events lasted more than two days, indicating a 
malicious MOAS. The authors in [38] argued that it was very difficult to assess the other 
MOAS conflicts (11%) from the BGP data, which means their nature was unclear. 
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2.4.6.3 System benefits and limitations 
On the one hand, the proposed system can use different sources and data collection 
techniques and differentiates between suspicious MOAS events. It is also able to observe that 
75% of benign MOAS occur among peers and 14% of malicious MOAS appear among non-
peers. On the other hand, for 11% of MOAS events, the system can categorise them neither 
as benign nor malicious. In addition, the authors in [38] indicated that systems based on 
correlating abnormal BPG events with malicious network traffic are insufficient for 
conclusively identifying malicious BGP hijacking. They also pointed out that the previously 
detected cases should again be put to the test, and concluded that state-of-the-art detection 
systems still have a great chance for improvement in the study of malicious BGP hijacks.  
2.5 Comparison between prevention and detection solutions  
Regarding advantages, prevention-based solutions, which were discussed in section 2.3, are 
considered very secure because they require to have pre-knowledge about routing 
information (e.g. routers and real owners of AS numbers and IP prefixes) are involved in the 
Internet, while some detection-based solutions do not have that prior knowledge but trace the 
impersonation of IP prefixes and monitor the behaviour of routers. Both prevention-based 
solutions can be employed to check the real identities of IP prefix owners and change 
identification certificates continuously. For example, the soBGP uses a decentralised 
technique to authenticate AS numbers among routers without the need to trust authorities. 
Similarly, detection-based solutions have different tools for monitoring sudden, high routing 
changes among routers using historical windows and predictive statistical methods that can 
be customised to check the origination of IP prefixes periodically.  
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With respect to disadvantages, both prevention-based and detection-based solutions have 
significant limitations. Due to the large-scale exchange of BGP update messages, prevention-
based solutions cannot authenticate thousands of messages dynamically and in a short period 
of time. Because of this limitation, prevention solutions are still considered theoretical 
proposals and are as such not yet deployable. However, previous detection-based solutions 
are often based on single or dual combined techniques such as rule-based [16], which 
requires prior knowledge of network conditions [59] and enormous processing power [47]. 
Moreover, classification-based, which was discussed in [46], [60], [61], is categorised as a 
detection-based solution; but in this approach, the accuracy measure of the results is often 
approximated. In other words, classification-based solutions cannot guarantee whether they 
cover all possible factors related to a specific issue. Furthermore, a statistical-based approach 
was also used in [9], [35], [36] which is only suitable for data that are fixed and scaled in 
time and frequency [47], but these specifications are not applied to BGP data.  Finally, 
detection-based solutions, in most cases, cannot identify the main reason behind the 
instability of routers because of IP prefix hijacking or other network events such as worms 
and blackouts [62]. 
Based on the advantages and disadvantages of prevention-based and detection-based 
solutions, a dynamic detection method is considered more feasible than a prevention method 
because it does not require any changes or modifications to the infrastructure of the BGP. As 
a result, the detection approach will be used in this thesis to detect IP prefix hijacking, as 
presented in Chapter Chapter : 3, Chapter : 4, Chapter : 5 and Chapter : 6. 
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2.6 Summary  
First, this chapter discussed the security, architecture and communication of the BGP and 
then discussed the weaknesses that encounter the protocol to give an overview about the 
BGP. It was found that the BGP has many different categorised vulnerabilities, including 
being subject to IP prefix hijacking. This event is considered a very serious issue because it 
enables other ASes to originate the IP prefixes of their neighbours and manipulate the 
stability of routers, blocking access to services or forcing end users to be redirected to a 
specific malicious interceptive machine. This chapter also illustrated the IP prefix hijacking 
scenario, demonstrated the extent of its danger, and discussed its ability to spread widely. 
Unfortunately, IP prefix hijacking has not yet been solved, as researchers have recently 
pointed out [63], [64], [65], [4], [38].      
In the last two decades, two main security approaches have been proposed to secure the BGP: 
providing like authentication and verification between peers, and monitoring routing changes 
that could affect the stability of BGP routers during worm attacks, spamming, and IP prefix 
hijacking. These two approaches can be crystallised in attack prevention and anomaly 
detection. On the one hand, previous prevention solutions have had the same objective but 
have used different mechanisms to achieve trust between routers. For example, the sBGP, 
soBGP and psBGP authenticate AS numbers and BGP speakers using different types of 
signing, like centralised or decentralised, and different numbers of certificates, such as one 
certificate per one AS or one certificate per one BGP speaker. With regard to origin and 
ASPATH verification, the sBGP and soBGP use multiple centralised levels of signing, while 
the psBGP does not support trust transitivity. Prevention solutions are also based on trust 
among ASes or third party organisations, but there is no guarantee that a trustworthy entity 
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would not manipulate at any time. Furthermore, the nature of the routers’ dynamic function 
and the exchanging of huge numbers of BGP update messages are not compatible with this 
type of secure BGP. 
On the other hand, detection solutions using a rule-based technique to check registered 
routing information such as unallocated exploited ASNs and IP prefixes for detecting prefix 
hijacking. This technique can detect hijacking but with many false positives because it does 
not have a mechanism to differentiate between super- and sub-prefixes of IP addresses within 
ASes. In addition, monitoring changes in the origination of a specific prefix using different 
techniques such as historical-based, which was proposed as a detection method but could not 
detect IP prefix hijacking because it did not take into account that some organisations can 
have more than one AS number and the first collected historical BGP update messages, that 
are used to create the historical window, could have prefix hijacking. Moreover, detection 
solutions observe changes in the stability of routers by monitoring the reachability of specific 
networks during IP prefix hijacking, but unreachability can occur via different events such as 
link failures and power outage; therefore, this technique also fails to detect IP prefix 
hijacking. Finally, detection solutions also monitor the stability of networks during the 
occurrence of different events, such as spamming, but the authors in [38] state that it is very 
difficult to detect IP prefix hijacking as correlating abnormal BPG events with malicious 
network traffic is insufficient to conclusively identify malicious BGP hijacking.  
Although statistical-based methods and intelligent research tools such as machine learning 
and neural network are important, no solution used them to detect IP prefix in particular. For 
example, the HMM (Hidden Markov Model) is a statistical-based method used in [8] to 
detect Internet anomalies from BGP data, but does not include IP prefix hijacking. In 
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addition, Naïve Bayes and SVMs (Support Vector Machines) are machine learning classifiers 
discussed in [46], [7], [59] to detect worms, but not IP prefix hijacking specifically. Since 
these tools have not been used, this thesis will build the methodologies for detecting IP prefix 
hijacking based on them, starting with statistical-based techniques and finishing with the use 
of machine learning. 
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Chapter	  :	  3 IP	  prefix	  hijacking	  detection	  based	  on	  statistical	  analysis	  	  
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the first proposed method, which is based on the statistical analysis of 
variance to detect IP prefix hijacking in the BGP. Determining the resources where update 
messages can be collected is one of the most important tasks needed to be performed before 
detecting IP prefix hijacking because some of the resources do not show the content of the 
BGP packet, like in routing tables, or the route for delivering a specific IP prefix, like in 
Regional Internet Registries (e.g., the RIPE database). However, update messages can contain 
both features. Given they contain the values of BGP attributes and policy among routers, they 
will be used as the resource for raw data. The second task that needs to be explained in this 
chapter is the study of the data types and the availability of BGP update fields in the BGP 
packet announcements, as illustrated in section 3.2.2. Update messages have mandatory and 
optional fields, which might not be sent in some BGP update packets. As a result, each field 
needs to be investigated in terms of its availability in the packets, the format of its values, and 
whether the field takes one value or a list of values (different size arrays) in order to find 
important data involving or which could help detect IP prefix hijacking. The next important 
task discussed in this chapter is preparing data in an easy analytical format so that different 
analyses can be applied easily, such as descriptive analyses, machine learning and data 
mining. This chapter investigates the contents of BGP update messages. The chapter also 
investigates the relevance of data that could help to detect IP prefix hijacks.  
The 2008 YouTube Pakistan IP prefix incident [66], along with other incidents occurring on 
the same date, will be used as a case study in this chapter. The YouTube incident is 
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investigated in section 3.2.3 to give an overview of IP prefix hijacking behaviour. The section 
shows the data state when IP prefix hijacking starts and ends and analyses the hijacking 
process. 
The investigation of BGP update messages, as well as research studies related to the security 
and vulnerabilities of the BGP, highlight a number of preliminary features to be used for 
detecting IP prefix hijacking in the BGP. Such features will be based on two main fields, 
ASPATH and ANNOUNCE, both having a direct relation to the issue of IP prefix hijacking 
because hijackers manipulate AS origins which exist in the ASPATH field, while the 
impersonated IP prefixes are available in ANNOUNCE field. Similarly, the number of 
announcements and withdrawals, which can be extracted from the ANNOUNCE field in BGP 
updates, can also be used as features to investigate the occurrence of IP prefix hijacking at a 
specific period of time. Each feature will be tested separately; if there is an indication of IP 
prefix hijacking, the feature will be considered; otherwise, a new feature will be tried. 
In the beginning, it is assumed that IP prefix hijacking can happen in one second but not 
necessarily spread out fast because BGP routers need time to decide the best path and 
announce routers to their neighbours; a 15-minute time slot is considered suitable for 
gathering BGP updates and processing them; more than that would make the processing very 
difficult, requiring more time because of the size of the BGP update announcements. In 
addition, less than that is not required because the spreading of fake routes would not be very 
wide, as will be explained in section 3.2.6. Based on these reasons, 15-minute will be 
appropriate as a compromise for the size of the sampling data.  
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There are a number of factors that could affect the stability of edge routers and increase the 
number of exchanging routing information (BGP update messages) among them. This makes 
it challenging to distinguish between the stability of routers that could occur due to legitimate 
events such as blackouts, disconnected big edge routers on the Internet, and any normal 
configuration operation that could take place by a network operator or malicious events like 
IP prefix hijacking. However, it is assumed that the behaviour of routers in case of legitimate 
operations would be different from the behaviour of routers during IP prefix hijacking. Given 
the limitations of existing methods in identifying an IP prefix hijacking event, this thesis 
proposes a novel method of detection that is based on observing the behaviour of legitimate 
BGP updates and updates that could have happened during IP prefix hijacking. Based on the 
choice of data collection resources and investigations of update messages, a detection method 
process for extracting relevant features and detecting the IP prefix hijacking issue will be 
created. Each feature will be independently tested to determine its impact and correlation 
with IP prefix hijacking. If there is an indication of IP prefix hijacking, the feature will be 
considered; otherwise, a new feature will be tried. The detection method analyses data and 
compares the behaviour of routers during incident days and normal days (case study). The 
results of the analytical process will be discussed in detail in section 3.2.7. The detection 
method did not work effectively because the assumed benign days of update messages had IP 
prefix hijacking incidents. In other words, there was no clear scale to know days that were 
affected with hijacking (abnormal days) from unaffected days (normal days). As a result, the 
detection method failed to find any indication of IP prefix hijacking. In other words, 
approximately all days of BGP updates have IP prefix hijacking; therefore, the detection 
method had difficulty studying the behaviour of routers based on the dates on which IP prefix 
hijacking occurred.  
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This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents the detection method contents 
starting from data collection and ending with the implementation of a process for finding an 
indication of data hijacking to detect IP prefix hijacking. Section 3.3 evaluates the detection 
method and proposed engine, which is created in section 3.2. The last section summarises the 
findings of the chapter. 
3.2 Detection method  
This section discusses a proposed detection method and shows how BGP updates are going to 
be investigated to detect IP prefix hijacking. The detection method is represented in three 
main processing components, as shown below in Figure 3.1 BGPdump can read MRT format 
updates and convert them to ASCII. In other words, BGP updates are stored in binary format 
and a specific organisation; therefore, BGPdump [67] converts the binary format into ASCII. 
This open source tool is customised to organise all possible data and put them in consistent 
columns and a unified data-type format (numeric). The second component is called Features 
Extractors, which extracts useful features from update fields, such as the number of 
announcements and withdrawals, origin ASes and propagators. The last component is 
Analytical Processing, which uses descriptive analyses such as calculating mean to put data 
of normal days against the incident day in a corresponding and consistent way. Analytical 
Processing also uses standard deviation to work out the deviation between normal and 
abnormal behaviour of routers. Standard deviation is calculated based on the corresponding 
routers of the two behaviours on normal days and the incident day. If the deviation is small, 
this means the similarity is very high between the behaviour of routers on normal days and 
the incident day; otherwise, it will give a good indication of IP prefix hijacking. The 
architecture of the detection method is shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Detection method  
3.2.1 Data collection  
In 1997, Oregon University in the US built a Route Views Archive Project to collect BGP 
updates intermittently generated by a pool of roughly 50 routers [21]. These updates are 
stored in MRT format, sorted by dates and UTC times, and listed on the www.Route 
Views.org website. The updates are downloaded and saved in three separate folders because 
each day has about 96 BGP update files.  The size of update files is not fixed because some 
routers are added and some of are removed from the Internet. These data are organised to be 
read automatically by BGPdump and then used later in data analysis. 
The reason for selecting the Route Views Archive Project as a data source is that it collects 
BGP updates in real time and from different locations. These updates are provided for the 
research community. This source not only registers the routing information of each router 
separately but also stores BGP attributes and the exchanging routes among routers. BGP 
MRT BGP 
update 
BGPdump Update Fields Features Extractor 
Analytical 
Processing 
IP prefix hijacking 
Indication 
Feature values 
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attributes represent the policy of the BGP for choosing the best path to access a particular 
network; their values are stored in special fields in the updates. The Route Views Archive 
Project stores data as MRT (Multi-threaded Routing Toolkit) [67] to reduce the size of the 
update message files. The size of the outputs during the reading of MRT files is reasonable 
and does not need additional work to split the outputs (ASCII) into smaller files.  
BGP updates of an incident (February 24, 2008) one day before (February 23, 2008) and one 
day after (February 25, 2008) are collected to be used as a case study for detecting IP prefix 
hijacking in the BGP. This incident is called the 2008 YouTube Pakistan blocking incident, 
and the two days, one before the incident and one after, are considered the normal days that 
should not have any IP prefix hijacking incidents. Since the incident lasted only about two 
hours and no reports talked about any hijacking on February 23, 2008 and February 25, 2008, 
the two days are assumed hijacking-free. Figure 3.2 represents a small snapshot of the format 
and possible data the case study could have. In other words, this figure shows the format of 
raw data fields and their data types and structures (e.g. variable or array) of the BGP updates 
that are going to be used in this thesis.  
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Figure 3.2 A snapshot of a raw BGP update message 
3.2.2 Data study  
BGP updates are either announcement packets or withdrawal packets. Table 3-1 shows all 
possible data that can appear in different updates. Data from DATE to DESTINATION_AS 
represent fixed shared fields, which means these fields appear in all announcement and 
withdrawal packets as exchanging among routers, but they are not BGP attributes. Data from 
ORIGIN to NEXT_HOP represent mandatory BGP attributes that could show up in every 
announcement BGP packet. Finally, fields from MULTI_EXIT_DISC to COMMUNITY 
could show up or be hidden in some BGP update packets when they are announced by edge 
routers, which makes tracing their values in all packets very difficult. As a result, these fields 
are not important and ignored because their values are not available in all announcement 
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update packets. In addition, these mandatory and discretionary attributes do not appear in 
withdrawal packets; therefore, this type of packet is not considered. The highlighted fields in 
Table 3-1 are considered the two most important fields relevant to the IP prefix hijacking 
issue because they include origin ASes and IP prefixes, where the hijacking takes place. 
Based on these two BGP attributes, features have to be extracted and analysed. Other data 
can be used as supportive information but are not directly related to the main issue (IP prefix 
hijacking) such as TIME and DATE to know the exact time and date the IP prefix hijacking 
occurred, and FROM to know the identity of the hijacker and the propagators to find the 
affected routers that spread fake routes.  
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 77 
Table 3-1 Announcements in BGP update messages 
Based on the data analysis and observations of BGP updates, it is noticeable that some fields 
need to be processed and put into an organised table.  
3.2.3 Data preparation  
As it was mentioned in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 that the most important data to the IP prefix 
hijacking issue are data related to the two fields, AS_PATH and ANNOUNCE, the research 
focuses on these two fields, but all possible data in the BGP updates are processed to make 
them ready upon request. Both data types, mandatory and discretionary in the announcement 
packets, will be taken, and any attribute that does not have a value will be given zero to keep 
the consistency of the data among received packets. All non-numeric attributes will be 
changed to numeric values, and any inconsistent attributes having more than one value will 
be altered to be consistent, such as ASPATH and ANNOUNCE values. The process of 
converting non-numeric data to numeric and inconsistent data to consistent is summarised in 
Table 3-2. For example, the four-dotted decimal notation of IP addresses is converted to 
integers using a built-in function in C++ called addr2int to avoid dots in the IP addresses and 
deal with only numeric data. All these data represented in Table 3-2 will comprise a large 
table, as a bank of BGP update data, so the detection method can extract relevant features 
from it. 
NO Data Numeric and Consistent values 
1 TIME Delete : character to give a numeric value (e.g., 234500) 
2 DATE Delete / character to give a numeric value (e.g., 081913) 
3 FROM Source Router ID is converted to a numeric by removing dots 
and using addr2int function in C++. 
AS is removed from source AS to give a numeric value (e.g., 
AS 6762 = 6762) 
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4 TO Destination Router ID = converted to a numeric after taking 
absolute value 
Destination AS = 6447 not appear in the ASPATH, 7029 
before the last 
5 ORIGIN 0 if message type is withdraw 
IGP=1 
EGP=2 
Incomplete=3 
6 ASPATH First AS = origin ASes = 6762 
ASPATH length = 3 
Middles ASes = the number of ASes in between = 1 (in this 
case) 
Last AS = last hop/the last AS before the destination (7029) 
7 NEXT_HOP Converted to a numeric after taking absolute value 
8 MULTI_EXIT_DISC Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
9 LOCAL_PREF Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
10 AGGREGATOR_AS Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
11 AGGREGATOR_ADDR Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
12 ORIGINATOR_ID Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
13 CLUSTER_LIST Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
14 UNKNOWN_ATTR Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
15 MP_REACH_NLRI Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
16 MP_UNREACH_NLRI Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
17 COMMUNITY Either its original value or zero if it is not sent 
Community length = 1 
18 ANNOUNCE Prefixes = 162.39.27.0 
Lengths = 24s 
Packet type = 1 (2 if withdrawn) 
Table 3-2 Raw data preparation 
3.2.4 2008 YouTube Pakistan incident (case study) analysis  
Based on a programme created by the researcher to return with the first packet of an 
impersonated IP prefix by the hijacker and announced by the owner, and to return with the 
last packet when the hijacker withdraws the prefix from the Internet, Table 3-3 was generated. 
This table contains the time of the hijacking, the ASPATH attribute values, and the IP prefix 
that was hijacked. By tracing where the IP prefix impersonated by the hijacker and 
announced by the owner over 15-minute time slots, the general behaviour of the IP prefix 
hijacking can be disclosed. The ASPATH list in Table 3-3 represents one of the BGP 
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attributes, which contains the ASNs of announcers and propagators to access the destination. 
Data in the table represent snapshots taken between 12:07:00 UTC and 12:13:07 UTC on 
February 24–26, 2008, when Pakistan Telecom erroneously announced one of the YouTube 
IP prefixes. The programme divides the BGP updates into quarters and receives 15-minute 
time slots per processing. The first 15-minute time slot of the update packet shows the 
occurrence of the hijack when an edge router belonging to AS17557 announced the 
208.65.153.0/24 IP prefix, which was actually owned by AS36561. Since AS36561 could 
have announced 208.65.153.0/24 at any time, whether before or after the hijacking, it would 
be helpful to detect whether there are two different routers with different ASNs that 
announced the same IP prefix, which is an illegitimate action, in the same 15-minute time slot 
of data. Third, partial data of the update packet in Table 3-3 shows the last period of 
hijacking activity when the fake route was withdrawn by AS17787.  
TIME Router ASPATH LIST ANNOUNCE WITHDRAW 
02/24/08 18:47:57 Hijacker 1280,6461,3491,17557 208.65.153.0/24 – 
02/24/08 20:51:31 Owner  2497 3549 36561 208.65.153.0/24 – 
02/24/08 21:01:21 Hijacker 13237 702 17557 17787 – 208.65.153.0/24 
Table 3-3 Tracking occurrence of YouTube Pakistan hijacking incident 
Another shell-scripting programme was written to search for fake routes in all divided update 
messages (15-minute time slots) on the day of the event, February 24, 2008. The programme 
already knew the ASNs of YouTube, Pakistan Telecom, and the hijacked IP prefix. The 
programme divided the BGP updates into quarters and received one 15-minute time slot per 
processing as in the previous programme, which only looked for starting and ending 
hijacking. However, this programme tracked all possible hijacking to the YouTube IP prefix. 
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The programme found that the hijacked IP prefix showed up in five quarters: the 74th, 79th, 
81th, 82th and 83th as it is going to be presented and discussed in section 4.2.3.1. The 
impersonator (AS17557) started by announcing 208.65.153.0/24 (in the 74th quarter) before 
the legitimate owner. The legitimate AS (36561) began to announce the same IP prefix in the 
79th and 81st quarters, but in the absence of the hijacker. The impersonated IP prefix again 
started to appear in the 82nd and 83rd quarters, but under two different origin ASes, the owner 
and the impersonator. The hijacked IP prefix was withdrawn by AS17787, which had a direct 
link to the impersonator. The case study of the YouTube Pakistan Telecom incident is used 
here to investigate the BGP messaging footprint of an IP prefix hijacking in order to build a 
reliable, generic IP prefix hijacking detection method. This event will be used as a case study 
for studying the IP prefix hijacking in this thesis. 
3.2.5 Features extraction  
Table 3-4 presents a list of features already used in [7], [62], [68], [46], [59] as well as 
suggested features in this thesis that try to detect IP prefix hijacking in a different way. 
Preliminary and statistically, some of these features will be used with the detection method to 
test their indication strength for the IP prefix hijacks. Section 3.2.5 explains how the 
detection method uses these features while searching for IP prefix hijack indications. 
NO Fields Features 
1 Time Inter Arrival Time [46] 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insertion ASes 
3 Deletion ASes 
4 Substitution ASes 
  
5 Announcement to Longer Path (max) [7] 
6 Announcement to Shorter Path (min) [7] 
7 ASPATH_LENGTH per Prefix 
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Table 3-4 Suggested and previous solutions’ features 
According to the conclusion of section 3.2.2, features related to origin, time and withdrawals 
will not be considered in the thesis. The remaining features will be tested individually, and 
any one that gives a clear indication between routers’ behaviour on normal days and the 
8  
 
 
 
 
ASPATH 
Average Announcement per Prefix [7] 
9 Average AS_PATH Unique Length [46] 
10 Average Edit Distance [46] 
11 Average of ASPATH_LENGTH per Prefix  
12 Average of Number of FIRST_AS per Prefix 
14 Average AS_PATH Length [46] 
  
15 Concentration Ratio [7] 
16 First Order Concentration Ratio [7] 
17 Second Order Concentration Ratio [7] 
18 Third Order Concentration Ratio [7] 
  
19 Maximum AS_PATH Length [46] 
20 Maximum Edit Distance [46] 
  
21 Number of Repeated ASes 
22 Length of Repeated ASes  
23  
Origin 
Number of EGPs [46] 
24 Number of IGPs [46] 
25 Number of Incompletes [46] 
27  Number of Neighbours 
28  Number of Specific Routers  
30  Number of Updates [7] 
31  Summation of AS_SENDER Over Summation of First AS_PATH 
32  Summation of NEXT_HOP Over Summation of its Prefix 
33  
 
Announcements 
Number of Routers Recently Announced [62] 
34 Maximum Announcement per Prefix [7] 
35 Number of Duplicate Announcements [46] 
36 Number of NLRI Prefix Announcements [46] 
37 Number of Reachable Prefixes 
38 Number of Unreachable Prefixes  
39  
 
Withdrawals 
Number of Duplicates Withdrawn [46] 
40 Number of Implicits Withdrawn [46] 
41 Number of Routers Recently Withdrawn [62] 
42 Number of NLRI Prefixes Withdrawn [46] 
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incident day will be used in the detection method. For example, insertion ASes measure the 
number of ASes that have been entered into ASPATH lists in the announcements of hijackers 
and impersonators. Similarly, depletion and substitution ASes compute the number of ASes 
that have been deleted or substituted along with announcing routes by a hijacker and victim 
and returns with their ASNs. 
3.2.6 Determining data analysis sampling period  
According to the calculation time of spreading fake routes among edge routers, few ASes 
could be affected within 15 minutes. Any proposed detection method that uses 15-minute as a 
time slot to search for IP prefix hijacking in the BGP updates would have enough time to 
notify routers of the hijacking before it spread widely. In fact, the 15-minute processing time 
can also be a variable to add more flexibility to any IP prefix hijacking detection system. For 
instance, the time slot can be adjusted to be more or less than 5 minutes. In Table 3-5, second 
record represents time, which consists of six digits, first two digits are allocated for hours, 
second two digits are assigned for minutes and the last two digits are specialised for seconds. 
If AS18638 and AS3602 are taken as an example to show the maximum time a fake route 
spreads, the first Q (quarter) shows the first three uniquely affected ASes in the first three 
records with a maximum of 1 second. Similarly, the second Q shows the first four unique 
affected ASes in the first six records with a maximum of 3 minutes. The rest of the records 
(announcements) in the table are considered repetitions of the affected ASes. If the selection 
of the best path is taken into account, many of the routers in the ASes will not be affected as 
they might ignore the fake update. In other words, the maximum number of affected ASes 
cannot be predicted easily. Based on the results of the maximum affected ASes, which is only 
six ASes, during hijacking incident of AS5571 with AS8190 and AS13902 with AS33694, a 
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15-minute time slot will be used as a processing period for detecting IP prefix hijacking in the 
BGP updates. ASPATHs from column 5 upwards represent either Pro (propagator), Ann 
(announcer) or Pad (padding) for padding zeros which makes columns consistent. 
Q	   Time	  
ASes	  
length	  
Destination	  
ASes	  	   Pro/Ann	  	  
Pro	  
/Ann/Pad	  
	  Pro	  
/Ann/Pad	  
Pro	  
/Ann/Pad	  
	  Pro	  
/Ann/Pad	  	  
Pro	  
/Ann/Pad	  
1	   000700	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   000701	   3	   701	   1239	   3602	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   000701	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
1	   000701	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   000703	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
1	   000712	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   000740	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
1	   000807	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   000834	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
1	   000900	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   000928	   3	   701	   1239	   3602	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   001000	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   001021	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
1	   001420	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   001447	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
1	   001513	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   001725	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
1	   001817	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   001844	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
1	   001913	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   001940	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
1	   002007	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
1	   002034	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002126	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002200	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
2	   002220	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002246	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
2	   002313	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002340	   3	   701	   1239	   3602	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002406	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002433	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
2	   002528	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002600	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
2	   002624	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002651	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	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2	   002718	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002743	   3	   701	   1239	   3602	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002811	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   002837	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
2	   002931	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   003000	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
2	   003143	   3	   701	   1239	   3602	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   003210	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   003236	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
2	   003331	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   003402	   7	   701	   6327	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	   3602	  
2	   003423	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   003450	   3	   701	   1239	   3602	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   003517	   3	   701	   25983	   18638	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Table 3-5 Maximum time of spreading fake routes among routers 
3.2.7 IP prefix hijacking detection process  
After collecting, studying and preparing data, as well as analysing the case study hijacking 
and finally extracting features, the detection method needs a clear process to detect IP prefix 
hijacking. The detection method process starts with using the proposed features, which are 
directly extracted from ASPATH attribute and ANNOUNCE field. These features are 
organised and sampled in two ways, with the same routers and different routers. The 
organisation and sampling are shown in Table 3-6 – Table 3-8. The detection method 
receives each feature values of the incident day and the normal two days and plots them 
against each other to display routers’ behaviour on normal days and the hijacking day. To 
find similarities and differences between normal and hijacking days in terms of routers’ 
behaviour, the standard deviation will be calculated. 
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3.2.7.1 Data organisation of sampling different routers  
In the first data organisation of routers’ behaviour, the detection method counts different 
features that represent the behaviour of all routers in different 15-minute time slots of the 
incident day and IP prefix hijacking-free two days, and each feature is calculated for 50 
different routers. For example, vectors in Table 3-6 – Table 3-8 are represented as [F1, 
R1...R50], [F2, R1...R50], [F..., R1...R50] where F1 is the first feature and F2 is the second 
feature every 15 minutes, R1 is the first router, and R50 is the last router. Features are tested 
in the same way: If the results of the features (e.g., the number of announcements and number 
of withdrawals) work effectively, they are adopted; otherwise, they are ignored. Each value 
of 15-minute represents the average of different routers’ behaviour. Values of routers’ 
behaviour on the incident day are plotted to present routers’ stability on February 24, 2008. 
Similarly, values of routers’ behaviour on the normal days are plotted to present routers’ 
stability on February 23, 2008 and February 25, 2008. To compute the similarities and 
differences between routers’ behaviour on the incident day and normal days, the standard 
deviation of the two behaviours will be worked out in section 3.2.7.3.  
Quarters  F1 of R1... R50 F2 of R1... R50 Next feature … 
Q1 Mean Mean Mean 
Q2 Mean Mean Mean 
Q96 Mean Mean Mean 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Table 3-6 Routers’ behaviour on February 23, 2008 
Quarters  F1 of R1... R50 F2 of R1... R50 Next feature … 
Q1 Mean Mean Mean 
Q2 Mean Mean Mean 
Q96 Mean Mean Mean 
 Mean Mean Mean 
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Table 3-7 Routers’ behaviour on February 24, 2008 
Quarters  F1 of R1... R50 F2 of R1... R50 Next feature … 
Q1 Mean Mean Mean 
Q2 Mean Mean Mean 
Q96 Mean Mean Mean 
 Mean  Mean  Mean  
Table 3-8 Routers’ behaviour on February 25, 2008 
3.2.7.2  Data organisation of sampling same routers  
The second method for sampling and organising data of routers’ behaviour is based on 
calculating the behaviour of the same routers on one day. On the one hand, the detection 
method receives one feature for all routers during normal days. For example, router 1 
receives a number of announcements per 15-minute and puts them in one column vector. 
Afterwards, each router computes the mean of the feature (e.g., the number of 
announcements) to give the behaviour of all routers separately, as shown in Table 3-9 and 
Table 3-11, where Q is quarter, F is the feature, and R represents routers. Each value of 15-
minute represents the average of the same routers’ behaviour. The same process is applied to 
the hijacking day shown in Table 3-10. The average behaviour of 50 routers on the hijacking 
day is plotted against the average behaviour of other 50 routers of the hijacking-free two 
days. The standard deviation will be calculated for both behaviours, hijacking day and normal 
days, in section 3.2.7.3 to observe the similarities and differences of routers’ behaviour.  
Quarters  F1 of R1 F1 of R2 ... F1 of R50 
Q1 Number Number Number Number 
Q2 Number Number Number Number 
Q96 Number Number Number Number 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean 
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Table 3-9 Routers’ behaviour for normal day (February 23, 2008) 
Quarters  F1 of R1 F1 of R2 ... F1 of R50 
Q1 Number Number Number Number 
Q2 Number Number Number Number 
Q96 Number Number Number Number 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Table 3-10 Routers’ behaviour for hijacking day (February 24, 2008) 
Quarters  F1 of R1 F1 of R2 ... F1 of R50 
Q1 Number Number Number Number 
Q2 Number Number Number Number 
Q96 Number Number Number Number 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Table 3-11 Routers’ behaviour for normal day (February 25, 2008) 
3.2.7.3 Hijacking and normal routers’ behaviour differentiation  
This section discusses the way to find similarities and differences in the behaviour of routers 
in both data organisations presented in section 3.2.7.1 and 3.2.7.2. The detection method plots 
each data organisation separately and then calculates the standard deviation of both cases. 
The last rows in all three tables (Table 3-9-Table 3-11) represent routers’ behaviour. The 
standard deviation of each router or different routers’ behaviour, on normal days and the 
hijacking day, are taken correspondingly in order to observe the effectiveness of the proposed 
features. The final result of the standard deviation and the quality of the detection method is 
discussed in detail in section 3.3. 
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3.3 Evaluation  
The detection method goes through different, important phases to detect IP prefix hijacking, 
starting by determining the case study and ending by analysing the spread of fake routes. In 
more detail, the detection method studies data related to the issue to extract the most feasible 
features and prepares data in a numeric format and a consistent way to come up with an 
accurate and wider analysis. In addition, the detection method traces the behaviour of IP 
prefix hijacking and its movement and transfer among announced BGP updates of routers. 
Moreover, the detection method traces the extent of the spread of fake routes among routers 
to give an overview of IP prefix hijacking and the appropriate sampling that can be chosen to 
process update packets. All mentioned data studies, preparations, analyses and traces give the 
detection method strength to know more about IP prefix hijacking and select the most 
effective process of organising data to detect IP prefix hijacking.  
IP prefix hijacking is a serious issue that could affect the stability of routers continuously, and 
it is rare to find one day IP prefix hijacking-free. Since it is very difficult to find one day that 
is IP prefix hijacking-free, the detection method instead needs to separate hijacking packets 
from unaffected packets, but that requires more effort because each router in the network 
needs to be checked if it announces other routers’ IP prefixes. However, separating hijacking 
packets from unaffected packets is not a good mean to obtain an identical method because the 
detection method needs to detect IP prefix hijacking in a normal exchanging order of BGP 
updates among routers. Two analyses, in section 3.2.4 and 3.2.6, of IP prefix hijacking 
movement behaviour use the normal exchanging order of BGP updates.   
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The detection process has the ability to plot the behaviour of routers on normal and hijacking 
days. However, the detection method process considers normal days (February 23, 2008 and 
February 25, 2008) IP prefix hijacking-free; but in fact, they are not. Therefore, the detection 
method could not give a clear view of the difference between routers’ behaviour during 
normal and incident days. In other words, February 23, 2008 and February 25, 2008 were not 
hijacking-free days, but the detection method considers these two days as hijacking-free 
because no report was announced or published which pointed out that these days included IP 
prefix hijacking. As a result, the detection method failed to study the behaviour of hijacking 
and differentiate it from the normal behaviour of routers. Based on the tested features (the 
number of announcements and withdrawals), the graphical lines of routers’ behaviour on 
normal days overlap with the graphical lines of routers’ behaviour on the incident day, which 
means no clear indication of hijacking behaviour.  
Chapter 4 will present a novel method to distinguish between malicious and benign packets 
every 15-minute by tracing attack signatures to overcome the limitations of the detection 
method proposed in this chapter. The new method will search whether there is more than one 
AS announcing the same IP prefix, instead of comparing the behaviour of routers on incident 
days with IP prefix hijacking-free days. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter proposes a detection method for detecting IP prefix hijacking based on the 
routers’ behaviour during hijacking and normal days for exchanging BGP update messages. 
The chapter started by picking the case study used with the detection method, then collected 
data based on that. The case study was the 2008 YouTube Pakistan incident; this incident was 
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chosen because it is common among reported IP prefix hijacking incidents and covers all 
possible cases around the hijacking such as both organisations, YouTube and Pakistan 
Telecom, being in different regions and their routing information being provided by two 
different RIRs. BGP updates are collected every day by the University of Oregon and put in 
the Route Views Archive Project for the research community. The detection method 
downloads updates that include the case study incident.  
The second thing the detection method studies are BGP update packets to know which data 
are critically important to the IP prefix hijacking issue, such as ASPATH, which includes 
origin and propagating ASes, and ANNOUNCE, which contains IP prefixes.  In addition, the 
detection method prepares and organises data to fit the idea of the detection method.  For 
example, all possible data in the BGP update packets are listed and saved in a consistent way 
and a unique format to provide organised and tabular data. Based on these data, some features 
are suggested to explore the behaviour of routers, like the number of announcements, the 
number of withdrawal insertion ASes, deletion ASes and substitution ASes, as they are 
displayed in Table 3-4. The detection method also uses two analyses to study the behaviour 
of IP prefix hijacking based on the start and end point of the incident and its spread among 
BGP routers to pick the most appropriate sampling of data.   
The detection method has two ways of organising data to detect IP prefix hijacking. This 
organisation is based on tracking the behaviour of similar routers and the behaviour of 
different routers separately, as in Table 3-6 - Table 3-11. The detection method tries features 
separately. Only two features, the number of announcements and withdrawals, have been 
attempted, and the detection method directly observed the behaviour of routers on the 
incident day as very similar and overlapped with the hijacking-free days, which means no 
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clear indication could show the difference between routers’ behaviour during normal times 
and hijacking time; therefore, the remaining features stopped being tested. The reason behind 
the similarity and overlapping of routers’ behaviour is that February 23, 2008 and February 
25, 2008 were considered hijacking-free, but in reality they were not. They had some 
incidents, which were not reported or published in any papers or sources. As a result, the 
detection method failed to detect the pattern of IP prefix hijacking. 
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Chapter	  :	  4 Attack	   signature	   and	   RIR	   verification-­‐based	   IP	   prefix	  
hijacking	  detection	  	  
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 3 proposed a detection method to detect routers’ behaviour patterns during hijacking 
and normal router work. The detection method studies BGP updates and the preparation of 
data to find the most important data related to the hijacking issue. In addition, Chapter 3 
proposed some features and built a programme to determine the effectiveness of these 
features. However, the detection method failed to test the features and find IP prefix hijacking 
from routers’ behaviour because of the difficulty of finding a case study (one-day BGP 
updates) hijacking-free. In other words, the detection method failed to find an indication that 
could distinguish routers’ behaviours on normal days (one day before and after the incident 
day) from the incident day (Pakistan and YouTube). The reason behind the failure is that one 
day could have many IP prefix hijacks and it is very difficult to find one day free of 
hijacking. As a result, the detection method cannot detect the IP prefix hijacking based on 
monitoring the behaviour of routers.  
Following Chapter 3, which explores and identifies the limitations of the proposed detection 
method, a more appropriate methodology to detect IP prefix hijacking will be described in 
this chapter. The case study of the IP prefix hijacking incident, data study of BGP updates, 
preparation of the analytical data, the analysis of IP prefix hijacking occurrences, and the 
selection of sampling data utilised in Chapter 3 will be considered in this chapter with a novel 
method of organising data and the detection process. This method relies on a signature-based 
technique and validating results based on the RIR databases. In other words, the detection 
method searches for more than one edge router, in a specific period of time, claiming the 
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origin of an IP prefix but not belonging to one AS-block. The detection method uses data 
reduction and a Binary Search Algorithm (BSA) to detect IP prefix hijacking events quickly. 
For example, each edge router could announce a specific IP prefix multiple times, but that 
would lead to the enlargement of the list in which the detection method is searching for IP 
prefix hijacking; therefore, reducing unwanted and repeated announcement operations is very 
important to any detection method working with a large amount of data. Based on the BSA, 
the detection method algorithm traces origin ASes and their actual IP prefixes in 15-minute 
time slots and categorises the results into two types, benign packets and suspicious packets, 
which later are validated through RIR databases.  
Following the introduction, this chapter presents the structure and architecture of the 
detection method in section 4.2, which includes four main components. Section 4.2.1 
discusses the pre-processing of raw data, while section 4.2.2 talks about extracting 
organisations’ names and their ASes from RIRs, and filtering organisations that announce IP 
prefixes with one ASN or multiple ASNs to create a verification table. The algorithm of the 
detection method for detecting IP prefix hijacking is explained in section 4.2.3. Detection 
method limitations and challenges are also assigned a separate section, in section 4.3, as they 
are considered very important aspects for evaluating the detection method. The last section is 
reserved for summarising the chapter. 
4.2 Detection method 
A new detection method is proposed in this section to identify different ASes that likely 
announce the same IP prefix and flag these events as IP prefix hijacking. This method is more 
practical than the previous one proposed in Chapter 3 because of the chance it can check all 
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BGP-announced packets. It is true that the detection method is self-checking, but because it 
uses RIRs to validate the outputs, it will lose this feature. In other words, the efficiency of the 
detection method will depend on the accuracy of the information registered in the RIRs; 
therefore, it is not easy to predict the results in advance. The detection method consists of 
four main components: an update processor which extracts ASes and their IP prefixes and 
organises them, a hijacking detector which will detects IP prefix hijacking, an RIR processor 
which extracts ASNs and their ORG (organisation) codes for RIRs, and a filter which 
separates organisations that have one AS from those that have many ASes. The general 
architecture of the detection method is displayed in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1 IP prefix hijack detection method architecture  
RIR processing has an extractor which extracts origin ASes from RIRs and links them to their 
IP prefixes, and excludes redundant data in order to provide a unified view of repeated 
prefixes and associated ASes. This component will be demonstrated in detail in section 4.2.2. 
A filter is used to separate organisations that have one ASes from those that have a block of 
ASes to make the detection method faster, as will be explained in section 4.2.3. An update 
processor is linked to BGP updates to extract origin ASes and announced IP prefixes and 
organise them into associated smaller tables than the one built in section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3. 
This table will be given to the next component (the detector) to detect IP prefix hijacking. 
The detector in section 4.2.4 has a single output with two values, either benign or hijacking. 
Before announcing the last result, the detector will have two types of values in [origin AS, IP 
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prefix] format and will save them in a SASL (Suspicious Autonomous System List) to be 
validated through the verification table, which includes organisations with more than one AS 
number and organisations with one AS number. On the one hand, if an AS exists in ORGs 
with more than one ASN, the suspicious AS will be removed from the SASL because it is 
considered a false positive. On the other hand, if an AS exists in the ORGs with one ASN, it 
will be considered a hijacking. The details of the detection method will be explained in the 
following subsections.  
4.2.1 Update processor  
ASPATH and ANNOUNCE data available in the update messages are not consistent in BGP 
packets, which is likely to make it very complicated to deal with data and trace fake 
impersonations of routes. Therefore, these data need to be separated into two different 
organised tables. In other words, ASPATH sometimes appears with different lengths of ASes 
and ANNOUNCE appears with different lengths of IP prefixes because these two fields are 
dynamic array data types. In this case, it is very difficult to turn both data types into 
analytical columns in one table because the columns will be dynamic as well. The potentially 
relevant data (e.g., ASNs and IP prefixes) to the issue are extracted from the large table, 
which was already created in section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3, and saved into two different tables as 
shown in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2. The first table has ASPATH, including origin ASes, and 
the second includes IP prefixes. The first table also has ASPATH length, while the second 
table has the ANNOUNCE length and the prefix range in addition to IP prefixes.  Row size of 
the two tables also has to be equal. In other words, the number of rows in the first table needs 
to be equal to the number of rows in the second table, and each must correspond because the 
IP prefixes in Table 4-2 are announced by ASes in Table 4-1, which will maintain the main 
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order of the announcement BGP packets. These two tables are created so the detector can 
associate each origin AS in the ASPATH attribute to its IP prefixes in the ANNOUNCE 
attribute in the BGP update packets. The update processor in Figure 4.1 has the flexibility to 
change the time slot of processing data; therefore, the detector can work smoothly while 
checking hijacking in the BGP packets.  
Order ASPATH Length AS1 AS2 AS ... Origin Padding 
1 Number Number Number ... Number Zero 
2 Number Number Number ... Number Zero 
3 Number Number Number ... Number Zero 
Last row in time slot Number Number Number ... Number Zero 
Table 4-1 Organising of consistent, dynamic ASPATH attributes 
Order IP Prefix Length IP Prefix IP Prefix ... Padding 
1 Number Integer IP address ... Zero 
2 Number Integer IP address ... Zero 
3 Number Integer IP address ... Zero 
Last row in time slot Number Integer IP address ... Zero 
Table 4-2 Organising of consistent, dynamic ANNOUNCE attributes 
All of the above tasks and the special organising of BGP updates are considered very 
important to be performed before detecting IP prefix hijacking; therefore, data pre-processing 
comes as a first step in the detection method. The update processor treats BGP updates every 
15-minute and then saves the results in especial organisation as it is shown in Table 4-1 and 
Table 4-2. The ASPATH Length in both tables are needed to access specific AS and IP 
prefixes during detection processing, while padding is used to maintain the consistency of the 
ASes and IP prefixes. 
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4.2.2 RIR processor  
This section discusses the process of investigating the organisations that are likely to have 
more than one ASN and are used to announce their IP prefixes. Since BGP update messages 
do not have organisation names, the detection method will use RIR databases (specifically the 
RIPE Whois database [69]) to validate the suspicious ASes that were detected in section 
4.2.3. The general structure of processing the verification table is shown in Figure 4.2. The 
extractor in the figure searches in the RIR databases for the organisations that have ASNs and 
collects their codes (unique organisation codes) beside ASNs. If an organisation does not 
have an ASN in the database, it is simply ignored because it dose not provide the detection 
method with needed information. The filter in Figure 4.2 separates organisations that have 
one ASN from those that have more than one ASN because the detection method will 
validate the results, in the SASL, based on the organisations that have more than one ASN to 
avoid false positives. ORGs with one ASN need to be filtered out because they do not need to 
be compared to the data in the SASL, which is going to be implemented in section 4.2.3. The 
following two subsections, 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.2.2, will discuss these two parts in detail. 
 
Figure 4.2 Structure of the verification table 
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4.2.2.1 Extracting organisation codes and their ASNs 
As a conditional basis for RIR registration, each organisation has only one code to uniquely 
identify it. For instance, in RIPE, the ORG-YE1-RIPE code represents Yahoo in Europe, 
whereas ORG-HBp1-RIPE represents HSBC Bank. In fact, the verification table is processed 
in three phases: The first phase extracts the ASNs and their organisation codes from the RIPE 
dump database and stores data in two separate fields, named AUT-NUMS and ORGs. The 
second phase links AUT-NUMS and ORGs and puts them in several records; for example, 
AS20535 and its code, ORG-IG12-RIPE, will be in one record (AS20535, ORG-IG12-RIPE), 
but because the RIPE database sometimes has ASNs without an associated organisation code, 
the incomplete data will be filtered out. It does inherently limit the capabilities of the 
presented method because of these missing data. In the last phase, the organisation code is 
structured as an array created to include all organisation codes that can be mapped to the 
appropriate ASNs in RIPE.  
Organisation codes are divided into three parts (e.g., ORG, IG12 and RIPE, for example) and 
saved in an array. The second and third indices in the array represent the unique organisation 
code (e.g., IG12) and data source (e.g., RIPE). Currently, the most important part in the array 
is the second field because it uniquely identifies the organisations in the same source. The 
third field of the organisation represents the RIR database name (e.g., RIRs and ASN 
delegator) that provides the information regarding organisation codes; this helps to 
differentiate between multiple database source owners in case two have the same middle code 
(e.g., IG12-RIPE and IG12-ARIN). To optimise the analysis, these two parts are converted to 
numeric data to suit data in the SASL in section 4.2.3 later.  
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4.2.2.2 Filtering organisations with one ASN and more than one ASN 
Given that the method focuses on organisations with more than one ASN to refine the results, 
all organisations that have only one ASN will be filtered out because there is no need for 
them, as will be explained in section 4.2.3. This filtration allows the detector to parse a 
significantly smaller dataset in order to determine if the suspicious IP prefix events, which 
were caught in the SASL in section 4.2.3.1, are real hijackings or not. The size of the 
verification table before the filtering out of organisations with only one ASN was 25 580 
records and was reduced to 6283 records through the filter in order to minimise the compared 
table to make detection faster. If 6283 is divided by 25 580, the speed for detecting the IP 
prefix hijacking will be improved by 25%. The speed is probably not very clear because the 
detection method only deals with the RIPE database as an example to test the accuracy and 
efficiency of the detection method. However, the more databases are processed and used to 
validate the suspicious ASes, in SASL, the more the speed of the detection is clearer. The 
detection method will verify its results based on the reduced verification table. The first 
column in the verification table represents the AS numbers of organisations that have more 
than one AS, whereas the second column represents the organisation code and data source 
(e.g., RIPE). The first column will be used as a primary key to be linked to ASNs in the 
SASL, which will be presented in subsection 4.2.3.1.  
4.2.3 Detector  
This subsection discusses the last component of the detection method, which has three 
objectives: First, to map origin ASes to their IP prefixes and save them as pairs in a cell 
array; second, to remove duplications of associative origin ASes and their IP prefixes; third, 
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to search for two different ASes announcing the same IP prefix and then, finally, to verify the 
pairs of one origin AS and IP prefix based on the verification table already created in section 
4.2.2 and 4.2.3. The detector receives BGP update messages from the case study (2008 
YouTube Pakistan incident, as explained in the introduction of this thesis) every 15-minute 
and tries to observe the behaviour of the IP prefix hijacking and the other suspicious ASes 
that could show up.  
With every 15-minute BGP update message received by the detector, it associates every 
origin AS with its announced IP prefixes to generate a cell array composed of pair origin 
ASes and IP prefixes. Since the origin ASes and IP prefixes in the datasets sampled in section 
4.2.1 might be duplicated, the detector first requires a function to remove repetitions of origin 
ASes and their IP prefixes from the cell array [70] in MatLab. The cell array allows the 
detection method to map one ASN to multiple IP prefixes. In other words, both columns, 
origin ASes and IP prefixes in the cell array are subjected to data reduction. The lower the 
number of ASes and announced IP prefixes, the faster the detection will be.  Ultimately, this 
association, in conjunction with the timing of the message, has to be at the core of an IP 
hijacking detection method, as it provides all the information about which IP prefixes are 
apparently owned by their announcing AS routers. The cell array after the reduction of ASes 
and their IP prefixes and the removal of unwanted data is shown in Table 4-3. 
Order Unique Origin ASes Unique IP prefixes 
3 137 369760021 
4 151 369760021; 369760023; 3697600524 
5 174 139438524; 244296124 
582 44408 80045022 
Table 4-3 Example of the cell array after ASes and their IP reduction  
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As a second phase and after computing unrepeated origin ASes and their unrepeated IP 
prefixes, the detector needs to compare the IP prefix of each AS to the IP prefixes of all the 
origin ASes in the entire time slot (e.g., 15 minutes) to find any IP prefixes advertised by 
multiple ASes. The detector considers the first row of the origin ASes and its IP prefixes in 
the cell array as a main row vector. This vector is compared to the further down records in the 
cell array. The main row vector will be removed from the comparison and the next row 
vector will be the main row vector to be compared to the following IP prefixes of the origin 
ASes in the cell array. The processing continues until the end of the cell array. The detector 
separates each detected event with a row vector [0,0], like in row 3 and 6 in Table 4-4, to 
differentiate a new suspicious AS. This format of the cell array will be changed in section 
4.2.3.1 while displaying the results of suspicious ASes. 
Order Main row vector Compared row vector Suspicious ASes IP prefixes 
1 44 4 637 1317679024 
2 289 5 5963 1317679024 
3 0 0 0 0 
4 52 11 747 1536219224 
5 285 91 5803 1536219224 
6 0 0 0 0 
Table 4-4 Example of cell array after comparison  
In the comparison phase, the main row vector uses a relatively fast comparison search 
algorithm called the BSA [71] to compare the IP prefix of the current origin AS to the 
remaining origin AS IP prefixes. The reason for using the BSA is that it executes array 
comparisons exponentially faster than other algorithms, such as the Linear Search Algorithm 
(LSA) [71]. In other words, the BSA is considered the fastest search algorithm because of its 
speed, which is calculated as O(logn) bits. This specifies the index of an element in the cell 
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array where n is the size of the cell array. In addition, the detector only applies the BSA to the 
origin AS that has more than one IP prefix because origin ASes that have a single IP prefix 
are unique. This reduction of searching for hijacking signatures will also make the detection 
too fast because unnecessary records to be compared are also ignored. Table 4-4 shows an 
example of the cell array in two possible formats: unique origin ASes can have either a single 
IP prefix or multiple IP prefixes. Any suspicious AS caught in the cell array will be saved to 
the SASL to be validated, and in further sections through the verification table.   
4.2.3.1 Suspicious Autonomous System Lists and their analysis  
ASLoc and IPPLoc in Table 4-5 – Table 4-9 represent the ASN location and the IP prefix 
location where the suspicious hijacks were found in the cell array. However, the third column 
represents the IP prefixes and their range of super- and sub-prefixes. Each row in these tables 
displays two different origin ASes claiming one IP prefix. From Table 4-5 – Table 4-9, it is 
very clear that the detector can detect several different suspicious ASes other than the 
YouTube and Telecom Pakistan incident. However, this case study incident does not show up 
among suspicious ASes caught in the cell array, although the hijacking started in Quarter 74, 
which is represented in Table 4-5. Namely, the detector skipped the incident because the 
impersonation of the IP address by two different ASes was not simultaneous in the examined 
quarter. A proposed method will be discussed in Chapter 6 to address this limitation. 
Quarter 74 (starting time of the hijack) 
Order  ASLoc: IPPLoc Suspicious ASNs IP prefix hijacked  
1 18:3 105:4 637 5963 214.15.201.0/24 
2 57:2 424:2 3602 18638 209.5.171.0/24 
3 213:2 377:2 9498 17443 202.140.63.0/24 
4 446:2 642:2 19750 32004 207.181.144.0/24 
5 452:4 492:2 20214 22909 64.139.74.0/24 
6 507:7 725:2 23694 38513 202.87.191.0/24 
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Table 4-5 The suspicious ASes captured by the algorithm in Quarter 74 
Table 4-6 also shows that the detector in some quarters can only catch one or probably no 
suspicious hijackings, as there are no suspicious events flagged out in Quarters 75–78. 
Quarter 79 without repetition events 
Order  ASLoc: IPPLoc Suspicious ASNs IP prefix hijacked  
1 170:2 489:2 10461 35931 65.171.224.0/22 
Table 4-6 The suspicious ASes captured by the detector in Quarter 79 
Table 4-7 gives another indication that the detector can detect repeated suspicious AS 
hijackings with different IP prefixes, as shown in Order 2, 3 and 4. The detector can also 
detect repeated hijackings of the same ASes and IP prefixes, like in Order 3 in Quarter 74 and 
Order 12 in Quarter 81. In other words, the two same suspicious ASes are found in different 
quarters. 
Quarter 81 without repetition events 
Order  ASLoc: IPPLoc Suspicious ASNs IP prefix hijacked  
1 73:2 128:2 5571 8190 212.2.0.0/19 
2 254:2 498:3 16422 33770 41.223.58.0/24 
3 254:3 498:4 16422 33770 41.223.59.0/24 
4 254:4 498:5 16422 33770 41.223.57.0/24 
5 268:2 498:6 17175 33770 41.220.224.0/24 
6 268:3 498:7 17175 33770 41.220.225.0/24 
7 268:4 498:8 17175 33770 41.220.226.0/24 
8 268:5 498:10 17175 33770 41.220.229.0/24 
9 268:6 498:12 17175 33770 196.201.228.0,22 
10 328:2 489:2 19750 32004 207.181.144.0,24 
11 342:2 421:16 20858 25184 80.75.13.0/24 
12 156:3 270:2 9498 17443 202.140.63.0/24 
13 351:2 466:3 21396 29606 194.1.150.0,24 
14 351:3 466:4 21396 29606 91.199.151.0,24 
15 351:4 466:5 21396 29606 195.177.192.0,23 
16 383:7 564:2 23694 38513 202.87.191.0/24 
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Table 4-7 The suspicious ASes captured by the detector in Quarter 81 
As can be seen from Table 4-8, the algorithm of the detector identifies a duplicate 
announcement of one IP prefix. Both AS17557 and AS36561 announce the same IP prefix, 
208.65.153.0/24, of the AS36561 in the Quarter 82. From a detection perspective, this is 
equivalent to a potential hijacking incident; hence, it was successful in detecting the event. 
Quarter 82 without repetition events 
Order  ASLoc: IPPLoc Suspicious ASNs IP prefix hijacked 
1 142:2 255:186 9229 17557 202.5.150.0/24 
2 255:189 500:2 17557 36561 208.65.153.0/24 
Table 4-8 The suspicious ASes captured by the detector in Quarter 82 
Table 4-9 shows the last period of detecting IP prefix hijacking during the 2008 YouTube 
Pakistan incident. The hijacking still shows up, as it is presented in Order 3. However, 
AS17787, which is one of the Pakistan AS-blocks but cannot be displayed in the table 
because it is not a suspicious AS announcement, withdrew the bogus route from the Internet 
to return ownership to the real owner (YouTube). 
Quarter 83 (last time of the hijack) 
Order  ASLoc: IPPLoc Suspicious ASNs IP prefix hijacked 
1 339:2 1128:2 10143 38330 203.83.4.0/22 
2 447:2 1027:2 13902 33694 208.71.120.0/21 
3 549:188 1089:3 17557 36561 208.65.153.0/24 
4 705:2 890:2 21792 27169 69.22.144.0/24 
5 799:2 822:3 24213 24538 122.200.52.0/24 
Table 4-9 The suspicious ASes captured by the detector in Quarter 83 
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One interesting feature of SASL analysis is that when searching for the 2008 YouTube 
Pakistan incident, beyond the expected result (the YouTube hijacking), the detector 
highlighted additional multiple announcement events different from the case study incident. 
Subsection 4.2.3.2 provides an overview of these identified suspicious incidents in detail.  
4.2.3.2 Classifying newly detected suspicious ASes  
This section classifies new suspicious IP prefix incidents that were detected alongside the 
YouTube and Pakistan Telecom incident. Based on the registration information in the RIRs, 
the SASL is categorised into three categories: the same organisation with multiple ASes 
announcing the same IP prefix (not a hijacking), different organisations with different ASes 
announcing the same IP prefix (real hijacking), or no existence to organisation of one or both 
suspicious ASes (ambiguous event). Examples of these incidents are summarised in the 
following sections. This section will describe three examples of the categories to determine 
the most visible method in the detection and validate the results of the SASL while taking 
into account these categories. The validation will be performed in section 4.2.3.3  
Based on a search for the 2008 YouTube Pakistan incident in the BGP update messages, the 
following list was generated as cases of the same organisation with multiple ASes 
announcing the same IP prefix: 
1 DoD Network Information Centre (DNIC), Comcast Cable Communications Holdings 
and 24/7 Real Media, in the US [72] 
2 MDNX Enterprise Services and MDNX Internet Limited, in the UK [73]  
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3 Indonesia Network Information Centre, PT Arsen Kusuma and Digital Satellite PT, in 
Indonesia [73] 
Whereas the list below displays some cases of different organisations with different ASes 
announcing the same IP prefix: 
1- Cable Communications Inc. with DH Data Centres Inc. in the US  
2- Criteo Corp. with Business Information Group, in the US  
3- Townsend Analytics Ltd. with Viztek, Flagler Hospital Inc. with Trident Systems Inc., 
in the US [72]  
4- BHARTI Airtel Ltd. with Karuturi Telecom Pvt Ltd., in the UK  
5- NetConnex Broadband with Borwood UK Network, in the UK [73]  
6- Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. (Pakistan) with Speed Cast Ltd., in Hong 
Kong [73]  
7- Pakistan Telecom, in Pakistan [72]. and YouTube, in the US [73]  
8- Exetel Pty Ltd. and Speedweb Network, Australia [73]  
Finally, the cases of no existence to organisation of one or both suspicious AS in the 
registration information in the RIRs are shown below: 
1 New Skies Satellites Inc., in the US [72], [73], with an anonymous AS 
2 Afranet Tehran, in Iran [74], with an anonymous AS  
In summary, the detection method found some different IP prefix impersonations during the 
two-hour timeframe of the Pakistan Telecom hijacking. The first three cases in the first 
example are considered suspicious, and the next eight cases in the second example are 
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considered real hijackings, while the last two cases in the third example are considered 
ambiguous because their ASNs do not exist in the IANA, RIRs and delegator ISPs. The 
number of real incidents, in the range where the 2008 YouTube Pakistan incident shows up, 
is greater than the number of suspicious and ambiguous incidents (suspicious ASes). After 
analysing and categorising the pre-detected suspicious ASes, section 4.2.3.3 will discuss the 
verification of the suspicious ASes of the case study and the new suspicious ASes to show the 
final results of the detection method for detecting IP prefix hijacking.  
4.2.3.3 Verification of suspicious ASes in SASL using the verification table 
The verification table implemented in section 4.2.2 will be used in this section with the 
detector to verify the suspicious ASes caught in the SASL. As mentioned earlier in 
subsection 4.2.2, the verification table consists of two columns: The first column represents 
the unique ASNs, and the second column represents the unique organisation codes. Based on 
the ASNs in the SASL and verification table, the detector searches for two suspicious ASes in 
the SASL belonging to the same organisation in the verification table. If found, this incident 
is removed from the SASL because it is not a real hijacking; otherwise, it is considered a 
hijacking. The detector continues searching until it finishes the candidate ASes. Figure 4.3 
shows in detail how, in code, the verification table will be connected to the detector and 
checks out the results of the SASL to make the last decision.  
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Figure 4.3 Verification table linked to the detector 
4.2.3.4 Result 
In the case of the YouTube hijacking, the detector identified 1767 repeated incidents and 975 
unique incidents in the SASL for the whole day. Parsing the analysis through the verification 
table, the number of suspicious hijackings in the SASL dropped to 969. Table 4-10 shows the 
excluded suspicious ASes from the SASL from the whole day of the case study incident after 
using the verification table. 
Quarters ASes IP prefixes 
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1 21137 with 25551 145.248.195.0/24 
18 21021 with 30824 89.228.16.0/20 
18 21399 with 31377 72.246.0.0/22 
32 20961 with 21021 87.116.192.0/18 
61 8513 with 25228 213.255.206.0/24 
87 21021 with 30824 81.190.248.0/21 
Table 4-10 Some excluded suspicious incidents from the SASL 
4.3 Evaluation  
This section discusses three important aspects for evaluating the detector: the limitations, 
challenges and advantages of the detection method. The difference between challenges and 
limitations is that detection method limitations discusses the drawbacks of the detection 
method itself, while challenges refer to difficulties that could be faced by the detection 
method.  
4.3.1 Detection method challenges  
The first challenge for the detection method is that it needs to be linked to other databases 
that have organisation codes to produce a dataset with ASNs, IP prefixes and organisation 
names, as BGP updates lack them. Adding an organisation name helps to get rid of MOAS 
conflicts, as one organisation can announce an IP prefix with many ASNs.  
Some organisations do not include their unique code (organisation name) in their associated 
records (e.g., ASN and ORG code) in RIR databases. In other words, every delegator of 
ASNs and IP prefixes needs to provide their linked organisation names to ASNs in their 
databases. 
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From the downloaded RIR dump databases, it can be seen that their formats are not unified. 
As a result, each RIR database needs to be followed and processed separately to create the 
verification table. Moreover, delegators of AS numbers and IP prefixes are not few nor fixed, 
which means new delegators can also provide ASes and IP prefixes; therefore, the 
verification table needs to be updated regularly. 
The huge number of BGP updates being exchanged, the quick, continuous adding and 
removing of edge routers, and the changing of organisation ASNs and IP prefixes makes 
detection very complicated for many detection solutions. In other words, the quick, dynamic 
changing of routing information and registered information in RIRs makes detection very 
difficult. 
Another challenge is that some RIRs do not keep historical records of old Whois registration 
details so researchers can return to them while collecting completed routing information; 
therefore, researchers need to build the historical data. Once a record is updated or deleted, 
the old record is not stored in an archived database.  
4.3.2 Detection method limitations  
0 The first limitation is that when an edge router impersonates an IP prefix of an AS and 
the real owner does not announce it in the same 15-minute slot, the detector will not be 
able to detect the hijacking. In other words, the first 15-minute of BGP update messages 
received by the detector does not express the first time the owner advertised the IP prefix 
but a random 15-minute slot after a large volume of routing information has been 
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exchanged. Thus, it is very difficult to determine if the advertiser of the hijacked prefix is 
the owner or the hijacker in the absence of another AS in the time slots. 
As a first solution, the proposed 15-minute time slot length could be increased to 
improve detection accuracy, but that would have a negative impact on granularity and 
potential responsiveness. For example, if the period of the processed data is two hours 
(the total period of the hijacking but, unfortunately, this period cannot be predicted), 
the algorithm of the detector could probably detect the IP prefix hijacking from the 
first compared time slot. However, if the period of the processed data is increased, the 
short-lived hijacking might take place and finish before the detector detects it because 
the hijacking will be quicker that the detection. Therefore, It is very difficult to 
determine the appropriate period of data processing and find the hijacking quickly 
among the huge number of BGP packets.  
Another possible solution is – after comparing ASes and IP prefixes within one 
quarter – to compare the same quarter to all quarters for one day (cross-validation); 
but due to the huge amount of data being exchanged, this comparison would affect the 
performance and speed of the detection method. In addition, the hijackings that could 
take less than one day will disappear before they are detected. 
1 Another significant limitation is that an AS could impersonate a subspace/sub-prefix of a 
specific IP prefix of another AS, which means two different ASes announce one IP-
block; this is also considered a hijacking, but is called a sub-prefix hijacking. For 
example, YouTube’s CIDR (Classless Internet Domain Routing) is 208.65.152.0/22; any 
impersonator could announce an IP prefix in 208.65.152.0/22-208.65.155.0/32. In other 
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words, if Pakistan Telecom announces any CIDR between 208.65.152.0/22-32 and 
208.65.155.0/22-32, instead of 208.65.153.0/24, it would still impersonate one of 
YouTube’s IP prefixes; however, the detector cannot detect this kind of hijacking 
without the collaborative method discussed in Chapter 6.   
The collaborative method proposed in Chapter 6 is the best solution to avoid these limitations 
and overcome other possible drawbacks of the detection method. In summary, several copies 
of the detector have to work with each router in a collaborative way. These copies also need 
to be connected to routers to receive different time slots of BGP update messages and process 
them simultaneously. 
4.3.3 Detection method advantages  
First, the detection method can detect multiple occurrences of the same incident and allows 
the verification table to identify organisations that announce their routes with more than one 
ASN. Second, the detection method also achieves objectives regarding detection 
transparency; the time slot of processing data for detecting hijacking is flexible and gives 
results quickly. Third, the detection method uses a detection reduction technique to make 
detection of IP prefixing faster. Fourth, the detection method is considered self-checking as it 
searches for hijacking signatures in live BGP updates. Finally, the proposed detection method 
addresses different drawbacks and increases the accuracy of hijacking detection. Generally, 
the detection method would work to a high degree of efficiency and can detect hijacking 
when it is provided with live validating data. 
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4.4 Summary 
This chapter proposes an IP prefix hijack detection method using the 2008 YouTube Pakistan 
incident as a case study to build a trustworthy algorithm to detect hijacking incidents. 
However, a number of new national or international fake BGP announcements were detected 
during the aforementioned period, as discussed in section 4.2.3.2. The chapter also discussed 
a novel approach to distinguish between the same organisations announcing their IP prefixes 
with multiple ASes and different organisations announcing some prefixes with different ASes 
in order to avoid false positive detection. This investigation is needed in order to distinguish 
between normal and malicious BGP operations and address any errors that would likely cause 
false positives.  
From the results in section 4.2.3.4, it is clear that the detection method can work accurately 
and caught suspicious ASes their organisation codes and ASNs are available in RIPE 
database. Other RIRs were not included in the verification table because each has its own 
database structure and would not add many features to achieve the main idea and testing 
goals of the detection method. If the detection method works with one RIR, then other RIRs 
will likely work with the method both properly and accurately. First limitation encounters the 
detection method is determining the period to search for hijacking in the BGP update 
messages because hijacking behaviour could appear in two different time slots. Second 
limitation is that if an AS announces an IP prefix in the absence of the real origin AS, the 
algorithm will not be able to detect the impersonation when it works independently (non-
collaboratively). These two limitations will be solved by using the proposed collaborative 
method explained in detail in Chapter 6. Regarding its advantages, the detection algorithm is 
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able to improve the accuracy of IP prefix hijacks and remove suspicious hijackings that were 
already caught and added to the SASL. 
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Chapter	  :	  5 Detecting	   IP	   prefix	   hijacking	   based	   on	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  Systems’	  connectivity	  behaviour	  
5.1 Introduction  
An important observation needs to be taken into account regarding the previous solutions 
when they use ML (Machine Learning) as a detection technique. Previous solutions do not 
focus on the data, in the raw data, that directly contribute to achieving detection of the 
hijacking, such as AS numbers and prefixes. Picking the appropriate data to monitor and 
analyse will help detect IP prefix hijacking. For example, some solutions extract features 
[46], [7], [62] related to discovering the stability of routers to detect hijacking, but routers can 
become unstable for many reasons. In other words, any solution for detecting IP prefix 
hijacking based on monitoring router stability needs to find a way to distinguish between 
prefix hijacking and other, normal events that cause router instability. For instance, normal 
connections and disconnections of some routers could cause instability in others. Extracting 
features based on monitoring the stability of routers cannot determine whether router 
instability is due to hijacking or normal BGP functionalities. As a result, a detection method 
will be implemented in this chapter, based on different features, that monitors the 
connectivity of suspicious routers instead of their stability.  
The chapter discusses a novel detection method to detect IP prefix hijacking based on the 
ML. The detection method implemented in this chapter will use the IP prefix hijack 
classification to detect patterns of malicious behaviour by tracking the connectivity behaviour 
of suspicious ASes already found in Chapter 4, section 4.2.3 before verification. The 
detection method relies on the connectivity behaviour of suspicious ASes towards their 
neighbours. Namely, the connectivity behaviour of suspicious ASes will be used as input data 
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to five supervised learning classifiers. In other words, the detection method implements its 
own connectivity behaviour of suspicious ASes datasets and labels benign and malicious 
connectivity behaviour based on information about suspicious ASes located in the RIR 
databases. The detection method features will be extracted from the connectivity behaviour of 
the suspicious ASes; these features include the number of direct senders and the number of 
direct receivers for the victim and the hijacker. The quality of features will be calculated 
before the detection method classifies the suspicious ASes through their behaviour. The 
results of the five classifiers will be compared to judge the quality of the detection method. If 
the results of the classifiers are approximately equal, then the classifiers work properly. 
However, if the results of classifiers are too bad and the quality of features is very good, the 
limitations of IP prefix hijacking detection will be assigned to the classifiers; otherwise the 
limitations are attributed to the detection method. The detection method uses a different 
training dataset percentage and resulted in a 96% accuracy rate for detecting IP prefix 
hijacking.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 presents the components of the IP prefix 
hijacking detection method. Subsection 5.2.1 extracts some features based on the connectivity 
behaviour of suspicious ASes. Subsection 5.2.2 talks about a novel algorithm that can 
compute the similarity of suspicious AS behaviour to explore the capacity for differentiating 
between benign and malicious router behaviour via the proposed classifiers. Subsection 5.2.3 
discusses the methodology of the classification, while subsection 5.2.4 tests and displays the 
results of the detection method. Section 5.3 evaluates the accuracy of the detection method 
based on a classification dataset and the outputs of the learning algorithms. Finally, section 
5.4 summaries the findings of the chapter.  
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5.2 Detection method 
In the last few decades, Machine Learning has been used to detect anomalies in network 
traffic and has achieved good results as presented in [75], [48], [7], [46]. Based on these 
achievements, the proposed detection method in this chapter will use this technique to detect 
IP prefix hijacking in the BGP. Machine Leaning has different learning approaches for 
mining data, such as supervised learning, semi-supervised learning, unsupervised learning, 
reinforcement learning and deep learning. Since supervised learning needs to label malicious 
and benign instances before performing classification, it is considered more accurate and 
clear than other learning types; therefore, the datasets of the suspicious AS connectivity 
behaviour will be structured in a supervised learning format. The IP prefix hijack detection 
method consists of three main components as shown in Figure 5.1: a Feature Extractor (FE), 
Labeller and five different ML classifiers. 
   
Figure 5.1 Detection method using signature-model-based combination 
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5.2.1 Features extraction and data sampling  
The majority of previous anomaly detection methods extract features based on the stability of 
routers. However, these methods always fail to detect IP prefix hijacking or are rather poor at 
differentiating it from other anomalies [7], [8], [46]. Features extracted based on the stability 
of routers are not practical because routers can become unstable for other reasons, such as 
blackouts, outages and worms. The detection method proposed in this chapter includes a FE 
responsible for extracting nine features from potential suspicious ASes connectivity 
relationships with direct neighbours. All features extracted in this work are novel and 
extracted in a different way. The extraction method is based on the connective structure 
(topology) of relationships between suspicious ASes and their direct neighbours. The 
detection method extracts features from one of the direct locations of the issue, the ASPATH 
attribute, to differentiate the behaviour of hijackers and victims’ edge routers. Table 5-1 
displays the proposed features that will be used to detect IP prefix hijacking in the BGP.  
NO Type Features 
1.  
 
 
 
Connectivity 
Number of repeated incidents 
2. Number of receiver neighbours 
3. Number of sender neighbours 
4. Number of first propagators of suspicious routes 
5. Number of shared receiver neighbours 
6. Number of shared sender neighbours 
7. Number of shared first propagators of suspicious routes 
8. Number of connections between suspicious ASes 
9. Are they neighbours? 
Table 5-1 Features of suspicious ASes 
Feature 1 in Table 5-1 was extracted based on the observation that unintentional hijacking 
behaviour, such as misconfiguration, does not impersonate more than one prefix, whereas 
 120 
man-made prefix hijacks often attack different ASes at the same time. In other words, by 
monitoring the connectivity behaviour of misconfigured and man-made hijackings, it was 
found that deliberate hijacks attack different ASes, whereas misconfiguration hijacks attack 
only one AS. This feature must distinguish between deliberate hijacks and unintentional 
hijacks. Features 2–7 are based on the connections of the routers to suspicious ASes. 
Specifically, Features 2–4 focus on the direct neighbours (routers) of suspicious ASes, while 
Features 5–7 analyse shared direct neighbours between suspicious ASes. Feature 8 and 9 
identify direct and indirect connections between suspicious ASes. These features reveal both 
similar and different patterns of suspicious AS behaviours. 
5.2.1.1 Features calculations  
In order to see suspicious and affected ASes in the Internet infrastructure and calculate their 
connectivity when an edge router impersonates the ownership of a prefix owned by another 
edge router (AS), the NAV (Network Analysis and Visualisation) toolbox [76] will be used in 
the proposed method. The NAV toolbox can automatically help plotting the topology of 
suspicious ASes and show their connectivity to their neighbours. Suspicious ASes have a 
hijacking signature when advertising a BGP update message but are not necessarily 
announced as a real hijacking, whereas affected ASes spread fake routes over the Internet. 
The detection method tries to implement the features based on suspicious AS behaviour and 
not purely malicious or purely benign behaviour because if the detection method can detect 
IP prefix hijacking from suspicious AS behaviour, it can implicitly classify purely malicious 
ASes or purely benign ASes as well. Based on the methodology the detection method will use 
for extracting features, the affected ASes represent the direct neighbours of the suspicious 
ASes.  
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Suspicious ASes are composed of two ASes, either benign and benign or benign and 
malicious. Based on these categories, two types of behaviour need to be worked out for each 
feature: connectivity behaviour and relational behaviour. Connectivity behaviour is the 
connection of a suspicious AS to its direct neighbours, whereas relational behaviour is the 
relation between two suspicious ASes. The relational behaviours of these two suspicious 
ASes need to be computed separately to differentiate their behaviours.  
The connectivity behaviour of suspicious ASes will be calculated based on the suggested 
features displayed in Figure 5.1, and the results of the two ASes will be subtracted to give the 
relational behaviour value of the pair of suspicious ASes. For example, we assume that we 
have a pair of edge routers, (AS1, AS2) and (AS3, AS4), as in Figure 5.2. AS1 has the victim 
router and AS2 has the hijacker router, while AS3 has the real owner router of an IP prefix 
and AS4 has another real owner router of the same IP prefix. The victim router and hijacker 
router in (AS1, AS2) represent real hijacking, while owner routers in (AS3, AS4) are 
considered suspicious hijacking. The victim receives some announcements from two 
neighbours, while the hijacker receives its announcements from one neighbour. This shows 
that upper pair routers in AS1 and AS2 have a different number of sender neighbours, which 
is 2 and 1 (2 – 1 = 1), respectively. However, the pair suspicious routers in AS3 and AS4 
have the same number of sender neighbours, which is 3 and 0 (3 -3 = 0). The owners in AS3 
and AS4 are considered suspicious because they carry the signature of the hijacking; two 
different routers in two different ASes announcing one prefix.  
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Figure 5.2 Example of one-feature router connectivity calculation 
Since the relational behaviour between the two suspicious ASes can be negative in some 
cases, the absolute value of the differences has to be determined using  (1. The relational 
behaviour value is applied to remove the sign. SAS1 represents the connectivity behaviour of 
the first suspicious AS, while SAS1 reflects the connectivity behaviour of the second 
suspicious AS. Sr represents the relational behaviour between two ASes. SAS1 and SAS2 could 
both be owners of an IP prefix or a victim and a hijacker.  
𝑺𝒓 =    𝑺𝑨𝑺𝟏 − 𝑺𝑨𝑺𝟐  (1) 
The same process for calculating the relational behaviour of a pair of suspicious routers is 
applied to the remaining features, not just the number of sender neighbours. The results of 
each pair of ASes are subtracted and put in a column vector to represent the relational 
behaviour of a pair of suspicious ASes. The column vectors are put together in one training 
and testing dataset; these column vectors represent the behavioural pattern of the two 
suspicious ASes.  
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5.2.1.2 Labelling rules of relational connectivity behaviour of suspicious ASes  
After implementing the training and testing dataset in section 5.2.1.1, the relational 
connectivity behaviour of suspicious ASes will be labelled with malicious and benign marks 
(0s and 1s) based on RIR database information, such as AfriNIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC 
and RIPE NCC. Since AS numbers and prefixes are delegated by several organisations and 
the detection method is only based on the RIRs for differentiating the hijacker from the 
victim, there are some incidents that cannot be labelled. In addition, some suspicious ASes or 
impersonated prefixes are no longer available in the RIRs. To label the relational connectivity 
behaviour of suspicious ASes, the detection method uses three main labels as shown in Table 
5-2.  
The strategy for calculating the labels of the relational connectivity behaviour of suspicious 
ASes in the training and testing dataset is based on four rules: If the RIRs show that both of 
the suspicious ASes own the route, they are both marked with OWNER and the event is 
considered benign. However, if the RIRs show that one of the suspicious ASes owns the 
prefix, it is marked with OWNER while the other is marked as HIJACKER, and the event is 
considered malicious. If neither of the suspicious ASes owns the prefix, they will be tagged 
with NOTSURE, and the event will be labelled AMBIGUOUS. Finally, if the RIRs show that 
the two suspicious ASes do not exist, they will be ignored and not added to the training and 
testing dataset.  
Suspicious 
AS1 
Suspicious 
AS2 
AS1 status AS2 status Labels  
100 250 OWNER OWNER BENIGN 
200 10 ATTACKER OWNER MALICIOUS 
300 50 NOT SURE NOT SURE AMBIGUOUS 
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Table 5-2 Example of suspicious ASes labelling 
BENIGN represents semi-hijacks, which means one organisation could own a block of AS 
numbers and announce one of their prefixes with these ASNs. This announcement gives the 
same signature of a real hijacking but is in reality benign. MALICIOUS represents real 
hijacks. AMBIGUOUS events will be removed from the dataset, and only the records  
labelled BENIGN (represented by 1) and MALICIOUS (represented by 0) will be saved in 
the dataset, as presented in the next section.  
5.2.1.3 Sampling data of suspicious ASes 
This section discusses how the relational connectivity behaviour of suspicious ASes and their 
labelling values are put in supervised classification data structures. Table 5-3 shows a 
snapshot of the instances calculated based on the proposed features listed in Table 2-2 and the 
labelling rules discussed in section 5.2.1.2.  
Symbols F1–F9 represent the number of features of suspicious AS behaviour, while C 
indicates whether the event is a hijack or not. Each feature is stored in a separate column 
vector. These column vectors are concatenated with the class column vector to give a dataset 
composed of 10 columns, including observation classes, and 340 instances.  
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 C 
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2 22 1 665 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 7 0 7 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Table 5-3 Example of supervised sampling data 
There are several reasons for making the dataset small and should therefore be discussed in 
detail. As the registration details of some suspicious ASes are sometimes not shown in RIR 
Whois during labelling the relational connectivity behaviour of suspicious ASes, it would be 
very difficult to know hijackers from the victims and label them. Thus, 133 out of 340 
records were removed from the dataset. It is likely that the unfound suspicious ASNs or 
hijacked IP prefixes were delegated to suspicious organisations by other than RIRs, such as 
big ISPs that have a permission to provide their customers with ASNs and IP prefixes, or 
these data are no longer used by the organisations. Another reason for not seeing suspicious 
AS information is because AS-blocks or IP prefix spaces have not yet been allocated by the 
IANA and attackers might use them for different purposes; but in reality, they do not exist. 
As a result, the new size of the dataset was dropped to 227 instances. Another important task 
is to eliminate redundant instances. In other words, all duplicated records were removed from 
the dataset because there was no need for similar events. In other words, the detection method 
does not rely on the frequency of an incident’s occurrence. After labelling instances based on 
the RIR Whois validation and removing repeated suspicious observations, the new size of the 
classification dataset was 113 instances (suspicious AS patterns) by nine attributes (features).  
Although the size of the dataset decreased, the hijacking detection performance increased 
because only the necessary and definite benign and malicious suspicious ASes were 
 126 
considered, and ambiguous suspicious ASes were removed. By removing duplicated patterns 
of suspicious ASes behaviour in the dataset, the detection method becomes faster over a large 
number of BGP updates during live communication between BGP routers and the detection 
method to detect IP prefix hijacking. It would be a good idea for RIRs or other interested 
parties (e.g., Oregon University) to store the history of the hijacker and victim ASes in 
addition to BGP update messages to provide adequate and accurate information to 
researchers. That would provide interested researchers with a large dataset to work on. 
If the proposed learning algorithms in section 5.2.3 can differentiate between patterns of 
malicious and benign observations, then the extracted features are useful and built in a highly 
efficient way. Section 5.4 will determine the quality of the features and evaluate the detection 
method. 
5.2.2 Calculating data similarities and differences 
A novel algorithm will be implemented in this section to compute the similarity and 
difference behaviour of benign and malicious route patterns in the classification dataset. The 
dataset will be sorted according to their classes (0 and 1). Malicious and benign observations 
will be separated into two different matrices (datasets). Malicious row observations will be 
correspondingly compared value by value (scalar by scalar) against every benign sequence 
(instance). Afterwards, the algorithm will create a 0-and-1 matrix for holding the comparison 
results of corresponding sectors of the malicious row observations and benign row 
observations. If the corresponding scalars (values) are equal, the algorithm will put 0 in the 
corresponding location in the new 0-and-1 matrix; otherwise, the algorithm will put 1 in the 
location. For deciding 0 and 1 values, the algorithm uses the XOR logical operator concept; 
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the output is true if the inputs are not alike; otherwise, the output is false. One observation of 
either class (benign or malicious) will be compared to all observations in another class. Xb 
represents benign matrix row vectors, and Ym represents malicious matrix row vectors, as in (2) and (3).  
𝑋! = 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3, 𝑓4, 𝑓5, 𝑓6, 𝑓7, 𝑓8, 𝑓9   (2) 
𝑌! = 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3, 𝑓4, 𝑓5, 𝑓6, 𝑓7, 𝑓8, 𝑓9   (3) 
By the end, the algorithm will convert the integer values of the benign and malicious matrices 
into binary matrices having only two value types, as shown in Table 5-4. Zeroes represent the 
similarity scalars, while ones represent the difference scalars between benign and malicious 
observations in the classification dataset produced in section 5.2.1.3. The first row in Table 
5-4 shows the similarity and difference scalars of observations (behaviours) in the benign 
matrix compared to all observations (behaviours) in the malicious matrix. Each benign row 
vector creates a 0-and-1 matrix equal to the malicious matrix size [76 X 9], as in Table 5-4.  
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
. . . . . . . . . . 
76 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Table 5-4 Example of 0-and-1 matrix 
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The algorithm works out the similarities and differences of each matrix separately, as in (4, (5 
and (6. First, the algorithm calculates the number of similarities, which is the number of zeros 
in each row vector, and saves the values in a column vector. Similarly, the algorithm 
computes the number of ones, which represent the differences, and saves the values in the 
second column vector against the similarity values. Second, the algorithm calculates the 
summation of the values in the first column vector, which represent the similarity of the first 
row vector in the benign matrix to all observations (behaviours) in the malicious matrix. In 
the same way, the algorithm calculates the summation of the values in the second column 
vector, which represent the difference of the first row vector in the benign matrix to all 
observations (behaviours) in the malicious matrix. Equation 4 shows the first part of the 
computation of similarity and difference of each benign pattern to all malicious patterns, 
where for is the loop starting from the first observation in the benign matrix and ending at the 
last observation of the matrix.  𝑋!! is benign observations, and 𝑌! is malicious observations, 
whereas 0 is the summation of similar patterns and 1 is the summation of different 
patterns.  
𝑓𝑜𝑟!!!! 𝑋!!   𝑥𝑜𝑟  𝑌! !!       (4) 
Third, the algorithm takes the means of the summations of similarities and differences, which 
were already saved in the two column vectors, of benign and malicious patterns, from 
equation 5 and 6 below, where n is the number of similarities or differences in the column 
vectors, Si represents the similarities and Di the differences of every benign pattern 
corresponding to all malicious observations in the malicious matrix. 𝑆 returns with the mean 
of similarity for all benign observations to malicious observations, whereas 𝐷 returns with the 
mean of differences of all benign observations to malicious observations.  
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𝑆 = !!!!!!!   (5) 
𝐷 = !!!!!!!   (6) 
The similarity of malicious and benign patterns was calculated to determine to what extent 
the behaviour of benign and malicious suspicious ASes are similar. In other words, this 
calculation shows the quality of the classification dataset (features), which was proposed in 
section 5.2.1.3. Figure 5.3 shows the similarity of each benign behaviour to all malicious 
behaviours of suspicious ASes. If the average of benign behaviour against malicious 
behaviour is computed, it gives 4.31 out of 9, which is the number of features. This average 
needs to be multiplied by 100 and divided by 9 to give the total similarity between benign 
behaviour and malicious behaviour of suspicious ASes, which is 47%. This percentage is not 
very high, which means that the features are adequate to differentiate between the two 
behaviours. 
  
Figure 5.3 Features quality 
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5.2.3 Classification  
This section discusses the process of detecting IP prefix hijacking based on data classification 
techniques. The specific percentage of the labelled instances (training dataset), as mentioned 
in section 5.2.1.1, is passed on as inputs to the ML component to be trained; while the other 
instances, which represent the test dataset (unseen data), remain to be classified. In other 
words, the detection method uses the Split Test method to divide the dataset already received 
by the FE and labelled by the Labeller into the training dataset and test dataset. This method 
helps towards using the training dataset to estimate unseen data and knowing the quality of 
the proposed features. The detection method tests the quality of the features based on the five 
classifiers (learning algorithms) will be discussed in section 5.2.3.1. In other words, the 
detection method uses the best five learning algorithms that have been used on previous 
applications and which suit the specifications and characteristics of the classification dataset 
for evaluating the proposed features. The instances (observations or examples) in the 
classification dataset are classified based on the following steps: 
• The dataset is split randomly into 80% training dataset and 20% test dataset for 
each learning algorithm and retrained several times. 
• One of the selected classifiers starts with building the models of different learning 
algorithms and testing unseen instances of the suspicious ASes. 
• Every classifier’s parameters are adjusted repeatedly until the best parameters 
work efficiently with the proposed features. 
• The best result of each classifier is registered to be later compared with other good 
results of the classifiers. 
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• Based on the offset of the percentage of false positives and false negatives of the 
classifier results, the best result is announced. 
5.2.3.1 Best classifier studies  
In 2008, Wu et al. studied the best algorithms that have been used in data mining over the 
past few decades. The study concerned the best learning algorithms among several methods, 
such as classification, clustering, statistical learning, association analysis and link mining 
[77]. Table 5-5 shows the summary of the best 10 supervised and unsupervised learning 
algorithms that can be used in classification in different applications. However, the detection 
method is only concerned with supervised learning algorithms because the classification 
dataset was prepared to work with supervised learning classifiers. 
Algorithm Category Learning Types Families 
C4.5 (J48) Classification Supervised Decision tree 
K-Means Clustering Unsupervised Clusters 
SVM Statistical Supervised - 
Apriori Association Unsupervised Associations 
EM Clustering Unsupervised Clusters 
PageRank Link mining Unsupervised - 
AdaBoost Classification Supervised Ensemble 
KNN Classification Supervised Lazy 
Naive Bayes Classification Supervised Bayes 
CART Classification Supervised Decision tree 
Table 5-5 Top 10 algorithms in data mining [77] 
Another study investigating the best learning classifiers was conducted in 2014. The study 
compared 179 classifiers for 17 families and over 121 different databases and found that the 
best classifiers are RandomForest versions [78]. RandomForest belongs to a rule-based 
family and is categorised as supervised learning. In addition, In 2014, Kaur and Chhabra 
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claimed that an improved J48 was used recently to increase the accuracy rate of classification 
[79]. J48 is categorised as one of decision tree family that is based on several parameters such 
as binary split, confidence factor and pruned or unpruned leaves. It can work with datasets 
that have missing class values, numeric or nominal class and binary class. 
 
5.2.3.2 Classifiers selection 
This section discusses the selection of classifiers used with the classification dataset. This 
selection is based on two previous deep studies of the best algorithms in data mining. The 
first study [77] was based on the research community and how the best algorithms are used 
widely in different area in data mining, while the second study [78] was an empirical study 
performed by some experts in data mining. Both studies are important because they cover 
each other’s limitations. The studies covered two types of learning, but the detection method 
uses supervised learning algorithms because they can provide a better prior picture of benign 
and malicious patterns.  
The classification dataset was prepared to suit different specifications of the classification 
algorithms. The dataset is numeric, does not have missing values, has natural and discrete 
attribute values, fewer data, and is a binary class, which makes the classification of classifiers 
easier. According to the two strongest attribute evaluators of datasets, PCA (Principal 
Component Analysis) determined that the dataset has only one redundant attribute and that 
the remaining eight features are relevant, while the SVM (Support Vector Machine) attribute 
evaluator considered all attributes to be useful.  
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Based on the features of learning algorithms, such as accuracy, speed, the offset of having 
false positive and negatives, and the ability to deal with the structure of the dataset, the 
classifiers were chosen. The detection method uses J48, which is considered an improved 
version of C4.5 and C5.0, because it has several advantages and can work with the structure 
of the dataset. Generally, a decision tree can classify unknown instances quickly and is 
suitable for interpreting small-sized trees (dataset). In addition, a decision tree can handle 
discrete attributes, works well in the presence of redundant attributes, and is robust in terms 
of the effect of outliers; therefore, two classifiers, RandomForest and CART (SimpleCart), 
were also used. Furthermore, k-NN (k-Nearest Neighbour) and NB (Naïve Bayes) were used 
because of their ability to classify datasets with only two classes. Both NB and k-NN support 
complex decision functions or non-linear decision boundaries to isolate multidimensional 
data and different classes. 
5.2.4 Testing and results  
Deciding the best classifier for the dataset, as implemented in section 5.2.1.3, was based on 
the classification accuracy and error rate of false positives and false negatives. This section 
describes the accuracy classification of the proposed classifiers to classify the benign and 
malicious behaviour of suspicious ASes in the dataset. The error rate, which shows the best 
classifier, will be calculated in the two sections below. Since there is no a mechanism in the 
ML to determine the best percentage, the classifiers were randomly fed with different 
percentages of training and testing datasets. All classifiers’ parameter values in Table 5-6 
needed to be changed continuously to suit the dataset characteristics. Based on these changes 
of algorithm parameter values, the accuracy of the classification was registered and the 
classification stopped when the classifiers obtained the best results. However, the results in 
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Table 5-6 do not show the best algorithm that could work with the classification dataset 
because the error rate was at yet unknown. Thus, the computation of the error rate needed to 
be worked out for all classifiers, as demonstrated section 5.2.4.2. The highest classification 
accuracy of the classifiers showed up when the training dataset reached 80%. From the 
results in Table 5-6, J48 produced the best result in the classification. However, the detection 
method took the classifier error rate into account to pick the best algorithm that could work 
with the classification dataset and the proposed features.  
5.2.4.1 Confusion computation  
Table 5-7 shows correctly and incorrectly classified instances for both classes, benign and 
malicious, in the classification dataset. The first row in the confusion matrices column 
represents the malicious class, while the second row represents the benign class of tested 
instances (observations) in the testing dataset. None of the algorithms had difficulty 
classifying malicious observations except Naïve Bayes and RandomForest, but generally all 
algorithms worked well with the classification dataset and the proposed features.  
For malicious observation classification, J48 and CART classified the testing dataset and 
gave 0 incorrectly classified malicious observations and 18 correctly classified malicious 
observations, while k-NN yielded 0 incorrectly classified malicious observations and 10 
Family  Algorithm Training dataset Test dataset Accuracy 
Trees  J48  
 
80% 
 
 
20% 
 
96% 
Lazy k-NN 91% 
Bayes NB 87% 
Trees  CART 95% 
Trees  RF 91% 
Table 5-6 Results based on Rule and Tree machine learning algorithms 
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correctly classified observations. However, Naïve Bayes and RandomForest yielded two 
incorrectly classified malicious observations and 16 correctly classified observations.  
In terms of benign observation classification, RandomForest is considered the best classifier 
among the five algorithms because it had no incorrectly classified observations. J48, NB and 
CART had the same accuracy rate for detecting benign data, while k-NN was considered the 
worst as it had two observations classified incorrectly and three classified correctly.  
If the total number of chosen classified observations is considered, k-NN only classified 15 
observations out of all observations in the classification dataset. On the other hand, CART 
classified 25 observations, but the remaining three algorithms classified 23 observations. The 
calculation of false positives and negatives in section 5.2.4.2 will take all of this into account 
while calculating the trade-off between false positives and negatives of the five classifiers to 
determine the best one. 
Algorithms  Trained dataset percentage  Confusion matrices False positives 
and negatives  
J48 
 
80% 
18 0  0 
1 4 1 
k-NN  10 0 0 
2 3 2 
NB  16 2 2 
1 4 1 
CART 18 0 0 
1 5 1 
RF 16 2 2 
0 5 0 
Table 5-7 Confusion matrix testing for the five best classifiers 
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5.2.4.2 False positive and negative computation  
From the two equations below, 7 and 8, the detection method can compute the percentage 
error of the false positives and false negatives for each algorithm, where MFp represents 
malicious false positives and BFn represents benign false negatives. During classification, 
every classifier randomly selected the number of instances of the testing dataset to be 
classified. This number represents the total classified observations size.  
𝑀𝐹! =    !"#$%&#'()  !"#$$#%#&'  !"#$%"&'#!"#$$%&'(  !"#$%&'()!*#  !"#$     (7) 
𝐵𝐹!   =    !"#$%&#'()  !"#$$#%#&'  !"#$%"&'#!"#$$%&'(  !"#$%&'()!*#  !"#$   (8) 
Figure 5.4 visualises the error rate of false positives and false negatives of each algorithm. 
This graph shows that false positives (malicious classification errors) are fewer than false 
negatives (benign classification errors) in the three classifiers (J48, k-NN and CART) and 
explores the best algorithm based on the trade-offs between false positives and negatives of 
the classifiers. From the trade-off perspective of false positives and negatives (error rate), the 
graph shows that J48 and CART are the best two algorithms (classifiers) that can work with 
the classification dataset and proposed features for detecting IP prefix hijacking because both 
classifiers have the same value of benign false positives and malicious false negatives. 
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Figure 5.4 Algorithms tried with the detection method 
5.3 Evaluation  
Comparing to previous solutions such as those proposed in [7], [8], [46], the whole classifiers 
work in a good efficiency in terms of the detection method because the false positives and 
negatives do not exceed 13%, as shown in Figure 5.4. However, the two best classifiers that 
can work with the extracted proposed features are J48 and CART as their error rates are less 
than the other classifiers. The results of the classification support the 2014 Kaur and Chhabra 
study, which found that J48 increases the accuracy rate of the classification. However, as J48, 
k-NN and CART are all good at detecting malicious observations (real hijackings) and RF is 
considered the best for detecting benign observations (not hijackings), the detection method 
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The detection method in Figure 5.5 picks different percentages and tries them on the two best 
algorithms in order to determine to what extent picking the percentage of the training dataset 
could affect the result. The graph shows that there is a big fluctuation in terms of choosing 
the percentage of the training dataset in both algorithms but more so in CART. J48 is more 
stable than CART over the whole period. As a result, the best choice would be to use 80% of 
the training dataset to classify benign and malicious router behaviour and then detect IP 
prefix hijacking. 
 
Figure 5.5 Does changing the percentage affect the detection method? 
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detection method works more deeply and widely because it uses all RIR databases to label 
benign and malicious AS behaviour. It consists of three components: a Feature Extractor, a 
Labeller and ML classifiers. The Feature Extractor, or FE, receives suspicious ASes as inputs 
and extracts features based on the behaviour of suspicious AS connectivity. Feature values of 
the suspicious ASes are given to the Labeller to be labelled with two classes, benign and 
malicious. The Labeller uses registered information from the organisations, which is 
available in RIRs, to identify victims and hijackers and to determine if the suspicious incident 
is benign or malicious. The outputs of the Labeller, which comprises a classification dataset, 
are given to different supervised classifiers to predict the behaviour of malicious and benign 
router behaviour.  
There are three main ways to measure the accuracy of the detection method: the total 
similarity between benign and malicious behaviour patterns (quality of the dataset), extracted 
features and chosen classifiers. The similarity or differences between the malicious and 
benign behaviours is calculated in order to examine the quality of the classification dataset 
before training and classifying them. Based on the similarity or difference between the 
malicious and benign behaviour patterns, the proposed classification dataset is determined to 
be passed to the classifiers or not. In other words, studying the total similarity among benign 
and malicious behaviours in the classification dataset will help to determine the accuracy of 
the proposed features that attempt to detect IP prefix hijacking. Based on the quality and 
specifications of the classification dataset were explained in section 5.2.3.2, five learning 
algorithms are used with the feature values.  
The detection method is subject to some conditions that made the size of the classification 
dataset very small. First, building the dataset and labelling the benign and malicious 
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behaviour of suspicious ASes were performed manually because the registration information 
of the suspicious ASes was not available in the RIRs in structured databases to check them in 
a programmable way. Second, the detector presented in Chapter 4 only depends on the 
suspicious ASes. Namely, all clearly benign ASes were not included in the dataset because 
they are considered extra, suspicious ASes contain skeptical benign and malicious ASes as it 
was explained section 5.2.1.1. In other words, there is no tool to label data from historical 
incidents accurately. As a result, an accurate dataset was created based on checking the 
ownership of suspicious ASes and IP prefixes through RIR websites. Generally, the results of 
the detection method are encouraging compared to previous solutions and because the 
percentage of false positives and false negatives was less than 5% and the total classification 
accuracy of the best classifier (J48) reached 96%.  
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Chapter	  :	  6 Integrating	   the	   proposed	   detection	   methods	   with	   the	  
BGP	  	  
6.1 Introduction  
BGP is subjected to two types of hijacking: super-prefix and sub-prefix hijacks. BGP routers 
update their routing tables collaboratively and exchange huge amounts of data in 
milliseconds. As a result, any proposed detection method based on a detection technique to 
secure BGP should be structured in a collaborative way so it can search for IP prefix 
hijacking more efficiently and effectively. This chapter proposes a theoretical framework for 
collaborative BGP hijack detection. This method is composed of multiple instances of the 
individual detection nodes, running the method proposed in chapter 4 and 5, to give a chance 
for cooperation in detecting IP prefix hijacking. In addition, this method aims to overcome 
two limitations that appeared in the second proposed detection method in chapter 4. 
Each detection method instance, in either chapter 4 or 5, can be linked to individual BGP 
routers to collect data and process them separately. Afterwards, the detection method 
instances warn connected routers of the occurrence of IP prefix hijacking. In other words, 
some instances of the detection methods search for IP prefix hijacking similarly and at the 
same time, but likely with different time slots and BGP updates. A few connections of the 
same detection method instances to BGP routers in different regions can detect 
impersonations of origin ASes of other organisations. It is not necessary for all BGP routers 
on the Internet to be linked to the detection method instances but some of them can detect the 
IP prefix hijacking.  
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The aim of the collaboration is to allow the second and third detection method instances to 
jointly benefit from independently identified events on each router and, subsequently, result 
in higher accuracy and quicker detection of IP prefix hijacking. An IP prefix hijacking event 
might not significantly affect traffic exchanged with the impersonated AS until it spreads to 
multiple/different ASes. To alleviate the effect of the hijacking, the detection method 
instances of the second detection method have to work collaboratively to prevent the 
propagation of invalid routes. Similarly, different instances of the third detection method 
need to work collaboratively to detect hijacking among BGP routers. If there are routers do 
not have links to the detection method instances, they might be subjected to hijacking. 
However, their effect will be limited because the other instances of the detection methods, 
which are linked to the routers, will detect the hijacks and notify other instances with the 
hijacking. By doing so, each BGP router has a chance to suppress any suspicious routes to 
prevent itself from further propagating the hijacked routes. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 illustrates how the collaborative architecture 
of the detection method can link BGP routers to collect data and detect IP prefix hijacking 
quickly and accurately. Section 6.3 discusses a case study of integrating the detection 
method, proposed in chapter 4, to BGP router and draws a topology of the hijacking and its 
detection while Section 6.4 discusses the work of the third detection method, proposed in 
chapter 5, in the collaborative detection method. Section 6.5 evaluates the detection methods, 
proposed in chapter 4 and 5, when they work collaboratively. Finally, section 6.6 will 
summarise the whole chapter.   
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6.2 General architecture of collaborative detection method  
This section describes a novel theoretical collaborative detection method that make different 
instances of the detection methods that proposed in chapter 4 and 5 able to work together and 
detect different IP prefix hijacking on different routers at the same time. The collaborative 
detection method consists of separate blocks, with each block having the same instance of the 
detection method has been built in chapter 4 and 5. The hijacking detection method instances 
are connected to edge routers, operate independently and categorise network events, but may 
benefit from sharing detected IP prefix hijackings to detect the effect of such attacks rapidly; 
therefore, a special remote centralised database (RCDB) is allocated to the collaborative 
detection method in a trusted centralised organisation (third-party).  
The second detection method, proposed in chapter 4, instances need to collect updates and 
send them to the organisation and the organisation, in return, will have a mechanism to 
distribute different time-slots of updates (portion of updates) to different instances of the 
second detection method using unique identifiers.  
The third detection method, proposed in chapter 5, instances does not need the organisation to 
distribute time-slots of updates directly to different instances of the third detection method; 
instead, the instances will receive the results from the second detection method and send their 
outputs to the RCDB so other instances of the third detection method can achieve the 
collaborative detection.  
The same detection method instances of either second or third method instances have to work 
together and their results are controlled by the third-party to improve the reliability and 
timeliness of the information derived from the BGP update messages. Figure 6.1 shows the 
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general architecture of the collaborative detection method when it is linked to BGP routers 
and the remote centralised database, and the details of the collaborative detection method will 
be explained in section 6.3 and its subsections.  
 
Figure 6.1 Collaborative Detection method architecture 
Every detection method instance in the collaborative detection method detects IP prefix 
hijacking independently and saves the results in the RCDB of the third-party so that other 
detection method instances can access them for checking the existence of new caught 
hijackings. The third-party, in turn, originates and updates detected hijacking incidents in 
order to stop detection method instances notifying old hijacking events to affected network 
owners (network operators) and to control the size of the database. Afterwards, every 
detection method should have the ability to check RCDB every one-minute in order to 
identify whether it has incidents saved by other remote detection method instances. Any 
detection method instance finds a hijacking incident in the RCDB, whether caught by itself or 
via other collaborative detection method instances, has to inform it to network operators to be 
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either removed from their routing tables, to stop propagating it to other neighbours or to 
ignore the update if it has not arrived yet to unaffected routers.  
Both second and third detections will use one topology to evaluate their reliability. The 
second detection method discusses the use of the proposed techniques that are suggested 
going to be proposed in section 6.3.2 and the scenario of the hijacking in details. However, 
the third detection method will only discuss the operations that are different from the second 
detection method in order to avoid the re-explanation and because the result of the 
collaborative detection method is same. In other words, the third detection method instances 
will not talk about using the techniques that already used with the second detection method 
instances; instead will thoroughly discuss new things. 
6.3 Case study of integrating the second detection method to BGP 
This section will represent a topology case study to theoretically demonstrate the reliability of 
the detection method, was proposed in chapter 4, upon IP prefix hijacking is detected. The 
scenario starts with showing the connections among routers, then injects an IP prefix 
hijacking and tries to detect it. Afterward, the topology will show how the detection method 
instances can detect hijacking independently and collaboratively using the RCDB. Previous 
detection methods suffer from different factors affecting their reliability; therefore, the 
detection method will evaluate its reliability based on these factors plus other two factors. 
First, the contents of BGP updates have two attributes (distinguishing AS aggregation and IP 
confederation) with direct relationship to AS numbers and IP prefixes where the hijacking 
occurs. Second, MOAS conflicts also considered a problem to the reliability of the previous 
solutions. Since the proposed detection method deals with the ASes and IP prefixes away 
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from the distribution policies of ASes and IP prefix management, these attributes and MOAS 
will not pose any problem to the reliability of the detection method. However, the detection 
method may encounter two issues regarding detecting the hijacking, the compatibility speed 
of exchanging routing information and the detection, and missing some incidents when the 
impersonation of the IP prefix appear in different time-slots (announcements). The topology 
in section 6.3.1 will show the unaffectedness of the factors, which affected the previous 
solutions, to the proposed detection method and solve the other two issues by using the 
collaborative detection method. In addition, connection types (e.g. transit and stub ASes) play 
an important rule to the reliability of the detection method; therefore, the case study took into 
account this factor as well.  
6.3.1 Topology  
The topology of the proposed scenario consists of 5 routers and 5 Autonomous Systems, 
three network operators, three servers, fifteen connections, one organisation with a Controller 
and remote centralised database (RCDB), as it is shown in Figure 6.2. According to the ASes 
contents and their roles, AS600, AS700 and AS800 have three routers but were drawn in this 
way to show that these ASes are owned by one organisation. In other words, RTD should be 
allocated to different ASes but it is drawn as one router for the simplicity and to show that 
one organisation can announce one IP prefix with different ASNs. The organisation owns 
three ASes (AS600, AS700 and AS800), has one super-prefixes (192.155.10.0/16) and sub-
prefixes 192.155.0.0/9-15. RTD in AS600, AS700 and AS800 represents the victim whereas 
RTB in AS300 represents the hijacker. Three network operators also have been added to the 
topology in order to show their tasks in the collaborative method. An organisation needs to be 
assigned as a Controller to manage the RCDB, the distribution of the updates to the detection 
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method instances and their communication to detect the hijacking efficiently, as it is going to 
be explained in section 6.3.1.  
In terms of the contents of the servers and their roles, Server A has either Cisco, Juniper, or 
Zebra as a virtual router tool to establish a dummy BGP session (using multi-hop BGP 
sessions) with RTA in Autonomous System AS100 in order to be able to receive BGP update 
messages. In like manner, the two servers (server B and server C) should have one of routing 
tools (Cisco, Juniper, or Zebra) to establish sessions with RTB, in AS300, and RTE, in 
AS500. All servers should have a copy of the detection method, that already proposed in 
chapter 4, to show how they are collaborate to detect the hijacking efficiently. The topology 
also has a RCDB to store IP prefix hijacks that are detected by the detection methods.  
In terms of the connectivity among routers, RTA is connected to three nodes, two sending 
links and one receiving link, which means RTB receives updates from RTA but not vice 
versa. Similarly, RTC is linked to three routers and receives others’ updates through RTD and 
propagates them to RTA and RTE. However, RTB receives updates from RTA and TRD and 
sends the updates to Sever C whereas RTD also has three connections but receives updates 
from tow routers, RTB and RTE, and propagates them to RTC. RTB and RTD can receive 
and propagate BGP updates from each other. RTE receives BGP updates from RTC and 
sends them to other two nodes (RTD and Server B). Finally, the three servers are connected 
to the RCDB in two ways (sending and receiving data).  
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Figure 6.2 Detection method and BGP integration 
The RCDB consists of two tables, first table is used for receiving updates from different 
detection method instances and managing the distribution of the updates to the detection 
method instances while second table is utilised to manage detected hijackings. The first table 
has four columns: first column stores the detection method instances’ identifiers, second 
column stores the time of the announcement, third column saves the ASNs while the last 
column stores the announced IP prefixes. The second table has five columns: first column is 
allocated for the detection method instances’ identifiers but must be unique. The second 
column represents the times of the hijackings are detected at, while the third column is 
allocated for the ASes that impersonate other AS IP prefixes. The last column is reserved for 
the victims’ IP prefixes.  Fifth column is allocated for notified hijacking. In other words, 
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when a hijacking is shared with other detection method instances and notified to the network 
operators, it will be marked as notified so it makes sure it is not going to be notified again by 
the same detection method. 
6.3.2 Mechanism of the Controller and sliding window 
The BGP updates are received by different detection method instances, which are linked to 
the routers. These updates will not be duplicated in the RCDB because each update has 
different data from other updates. In other words, the RCDB will not have repeated BGP 
packets but will have repeated announcements (origin ASes, prefixes), which are going to be 
filtered by the detection method instances, as it was described in section 4.2.3. In addition, 
the impersonation of the IP prefixes cannot be predicted to which router is going to be 
happened; therefore it is not feasible to only collect updates from a single route. As a result, 
the Controller will receive updates from different routers and redistribute different time-slots 
of updates to the detection method instances. Sliding window technique will be used to solve 
missing out some incidents that showed up in chapter 4 upon the detection, and centralised 
controller mechanism will be used to overcome inefficiency between speed of hijacking 
detection method and routers’ speed of exchanging routing information.  
The Controller can decide the size of the window based on three things: the specifications of 
the servers that holding the detection method instances, how quickly the updates are 
processed by the detection method and the massiveness of saving the exchanging routing 
information in the RCDB (e.g. 15 time-slots). According to the three criteria, the time-slots 
might not be equal due to the specification of the servers. First time-slot has to be sent to one 
of the detection method instances to be processed. The operation is repeated with other 
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detection method instances continuously but with excluding one BGP packet from the 
previous time-slot to achieve sliding window technique. For example, if the time-slot is 5 
minutes, the first detection method will be given 5 minutes time-slot of updates and the 
second detection method will be given a time-slot based on the specification of the server the 
detection method linked to, but starting from the second update. In this case, the collaborative 
detection method can search for IP prefix hijacking signatures on different detection method 
instances without missing any incidents or having an issue to the speed of hijacking 
detection. Any detection method detects a hijack has to save it in the RCDB in order to the 
detection method instances be able to notify other routers with the hijackings.  
In the context of the RCDB maintenance, the Controller needs to manage the RCDB in order 
to prevent repetition of announcing the same hijacking by the same detection method instance 
upon checking the database for new hijacking and prevent the growth of the database. The 
Controller updates each detection method records in the RCDB as soon as it detects a new 
hijacking and the hijackings became out of date. If more than one detection method instance 
has the same IP prefix-hijacking incident in the RCDB, the incident will be given a high 
threshold to decide whether the incident is a real hijacking. In other words, the reliability of 
the detection can be achieved based on the number of detection method instances that 
announcing the same hijacking. 
6.3.3 IP prefix hijacking and detection method instances collaboration 
The topology drawn in section 6.3.1 has three servers and these servers have virtual routing 
tools (e.g. Zebra) that can work as BGP protocol and receive different updates from the 
routers. Based on the Controller policy and sliding window technique, proposed in section 
 151 
6.3.2, the Controller redistributes updates to the detection method instances on the servers in 
order to allow them searching in specific data in parallel for increasing the speed of the 
hijacking detection and to prevent omitting any incidents during detection processing.  
The RTD router in the topology represents the victim router; the router starts with 
announcing 192.155.10.0/16 using different Autonomous Systems (AS600, AS700 and 
AS800). Since AS600, AS700 and AS800 are considered transit ASes to AS400 and AS300, 
TRC and RTB can receive the announcements and propagate them to their direct neighbours. 
Second detection method instances are previously installed on Server A, B and C and based 
on the Detector, which implemented in chapter 4, the instances can realise that 
192.155.10.0/16 is announced by different ASes, which indicates to the hijacking signature. 
However, since the detection method uses the Verification Table proposed in chapter 4, the 
detection method instances notice that AS600, AS700 and AS800 belong to one organisation. 
As a result, the detection method instances will not save the event, in the RCDB, as a 
hijacking but rather will ignore it. Based on the Detector algorithm, the detection method 
instances will remove all repeated announcements before detection processing. 
RTB represents the hijacker, which announces the super prefix 192.155.10.0/16 or the sub-
prefix 192.155.20.0/12 of RTD. RTB will announce the prefixes to Server C and to the victim 
itself while RTD will spread the hijacking to RTC, then to RTA and then to RTE. However, 
RTD will not be able to detect the hijacking because it lacks the security and it is not linked 
to any servers has a detection method instance. In other words, since RTD does not have the 
detection method, it will not be able to detect the hijacking but other routers, which are linked 
to Server A, B and C, can stop receiving the fake route and drop it, if it is already saved in the 
routing table by network operators. Likewise, the detection method might not be able to 
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detect the hijacking from the first time because RTD could announce its IP prefixes 
(192.155.10.0/16 or any sub-prefixes) at a different time-slot while the detection method 
searching for hijacking. However, since the collaborative detection method is going to use 
different sliding windows, on different servers, the hijacking will be detected as soon as the 
real owner announce the prefixes and then will be saved in the RCDB.  
The topology shows the importance of the collaborative detection method, as the routers are 
directly connected and receiving updates from RTA, RTB, and TRE will not be affected 
continuously and spread fake routes like RTC and RTD. For example, RTA will stop 
spreading the hijacked prefix to the hijacker itself or any router beyond the typology could 
receive the update from it because it already has been notified with the fake route. In 
addition, RTE will be affected by the hijacking through RTC but because it is connected to 
the RCDB and have the detection method installed on Server B, it can either stop receiving 
the malicious announcement or remove it from its routing table and will not spread it to the 
victim again. However, the victim (RTD) will keep propagating the malicious announcement 
because it receives it from the hijacker (RTB) continuously. The RTD will not realise the 
hijacking although one of its prefixes was impersonated. In same manner, RTC will keep 
receiving the malicious announcement because it is linked to an affected router that does not 
have the detection method. In this case, the hijacking will be spread between RTD and RTC 
or to routers that might be connected to them behind the topology. RTC will keep spreading 
the hijacking to RTA and RTE till the hijacker stop impersonating the IP prefixes of RTD but 
both routers (RTA and RTE) will ignore the malicious update because it has been detected 
that the prefixes are belonging to RTD not RTB. Based on the time and the identifiers in the 
second table in the RCDB, the detection method instances on Server A, B and C need to 
checking the RCDB every one-minute in order to find out if there is new hijacked prefixes to 
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be ignored, removed from their routing table or stop propagating them. Finally, the detection 
method instances can either stop the hijacking independently by finding the hijacking 
separately or collaboratively through finding the hijacking in the RCDB. 
6.3.4 Notifications with hijacking   
The collaborative detection method can help the detection method instances to detect 
hijackings and notify them to network operators, but it does not take the action of removing 
the hijackings or even stop them. In other word, this is not a limitation of the design, but a 
limitation of scope because the detection method instances are not intended to stop the 
hijacking, but only to identify the hijacks. When operators are provided with the hijackings, 
they need to ignore, remove fake routes from their routing tables, or stop propagating them to 
their neighbours. The network operators can do so either manually, by injecting withdrawal 
hijackings or automatically, by making a separate programme to receive fake announcements 
are going to be sent from the detection method instances.  
6.4 Case study of integrating the third detection method to BGP routers 
The third detection method, which was proposed in chapter 5, uses the same facilities of the 
topology that is in section 6.3.1. However, the second detection method, propped in chapter 
4, traces the signature of the hijacking while the third detection method, proposed in 
chapter5, tries to find the behaviour patterns of the benign and malicious routers. Therefore, 
the third detection method will use the models behaviour of the routers that were given by the 
five classifiers to notify the network operators. First, Server A, B and C will have instances of 
the third detection method along to instances of the second detection method, which proposed 
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in chapter 4. The second detection method instances receive BGP updates using one of 
routing tools such as e.g. Zebra and give the SASLs results to the third detection method 
instances. The third detection method instances need to compute the behaviour patterns of 
suspicious ASes in the SASLs based on the features that proposed in section 5.2.1.  
The behaviour patterns need to be changed every ten minutes as the third detection method is 
based on the second detection method and needs to allocate enough time to data processing 
and IP prefix detection. Each second detection method instance needs roughly five minutes to 
collect updates and two minutes to give the SASL while a third detection method instance 
needs around three minutes to give the behaviour patterns of the benign and malicious routers 
and then calculate the malicious ASes. The malicious ASes need to be saved into the RCDB 
so that other third detection method instances can detect the hijacking collaboratively. The 
network operators, in turn, should ignore and remove the malicious announcements from 
their routing tables. The third detection method will have the same result efficiency of the 
second detection method as the third detection method is based on second detection method 
and both use one collaborative detection method. Therefore, the scenario of the hijacking and 
detection is not discussed. 
6.5 Evaluation and comparing to previous works 
Since the detection methods do not concern to the MOAS conflicts, the result of detecting the 
hijackings will not be affected. However, MOAS conflicts attributes a big issue to previous 
detection methods [16] [20] [40] but the detection methods took this into account by 
validating the suspicious ASes to the organisations that could announce their IP prefixes with 
more than one ASN. In addition, since the detection methods proposed in chapter 4 and 5 are 
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based on tracing the signature of IP prefix hijacking inside BGP updates and dealing with 
data (IP prefixes and ASNs) that directly involve in the hijacking, they do not need to look 
into routing policies (e.g. AS aggregation and IP prefix confederation) engineering. In other 
words, sub-prefix hijacking will not form any affects to the detection methods to be detected 
as supper-prefix hijacking. However, previous detection methods did not take routing policy 
into account; therefore [19]  [15] and [32] failed to prevent hijacking. Moreover, the detection 
methods are only based on IP prefixes and ASNs because the BGP policy of BGP allows for 
network operators not to send their full data, which makes hijacking detection in some 
methods is very complicated. Searching for the hijacking in different time-slots of updates is 
considered the most difficult factor to the second detection method because the hijacking 
might appear in different time-slots. However, collaborative detection method was proposed 
in section 6.2 to allow the second detection method instances to work collaboratively to 
overcome this issue by using sliding window, which proposed in section 6.3.2.  
The Controller proposed in section 6.3.2, used to solve difference speed issue between the 
detection method instances and routers while sliding window used to distribute updates to the 
detection methods instances. Both techniques work well and can overcome the limitations of 
the detection methods proposed in chapter 4 and 5. The advantage of the sliding window is to 
prevent different detection method instances from processing same BGP update time-slot. 
Another advantage of the collaboration is that the detection methods instances on the servers 
can distribute the burden and help the detection method instances to find the hijacking very 
easily. The architecture allows the detection methods to detect IP prefix hijacking quickly 
because each detection method on the network can check RCDB per specific period of time 
and then provides the network operator with caught hijackings. The remote centralized 
database is very useful because it can give other routers pre-knowledge before they receive 
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the packet and can help routers to avoid spreading malicious packets by removing the fake 
routes from the routing table. 
6.6 Summary  
This chapter discusses a collaborative architectural method for linking the proposed detection 
methods in chapter 4 and 5 to BGP routers and a remote centralised database. The 
collaborative architecture of the detection methods for detecting hijackings is considered a 
novel method for securing the BGP. The architecture is composed of detection methods 
proposed in chapter 4 and 5, a remote centralised database and BGP routers. These methods 
are linked to BGP routers separately and concurrently to the centralised database. The 
detection method instances can detect IP prefix hijacking separately and share them with 
other copies of the detection methods. Finally, BGP router operators are provided with 
notifications of IP prefix hijackings. The collaborative architecture has some advantages, 
which can be summarised in in section 6.5. It also increases the accuracy of the detection 
methods, the speed of detecting IP prefix hijackings, transparency, deployability and 
integration with BGP routers. The collaborative architecture displays some benefits, such as 
detecting hijacking quickly and alerting BGP routers of real hijackings.  
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Chapter	  :	  7 Conclusion	  	  
7.1 Achievements  
Chapter 1 pointed out to the aims and objectives of the research to detect IP prefix hijacking 
in the BGP. These aims and objectives were summarised into two things to be achieved: the 
background of BGP and the hijacking, and the three proposed detection methods, which are 
based on different techniques: statistical analysis, attack signature, and a suspicious ASes 
connectivity-behaviour. In terms of the background, the research can study the architecture, 
the communication, the vulnerabilities, and the security of the BGP and how it works based 
on the contents of the update messages. In addition, the research investigated the solutions 
that used to secure the BGP and detect IP prefix hijacking and focused on their advantages 
and limitations in order to avoid them in the proposed solutions.   
First detection method (statistical analysis) aimed to find an indication to the IP prefix 
hijacking from analysing normal and malicious behaviour of routers during hijacking days 
(24/02/2008) and normal days (23/02/2008and 25/02/2008) of BGP updates. However, the 
detection method failed to detect IP prefix hijacking because it did not take into account that 
normal, potential analytical time-slots of raw BGP updates could contain hijacks, while the 
other two detection methods have advantages that make them work highly efficiently. The 
issue with the first detection method is that it does not have a mechanism for separating 
benign BGP updates from hijacked BGP updates. However, this method can supply the other 
two detection methods with good analysis and data preparation. The detection method 
introduced many advantages that might not be directly related to detecting IP prefix hijacking 
but to the other two detection methods. For example, it provides them with data pre-
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processing and organisation. The detection method also performed a deep investigation of the 
BGP updates in terms of the occurrence and appearance of IP prefix hijacking in the raw data 
in order to get a general view of the functionality of the BGP and hijacking behaviours. 
Another advantage of this detection method is that it can gather the previous proposed 
detection method features and analyse their benefits and relations to the IP prefix hijacking. 
Moreover, the detection method found a clear mechanism for deciding the size of the 
processed time-slots of BGP updates so that it is not so big that it could affect the speed of 
the detection method speed or omit hijacking events. Finally, the detection method shows the 
importance of finding a good and an accurate way to separate benign BGP updates from 
malicious updates in the raw data before doing any hijacking detection.  
Second detection method, which is based on the signature attack, uses a novel approach to 
map ASes to their IP prefixes then compare one [AS, IP prefix] to many [ASes, IP prefixes] 
in one time-slot and validate the results using RIRs. The detection method is based on the 
Route Views project, which means the BGP updates are collected from real sources, not 
simulated routers. Since BGP updates are very large, the detection method also needs to use 
the quickest search algorithm (Binary Search Algorithm, or BSA) while mapping ASes to 
their IP prefixes, which was achieved in this detection method. In other words, the detection 
method employed data reduction to delete all repeated ASNs, IP prefixes and routing 
advertisement operations, which results in detecting hijacks quickly. MOAS conflicts (one 
organisation with multiple AS numbers) that could show up due to the typical management of 
distributing ASes and IP prefixes are calculated before making a decision about the results of 
the suspicious ASes. The detection method also keeps the identity of the hijackers along with 
the process of detecting the IP prefix hijacking so that it can determine malicious ASes in the 
future. The second detection method able to distinguish hijacking from other events, as it is 
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only focus on the signature of hijacking not the instability of the routers that can be done by 
different reasons. The second detection method can detect hijacking continuously because it 
is searching for the signature in the updates; unlike prevention methods, when a fake 
announcement passes the security technique will not be detected till the impersonator 
withdraws it. In addition, the detection method is not affected by routing policies conflicts 
such as ASes aggregation because it deals with ASes as separate entity. The detection method 
can achieve multiple-sampling technique because it uses time-window to decide the time-slot 
size every specific period of time to search for the hijacking in it. The detection method only 
achieved half self-checking because it is based on RIRs for validating the detection results 
that are collected in the SASL. Furthermore, the detection method does not assume that the 
first collected BGP updates are normal as in the PGBGP, but maps 15-minute BGP updates in 
order to avoid hijackings that might be embedded in normal behaviour. Periodically, some 
normal changes occur to inter-domain routing information, such as modifying an 
organisation’s ASNs and assigning a closed organisation’s IP prefixes to a new organisation 
while detecting the IP prefix hijack. Since the history of registered routing information is 
changing continuously, previous detection methods are unable to avoid these factors and 
detect IP prefix hijacks accurately. However, because the detection method algorithm is 
based on active self-checking (collecting and comparing origin ASes and IP prefixes of BGP 
updates), it works against this kind of unnoticeable factor, which make it very accurate when 
compared to other detection methods. The second detection method can also detect the 
hijacking with no false positives because it is resistible to MOAS. The detection methods can 
achieve deployment because it works far away from the routers’ infrastructure specifications. 
The detection method can be integrated with the BGP without any problem. The detection 
method can detect the hijacking without affecting the performance of exchanging updates 
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among routers. Thus, it can achieve router-friendly feature, as there is no need for the 
detection method to be connected to all routers on the Internet. 
Third detection method is combined with the second detection method to receive its outputs 
as inputs for tracing the behaviour of suspicious ASes in detecting IP prefix hijacking. 
Namely, the second detection method can be used as a filter for suspicious and purely benign 
AS behaviour, while the third method judges the behaviour of the suspicious ASes. This third 
detection method is based on the supervised learning and uses five supervised learning 
classifiers that suit the dataset characteristics, such as size, class dimensionality, data type and 
data distribution. The detection method uses supervised learning, which is considered the best 
and most accurate among machine learning types. The detection method uses many AS BGP 
updates collected from different regions up to about 50 ASes. New behavioural features and a 
manual created dataset were proposed in the connective-based method in order to arrive at a 
good result comparing to other detection solutions. For example, the detection method in 
chapter 4 reaches a 96% accuracy rate but iSPY can detect the hijacking with a false negative 
ratio below 45% and a false positive ratio below 17%. Furthermore, the detection method can 
detect hijacking in a percentage result so it can easily judge the accuracy of the detection, but 
some previous solutions claim the accuracy without any proof. The method classifies 
suspicious AS behaviour instead of purely malicious AS behaviour against purely benign 
behaviour, which means the classification is performed very fast. In other words, the 
algorithm of the detection method is based on signature attack as a pre-processing method to 
label the dataset, which is then trained and tested. The detection method extracts the new 
features from data that are directly related to the hijacking such as ASNs and IP prefixes, not 
to the stability of routers. This detection method also computes the quality of the proposed 
features based on the similarities and differences between malicious and benign behavioural 
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patterns. Moreover, the detection method is based on the information of suspicious ASes in 
the RIRs, which means it can collect data from an accurate source. The detection method also 
can confirm the accuracy of the detection method by using relational behaviour of suspicious 
ASes and split-test	   option with different supervised learning classifiers to evaluate the 
accuracy. Another achievement of the detection method is to detect hijacking very quickly by 
removing all redundant hijackings in the classification dataset, picking classifiers that are 
considered quicker than classifiers that are based on the regression analysis and only works 
on suspicious ASes. The detection method is very transparent so it can work and detect IP 
prefix hijacks automatically and without the requirement that all routers on the Internet be 
integrated with the programme; rather, some routers do the detection on behalf of others. It 
can also detect short-lived hijacks because it is based on a decentralised structure of detection 
(collaboration), as in chapter 6. This collaboration helps the method detect hijacks quickly 
because some last for a short time [5]. The detection methods can be deployed because it 
built to work separately from the routers and identifying a way to be integrated with the BGP 
and does not need any modifications to the infrastructure of current routes. Finally, the 
detection method can be integrated to the routers without affecting routing performance. 
7.2 Difficulties  
There is no database for community BGP research that can store benign updates in isolated 
locations away from malicious updates, so that researchers can use them directly and apply 
appropriate analyses to them. The lack of this database makes it very difficult for the first 
detection method to work efficiently; therefore, it failed to detect IP prefix hijacking. 
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Blocks of AS numbers are not delegated and given sequentially to organisations that use the 
BGP to exchange routing information with their neighbours; instead, they are given 
randomly. It would be very difficult to predict the real owner of an IP prefix if the AS 
numbers of AS-blocks of an organisation are not limited by upper and lower AS numbers. 
For example, YouTube can have 36040 and 36561 AS numbers but many organisations can 
have AS numbers in between these two, such as 36041, which belongs to the Savannah 
College of Art and Design Network Information. This way of distributing AS numbers makes 
it very hard for researchers to determine the whole AS numbers of a specific organisation so 
that when it uses multiple AS numbers to announce one IP prefix its AS numbers can easily 
be predicted. As a result, the second detection method uses RIRs to verify caught suspicious 
ASes though registered routing information. 
IP address blocks are also not distributed sequentially and that leads to difficulties while 
tracing the IP prefixes that a specific organisation has. As a result, the third detection method 
focused on the connectivity of the suspicious ASes to extract features from and predict the 
real owner of a specific IP prefix. Relative similarity between normal behaviour and 
abnormal behaviour makes it slightly difficult for classifiers to differentiate normal and 
malicious behaviour during classification.  
Changing the ASNs and IP addresses information of organisations occurs continuously in the 
RIRs and the IANA, which makes labelling benign and malicious behaviours of suspicious 
ASes very difficult to be classified because some of the organisations are no longer available 
on the RIR and IANA databases. As a result, any classification database (supervised dataset) 
will not have a chance to contain big samples of benign and malicious suspicious AS 
behaviours. None of the RIRs provides extended histories of the incidents and that also 
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makes it difficult for researchers to have a big sample of benign and malicious suspicious AS 
behaviours. These three factors make the labelled dataset proposed in section 5.2.1 very 
small. 
Delegating ASNs and IP prefixes happens through the IANA, RIRs and several ISPs, which 
makes collecting validation information for the verification table very difficult. In other 
words, ASNs and IP prefixes can be distributed by many organisations, and if there is a need 
to find the owner of an IP prefix, any detection method has to have all databases of the 
delegators in addition to the IANA and RIR databases.  
7.3 Limitations  
The limitation of first detection method is that it does not have a mechanism that can 
differentiate benign BGP updates from BGP malicious updates before doing analysis. The 
lack of this mechanism means that the detection method is not able to detect IP prefix 
hijacking. Second detection method has a serious limitation, which it cannot detect the 
hijackings when they are announced in different time-slots. The limitation of the third 
detection method is that it still yields about 3% false positives and 2% false negatives. It also 
requires all routers to advertise their own IP prefixes, at least once, during their exchanging 
routing information so the detection method can have enough historical or prior knowledge of 
the ownership of the IP prefixes. However, collaborative detection method is proposed to 
overcome the limitations of the proposed second and third detection methods. The 
collaborative detection method can evaluate the final accuracy of the second and third 
detection methods when they are integrated with the routers. Another advantage of the 
collaborative detection method is that each instance of the detection methods are installed on 
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the router can only check its own received BGP update packets from the Controller. Thus, 
there is no load to the proposed detection method algorithms to find the hijacking. Another 
advantage of this collaboration is checking hijacks signatures when occur periodically and in 
different time-slots. For example, if router A cannot detect the hijack at 1:15 AM because it 
does not have the time slot to do the check, there will be other copies of the algorithm 
integrated with the neighbouring routers to perform the hijacking check. 
7.4 Future work  
The detection method proposed in chapter 4 is considered is half self-checking because it 
depends on the RIRs for validating the results. The detection method needs to be improved 
and be fully self-checking. In other words, the detection method has to be totally depends on 
the BGP updates. For examples, the detection method can monitor the changes of each AS in 
the update itself such as number of fixed neighbours and the away showing and hiding some 
attribute in order to decide the owner of the IP prefix. In the same way, the detection method 
in chapter 5 still has 6% false positives and false negatives there it needs to be enhanced in 
future.  Using ANN can be another a good choice to retest the third detection method. For 
collaborative detection method, there must be a flexible way for removing the hijacking and 
reducing the spread of the hijacking without need to send notifications to the network 
operators. This approach could be achieved by embedding a new attribute into BGP. This 
improvement will help to take the responsibly out of the network operators with regarding to 
dealing with the hijackings and make the detection fully based on the methods. 
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Appendix
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Posters 
  
Existing Solutions and their Limitations 
 
•  Rule-/Packet-Based - not real-time detection [2]. 
•  Routing Table-Based – unable to access ISPs’ routing table information because they 
are not allowed to reveal some companies’ commercial policies [2]. 
•  Address Delegation and Origin Authentication – require high modification the router 
infrastructure and expensive computation [3]. 
•  IA (Identity Assertion ) e.g. Prefix Assertion List – cannot distinguish routers’ instability 
of normal events such as power cut-off from hijacks [5]. 
•  Historical-Based – cannot differentiate events from valid policy changes [1].  
•  Registry-Based – has high false positives and negatives [4].  
•  Combination of Historical and Registry-Based   
•  Statistical-Based (e.g. HMM, SVM and Naïve Bayesian)  
 
Problem 
•  IP prefix hijack can affect router stability and 
network availability.  
•  February 2008, Pakistan telecomm blocked 
YouTube unintentionally.  
•  Google was blocked on the 7th  May 2005. 
•  ISP in Malaysia blocked Yahoo on 2004.  
•  The impact of this attack is that the IP prefix  
impersonator can compromise the direction of 
the packets. 
 
Solution 
•  Intelligent data analysis – pre-process  
BGP updates and evaluate statistical 
features  
 
Architecture 
 
Data Extractor: 
-  In charge to extract relative data per 15 minutes 
-  Pre-process data and put them in analytical way 
Data Minimiser: 
- Responsible to reduce the number of data 
Detection Engine:  
-  Responsible to map AS origin to the real owner 
-  Detect IP prefix hijack based on BGP updates anomalies 
Routers Instant Condition Changes & BGP polices Tracker: 
- Verifying the IP prefix hijacks found  
 
Conclusion 
 
Security in BGP4 was extensively investigated in order to protect the 
integrity of BGP and detect or prevent illegitimate events. However, the 
BGP still suffers form some vulnerabilities and subject to  a serious 
attack, which is IP prefix hijacking. Different techniques and methods 
were proposed to detect this attack accurately. Nonetheless, some of 
them have inherent limitations. In the summarised research project, 
detection method consists of four components ; each one has a specific 
task. The proposed detection method aims to link intelligent data 
analysis and BGP polices to detect and reduce the impact of IP prefix 
hijacks. 
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Abstract  
 
Border gateway protocol (BGP4) has significant security issues regarding ASes and 
IP prefixes, such as impersonating the ownership of other AS IP prefixes. There is a 
variety of research methods already used to secure BGP4 such as using historical-
based and statistical model-based; in addition, recent research has already 
investigated IP prefix hijacking, but accuracy, robustness, and efficiency of proposed 
methods are still low. The algorithm in this poster detects IP prefix hijacks by 
monitoring the behaviour of BGP4 edge routers. The algorithm aims to find IP prefix 
hijacks of ASes in same and different regions (national and international). From a 
timing perspective, IP prefix hijack incidents should be detected within 15 minutes of 
their occurrence, based on the fact that the effect of invalid routes has to be reduced 
towards the impersonated organisation. 
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Abstract—In spite of significant on 
going research, the Border gateway 
protocol (BGP) still encompasses 
conceptual vulnerability issues regarding 
impersonating the ownership of IP prefixes 
for ASes (Autonomous Systems). In this 
context, a number of research studies 
focused on securing BGP through 
historical-based and statistical-based 
behavioural models. This paper proposes a 
novel algorithm aiming to track the 
behaviour of BGP edge routers and detect 
IP prefix hijacks based on a typical 
signature. The algorithm parses the BGP 
advertisements in order to detect the 
apparent relocation of specific IP prefixes, 
either in the same or in different regions. 
The algorithm aims to identify IP prefixes 
by multiple independent ASes. The 
method differs from routing consistency 
monitoring, which faces difficulties 
detecting events at the edge of the BGP 
infrastructure. Based on the RIRs’ 
database, the algorithm can detect national 
  
and cross-border IP prefix hijacks very 
quick. However, 5 results out of 16 were 
not accurate therefore the algorithm has 
some false positives and needs further 
improvement to be done in future.  
Keywords—BGP advertisements; Binary 
Search Algorithm; Data Reduction; IP 
prefix; origin AS 
I. Introduction 
BGP remains the protocol of choice for 
core Internet interconnectivity. At its core, 
the protocol consists of four messages: 
OPEN and KEEPALIVE (both used for 
session establishment and connection 
control), NOTIFICATION (to inform 
peers of errors), and UPDATE (to build 
and update routing tables) [1]. From the 
previous studies, some researchers tried to 
detect IP prefix hijacks based on 
monitoring routers’ stabilities. 
Nonetheless, their methods could not 
reliably distinguish IP prefix hijacks from 
normal events, such as power cut-off and 
submarine cuts [2].  In addition, RPKI 
(Resource Publication Infrastructure) 
system took place to detect BGP route 
hijacking, however the system had several 
false positives and negatives and needs 
further refinements [3]. Lastly, some 
methods analyse routing tables (table-
based)  in order to detect IP prefix hijacks, 
but these methods have two serious issues: 
organisations may refuse to provide their 
routing tables as well as not being able to 
detect the hijack on time [4]. This paper 
focuses on vulnerabilities caused by the 
implicit trust between BGP peers when 
receiving UPDATE messages. A novel 
method of detecting IP prefix hijacking 
incidents, based on data reduction and 
Binary Search Algorithm, is built in order 
to accurately and timely detect IP prefix 
hijacking events. The detection method is 
  
based on an algorithm traces origin ASes 
and their actual IP prefixes in 15 minute 
timeslots. The method is designed and 
tested using UPDATE messages of 
different routers downloaded from the 
Route Views Archive Project [5]. As a 
case study, UPDATE messages were 
collected from 24th of February 2008 when 
Pakistan Telecom intended to restrict local 
access to YouTube, but the advertised 
UPDATE messages blocked access to 
YouTube [6] for approximately two hours 
[7].  
The paper provides in section II an 
overview of a typical IP prefix hijacking 
incident, its impact on the end users and 
the ability to observe it, then a description 
of a specific incident that was used to 
build the proposed detection method. 
Section III includes information on data 
source, data pre-processing, data analysis 
and the algorithm while section IV 
discusses findings, some new incidents 
and the algorithm challenges. Section V 
introduces the architecture of the detection 
system, which relies on the collaboration 
among routers to improve detection 
efficiency. The paper finishes with 
conclusions and future work in section VI. 
II. IP prefix HIJACKING 
This section discusses the process view of 
the IP prefix hijacking, the impact on the 
end user, a case study of Pakistan and the 
YouTube IP prefix hijack and finally the 
data analysis of the hijack.   
A. The Process  
IP prefix hijacking occurs when more 
than one AS announces an IP super-prefix 
or a sub-prefix that is owned by another 
AS. However, hijack events could turn up 
during normal operations of the BGP such 
as AS confederation and complicated ASN 
  
(Autonomous System Number) changes of 
organisations. Figure 1 consists of seven 
ASes; edge router in AS100 represents the 
real owner (the announcer) of prefix 
1.1.1.1.0/24, AS300 aims to hijack the 
1.1.1.1.0/24 and the remaining edge 
routers of AS400, AS5000, AS1000, 
AS4000 and AS10000 work as 
propagators to 1.1.1.0/24. The edge router 
on the AS100 announces the IP prefix 
1.1.1.0/24 to an edge router located on 
AS5000 that, in turn, propagates it to 
AS1000. There is no direct connection 
between AS300 and AS100. AS300 could 
announce the same IP prefix to AS5000 
and AS4000 whether before or after 
AS100. Although both AS100 and AS300 
announce the same IP prefix 1.1.1.0/24 to 
AS5000, this AS cannot detect the hijack 
but would probably spread it out to 
AS1000. In addition, AS300 might 
announce the same prefix, which it does 
not originally own, to AS4000 then further 
to other national or international ASes. 
Moreover, AS300 can announce IP prefix 
1.1.1.0/24 indirectly to AS400, which 
would perhaps announce it to the real 
origin AS (AS100). However, the real 
owner will not detect that it had been 
hijacked because BGP lacks origin 
authentication. In this case, some edge 
routers would assume that AS300 could 
take it to 1.1.1.0/24 in a shorter way 
shorter than AS100. Consequently, edge 
routers would withdraw their routes in 
order to go through AS300.  
 
Fig. 1.  Process of the IP prefix hijacking 
If the case is applied to an extremely 
popular organisation such as YouTube, 
  
Google and Yahoo, denial of service will 
have an immediate impact on end users. 
B. The Case Study  
Below data raw represent snapshots 
taken between 12:07:00, 24 February 2008 
and 12:13:07, 15 February 2009, when 
Pakistan Telecom erroneously announced 
one of the YouTube IP prefixes. Packet 
one in figure 2 shows the first occurrence 
of the hijack when an edge router 
belonging to the AS17557 announced the 
208.65.153.0/24. However, figure 3 shows 
a different AS (36561) announcing the 
same IP prefix. Figure 4 shows the last 
period of the hijacking activity when the 
fake route withdrawn by AS17787.  
Based on the known hijacked IP prefix 
in the YouTube incident, a shell script was 
written to search for fake routes in all of 
the divided UPDATE messages in the day 
of the event. The program already knows 
the ASN of the YouTube and Pakistan 
Telecommunication. The program found 
that the hijacked IP prefix showed up in 5 
quarters 74, 79, 81, 82 and 83. The 
impersonator (AS17557) started by 
announcing 208.65.153.0/24 (in the 74th 
quarter) before the legitimate owner. The 
legitimate AS (36561) began to announce 
the same IP prefix in 79th and 81st quarter 
but in the absence of the hijacker. The 
impersonated IP prefix again started to 
appear in the 82nd and 83rd quarter but 
under two different origin ASes. The 
hijacked IP prefix was withdrawn by an 
AS (AS17787), which had a direct link to 
the impersonator. 
TIME: 02/24/08 18:47:57 
TYPE: BGP4MP/MESSAGE/Update 
FROM: 149.20.65.198 AS1280 
TO: 128.223.51.102 AS6447 
ORIGIN: IGP 
ASPATH: 1280 6461 3491 17557 
NEXT_HOP: 149.20.65.198 
MULTI_EXIT_DISC: 30 
ANNOUNCE 
208.65.153.0/24 
 
Fig. 2.  Raw data of YouTube hijacking when it 
started 
  
TIME: 02/24/08 20:51:31 
TYPE: BGP4MP/MESSAGE/Update 
FROM: 202.232.0.3 AS2497 
TO: 128.223.51.102 AS6447 
ORIGIN: IGP 
ASPATH: 2497 3549 36561 
NEXT_HOP: 202.232.0.3 
ANNOUNCE 
  208.65.153.0/24 
 
Fig. 3.  Raw data of YouTube hijacking in the 
middle 
TIME: 02/24/08 21:01:21 
TYPE: BGP4MP/MESSAGE/Update 
FROM: 81.209.156.1 AS13237 
TO: 128.223.51.102 AS6447 
ORIGIN: IGP 
ASPATH: 13237 702 17557 17787 
NEXT_HOP: 81.209.156.1 
COMMUNITY: 13237:40044 13237:46441 
WITHDRAW 
  208.65.153.0/24 
  203.92.5.0/24 
  203.92.4.0/24 
ANNOUNCE 
  203.215.170.0/24 
 
Fig. 4.  Raw data of YouTube hijacking at the end 
This case study is used to investigate 
raw data and the BGP messaging footprint 
of an IP prefix hijacking in order to build a 
reliable detection method to detect new IP 
prefix hijacks.  
C. IP prefix Hijack Analysis Based 
on the Case Study 
The above snapshots (figure 2, 3 and 4) 
are analysed according to two factors: 
extracting data that are directly related to 
the announcer (last ASN) and relevant to 
the hijack, then normalising the variable 
length of ASPATH and ANNOUNCE. 
Since the routes in the collected updates 
are generated by the last AS in the 
ASPATH attribute, pre-processing of 
messages requires firstly a function to 
extract the origin ASes from the UPDATE 
messages. As a result, for a given message, 
each IP prefix can be associated with its 
announcing AS and the ASPATH length. 
Ultimately, this association, in conjunction 
with the timing of the message, has to be 
at the core of an IP hijacking detection 
method, as it provides all the information 
about which IP prefixes are apparently 
owned by their announcing AS routers.  
ASes and IP prefixes are chosen to be 
in the last column of the processed data 
  
(dataset) in order to be stabilised 
automatically by MatLab and to meet its 
rules. All IP prefixes are converted into 
integer IP addresses to simplify the 
loading of data into MatLab, as integer 
data can be sorted faster than string and to 
be homogeneous with the rest of the 
numeric data in the dataset. The stability 
of data is not a very serious issue for the 
detection method except they need to be 
acceptable and loaded in an analytical 
environment. The most important factor is 
extracting the same features of all different 
edge routers.  
III. Detection method 
Based on the process described in 
section II, we propose a new detection 
method in order to detect different remote 
ASes that probable announce the same IP 
prefix, and flag these events as potential IP 
prefix hijacking. The method consists of 
three main blocks, data pre-processing, 
data analysis, and detection algorithm. The 
data pre-processing uses raw BGP 
announcements as inputs and organises 
them in CSV (Comma-Separated Values) 
format. The analysis extracts features, 
excludes redundant data and provides a 
unified view of repeated advertised 
prefixes and associated ASes. The 
algorithm reduces data dimensions, parses 
the output of data analysis and identifies 
any announcements of the same prefix by 
multiple ASes.  
 
Fig.  5.  Data processing and detection method 
The detection method is structured as 
shown in figure 5. The algorithm has a 
  
single output with three values: normal 
event, certain hijack or potential hijack and 
includes three tasks, focusing on data 
mapping, data reduction, and binary 
search. The remainder of this section will 
describe each stage of the process in detail. 
A. Data Pre-processing 
The proposed method uses as input 
BGP UPDATE messages as seen by a 
BGP router connected to the network, 
which are converted to ASCII using 
BGPdump [8]  with some modifications to 
suit the follow-up analysis. BGPdump is 
an open source tool used to convert binary 
data (raw data) into ASCII, as shown in 
figure 2, 3 and 4 in section II.B.  The 
customised version organises ASCII 
update packets in several rows and equal 
columns. ASPATH and ANNOUNCE 
attributes are not consistent which is likely 
to make it very complicated to deal with 
data and trace fake impersonations of 
routes. As a result, data pre-processing 
comes as a second step of the detection 
method in order to perform several tasks 
such as making raw data organised and 
consistent. Raw data (ASPATH and 
ANNOUNCE) have a variable number of 
the ASes and IP prefixes, which require 
making them consistent (such as padding 
variable length fields). As a task for the 
pre-processing phase the IP prefixes are 
converted from string IP address into 
integer IP address in order to unify data 
type and facilitate detection operation of 
the algorithm. 
B. Data Analysis  
When raw data were processed, 
features are extracted and saved in two 
different datasets; the first one includes the 
origin ASes in the last column of the 
processed data and the second one 
  
includes the IP prefixes with their prefix 
ranges in the last column as well. The first 
dataset also has ASPATH length while the 
second dataset has the announce length 
and the prefix range.  These two datasets 
were created to map each origin AS with 
its IP prefixes as it is described in the 
following subsection. As part of the 
analysis, the dataset is analysed in 15-
minute snapshots, including all the BGP 
UPDATE messages sent during that 
period. The algorithm receives each 15-
minute snapshot automatically. 
C. Algorithm  
The algorithm stage has three 
objectives – firstly to associate the 
announcer (origin AS) with each 
advertised IP prefix, secondly to remove 
duplications of associated origin ASes and 
IP prefixes and finally to identify any IP 
prefixes that were announced by more than 
one AS. The algorithm receives the origin 
ASes and their IP prefixes, from two 
different datasets, every fifteen minutes.  
Origin AS with its extracted features in the 
first dataset and IP prefixes with its 
extracted features in the second datasets 
are loaded dynamically into two different 
large matrices. Origin ASes, in the first 
dataset, and their IP prefixes, in the second 
dataset, are mapped automatically. In order 
to optimise search for the association 
between IP prefixes and their 
corresponding origins, these data are 
converted into a MatLab cell array [9]. 
Repetitions of ASNs and IP prefixes are 
deleted separately. In other words, both 
columns origin ASes and IP prefixes in the 
cell array are subjected to data reduction.  
Data reduction is applied to the dataset 
by removing unwanted origin ASNs and 
duplicate IP prefixes.  For example, matrix 
size before data reduction in quarter 82 is 
  
21968 (rows) by 507 (columns). After 
reduction, the dimension of mapping cell 
array becomes 582 by 2.  Each 15-minute 
snapshot compacts multiple 
announcements for a specific AS into a 
single row of cell array. After computing 
unrepeated origin ASes and their 
unrepeated IP prefixes, the algorithm starts 
to compare the IP prefix of each AS to the 
IP prefixes of all the origin ASes in the 
entire fifteen minutes to find any IP 
prefixes advertised by multiple ASes.  
The comparison algorithm considers 
the first row of the origin AS and its IP 
prefixes in the Mapping cell array as a 
main row column vector. This vector is 
compared to other origin ASes’ IP prefixes 
vectors. The main vector uses a relatively 
fast comparison search algorithm (Binary 
Search Algorithm [10]) to compare the IP 
prefix of the current origin AS to the 
remaining origin ASes IP prefixes. The 
main column vector will be removed from 
the comparison and the next column vector 
will be the main vector to be compared to 
the following IP prefixes of the origin 
ASes. The lower the number of ASes and 
announced IP prefixes, the faster the 
algorithm will be. The processing 
continues until the end of the cell array. 
The algorithm separates each detected 
event with a row vector to differentiate 
new anomalous cases (detected hijacks). 
Figure 6 depicts three subscribed 
components to discover the IP prefix 
hijacking. 
 
Fig. 6.  The organisation of detection method 
After converting the IP prefixes to 
integers in the subsection III.A and sorting 
  
the dataset produced by the reduction 
phase, the BSA (Binary Search Algorithm) 
is employed to determine whether more 
than one AS announces a specific IP 
prefix. The reason for using BSA is that it 
executes array comparisons exponentially 
faster than linear search algorithm (LSA) 
[10].  
TABLE 1. Example of mapping cell array in 
quarter 82 
Order Origin ASes IP prefixes 
3 137 369760021 
4 151 369760021; 369760023; 
3697600524 
5 174 139438524; 244296124 
582 44408 80045022 
Table 1 shows the format of the Mapping 
cell array for two different styles: single IP 
prefix and multiple IP prefixes, one origin 
AS can have one or multiple values. The 
BSA is applied to the origin AS that has 
more than one value.  BSA either ignores 
normal cases, or catches hijacks and 
suspicious hijacks. In other words, the 
detection method has three outputs normal 
data, potential and certain hijacks. 
IV. VALIDATION 
The proposed detection method is 
tested against the dataset that contains the 
IP prefix hijacking event described in 
section III.B. The global routing 
information can be reconstructed using the 
Route Views Project [11] which includes a 
comprehensive archive of BGP UPDATE 
messages. The dataset was generated using 
BGP UPDATE traces from the Route 
Views archive.  This section demonstrates 
detection method findings, incidents and 
algorithm challenges. 
A. Findings 
ASLoc and IPPLoc in tables 2-6 
represent the ASN location and the IP 
prefix location where the suspicious 
hijacks were found in the cell array. 
  
However, the third column represents the 
IP prefixes and their range of super and 
sub-prefixes. Each row in table 2-6 
displays two different origin ASes 
claiming one IP prefix. 
TABLE 2. The incidents captured by the algorithm 
in Quarter 74 
Quarter 74 (starting time of the hijack) 
ASLoc:IPPLoc ASNs IP prefix hijacked  
18:3 105:4 637 5963 214.15.201.0/24 
57:2 424:2 3602 18638 209.5.171.0/24 
213:2 377:2 9498 17443 202.140.63.0/24 
446:2 642:2 19750 32004 207.181.144.0/24 
452:4 492:2 20214 22909 64.139.74.0/24 
507:7 725:2 23694 38513 202.87.191.0/24 
TABLE 3. The incidents captured by the algorithm 
in Quarter 79 
Quarter 79 without repetition events 
ASLoc:IPPLoc ASNs IP prefix hijacked  
170:2 489:2 10461 35931 65.171.224.0/22 
TABLE 4. The incidents captured by the algorithm 
in Quarter 81 
Quarter 81 without repetition events 
ASLoc:IPPLoc ASNs IP prefix hijacked  
73:2 128:2 5571 8190 212.2.0.0/19 
254:2 498:3 16422 33770 41.223.58.0/24 
254:3 498:4 16422 33770 41.223.59.0/24 
254:4 498:5 16422 33770 41.223.57.0/24 
268:2 498:6 17175 33770 41.220.224.0/24 
268:3 498:7 17175 33770 41.220.225.0/24 
268:4 498:8 17175 33770 41.220.226.0/24 
268:5 498:10 17175 33770 41.220.229.0/24 
268:6 498:12 17175 33770 196.201.228.0,22 
328:2 489:2 19750 32004 207.181.144.0,24 
342:2 421:16 20858 25184 80.75.13.0/24 
351:2 466:3 21396 29606 194.1.150.0,24 
351:3 466:4 21396 29606 91.199.151.0,24 
351:4 466:5 21396 29606 195.177.192.0,23 
383:7 564:2 23694 38513 202.87.191.0/24 
TABLE 5. The incidents captured by the algorithm 
in Quarter 82 
Quarter 82 without repetition events 
ASLoc:IPPLoc ASNs IP prefix 
hijacked  
142:2 255:18
6 
9229 1755
7 
202.5.150.0/24 
255:18
9 
500:2 1755
7 
3656
1 
208.65.153.0/2
4 
TABLE 6. The incidents captured by the algorithm 
in Quarter 83 
Quarter 83 (last time of the hijack) 
ASLoc:IPPLoc ASNs IP prefix 
hijacked  
339:2 1128:2 10143 38330 203.83.4.0/22 
447:2 1027:2 13902 33694 208.71.120.0/21 
549:188 1089:3 17557 36561 208.65.153.0/24 
705:2 890:2 21792 27169 69.22.144.0/24 
799:2 822:3 24213 24538 122.200.52.0/24 
As it is noticeable from table 5, the 
algorithm identifies a duplicate 
  
announcement when both AS17557 and 
AS36561 announce the same IP prefix 
(208.65.153.0/24) of the AS36561 in the 
83rd quarter; from a detection perspective, 
this is equivalent to a potential hijacking 
incident, hence it is successful in detecting 
the event.  One interesting feature of the 
analysis is that, when applying the 
YouTube dataset on the proposed 
detection method, beyond the expected 
result (the YouTube hijacking), the 
algorithm highlighted further multiple 
announcement events relating to other IP 
prefixes. The following section provides 
an overview of these identified events.  
A. New Incidents  
This section analyses IP prefix 
incidents as reported by the proposed 
detection method using the dataset during 
Pakistan Telecommunication hijack 
incident. The purpose of choosing a 
specific incident is to determine the 
strength and potential limitations of the 
algorithm. The detection outcomes of the 
algorithm are categorised into three 
classes: a) same organisation with same IP 
prefix (low probability hijack), b) different 
organisation with same IP prefix (high 
probability hijack) and c) no exit to an AS 
with one organisation. These incidents are 
summarised into the following points:  
a) Same Organisation with Same IP 
prefix: 
DoD Network Information Centre 
(DNIC), Comcast Cable Communications 
Holdings and 24/7 Real Media, in the US 
[12]. MDNX Enterprise Services and 
MDNX Internet Limited, in the UK [13]. 
Indonesia Network Information Centre, PT 
Arsen Kusuma and Digital Satellite PT, in 
Indonesia [13]. 
  
b) Different Organisations with Same IP 
prefix:  
Cable Communications Inc with DH 
Data Centres Inc, Criteo Corp with 
Business Information Group, Townsend 
Analytics LTD with Viztek, Flagler 
Hospital Inc with Trident Systems Inc, in 
the US [12]. BHARTI Airtel Ltd with 
Karuturi Telecom Pvt Ltd, NetConnex 
Broadband with Borwood UK Network, in 
the UK [13]. Pakistan Telecommunication 
Company Limited (Pakistan) with Speed 
Cast Limited in (Hong Kong) [13]. 
Pakistan Telecom (Pakistan) and YouTube 
(US) [12][13]. Exetel Pty Ltd and 
Speedweb Network, Australia [13].  
c) Non-existent to the AS with one 
Organisation:  
New Skies Satellites Inc (US) with an 
anonymous AS [12][13]. Afranet Tehran  
(Iran) with an anonymous AS [14]. 
In summary, the detection method 
found about 16 different IP prefix 
impersonations during the two hours 
timeframe of Pakistan Telecom hijacking. 
The first five events in a) are considered 
suspicious and the next nine cases in b) are 
certain hijacks and the last two events in c) 
are ambiguous because their ASes do not 
exist in IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority).   
A. Algorithm Challenges and 
Proposed Solutions 
The first challenge is that when an edge 
router impersonates an IP prefix of an AS 
and the real owner does not announce this 
IP prefix in the same 15-minute chunk, in 
this case the algorithm will not be able to 
detect the hijack. The proposed 15-minute 
timeslot length could be increased to 
improve accuracy, but that would have a 
negative impact on granularity and 
  
potential responsiveness. For example, if 
the period of the processed data is 2 hours 
(the total period of the hijacking), the 
algorithm could probably detect the IP 
prefix from the first compared chunk, 
assuming that the 74th quarter is the 
starting point of the exchangeable 
UPDATE messages.  
If the period of collecting processed 
data is increased, the hijack (short-lived) 
might take place and finish before the 
algorithm starts comparing data (origin 
ASes against their IP prefixes) and finds 
the hijack. As there is no clear technique to 
determine the appropriate period of 
analysing data, it would be very difficult to 
find the hijack rapidly. Another suggested 
solution is, after comparing IP prefixes 
within one quarter, the same quarter can be 
compared to all the quarters in the day 
(cross-validation), but due to the amount 
of data exchange that would affect the 
performance of the detection method 
speed.   
Another significant challenge is that an 
AS could impersonate a subspace/sub-
prefix of a specific IP prefix. For example, 
YouTube CIDR (Classless Internet 
Domain Routing) is 208.65.152.0/22; any 
impersonator could announce from 
208.65.152.0/22 up to 208.65.155.0/32. In 
other words, if Pakistan Telecom 
announces any of 208.65.152.0/22-32 - 
208.65.155.0/22-32, instead of 
208.65.153.0/24, it would still impersonate 
the ownership of the YouTube’s IP 
prefixes. Moreover, there are two main 
factors, which could play important role in 
the accuracy of the detection method: 
routes aggregation and ASes confederation 
or reflection. In future, these two factors 
will be investigated in terms of their effect 
on the IP prefixes and ASes.  
  
Periodically, some normal changes 
occur to the inter-domain routing (the 
internet) such as modifying organisation’s 
ASNs and assigning closed organisations’ 
IP prefixes to a new organisation during 
the algorithm detecting the IP prefix 
hijack. These factors could make the 
algorithm inaccurate because the history of 
collected data changes continuously.  This 
issue needs to be investigated to reduce 
false positives. The described challenges 
encounter the algorithm running on a 
single router; if the system is extended to 
allow the exchanging of information and 
work collaboratively with different copies 
of the algorithm on remote routers, its 
accuracy and strength would significantly 
increase. A possible collaboration 
architecture is introduced in the following 
section.  
V. Proposed detection architecture 
This section describes a possible 
architecture that allows the proposed 
method to aggregate data collaboratively 
on several different routers. The aim of the 
architecture is to allow BGP routers to 
jointly benefit from the independently 
identified events on each router and, 
subsequently, lead to higher accuracy 
when detecting anomalous behaviour. 
A. Architecture Method and the 
Advantages 
IP prefix hijacks might not influence 
the impersonated AS greatly until they 
spread out over many different ASes, 
therefore the algorithm has to work 
collaboratively to allow it to prevent the 
spread out of invalid routes and then to 
limit and reduce the impact of the hijack. 
The detection algorithm is connected to 
the BGP independently and categorises 
network events, but may benefit from 
  
sharing and receiving data from other 
similar routers in order to detect the effect 
of the attack rapidly. The BGP updates are 
collected and aggregated by a router over a 
specific operational timeslot (e.g. between 
10 minutes and 2 hours) as anomaly 
detection becomes stale with higher 
aggregation slots. In case of detecting a 
suspicious route, an alarm is sent to the all 
neighbours reporting the invalid route. 
Routers that run the algorithm should work 
together in order to improve the reliability 
and timeliness of the information derived 
from the UPDATE messages.  
The algorithm should run over each 
router, connected to the internet, with 
different random checked chunks. In 
addition to the use of BSA, making the 
routers work collaboratively and 
independently would make detection very 
fast and would not require any 
modifications of the infrastructure of the 
BGP routers. Figure 8 shows the general 
structure of the detection method when it 
is linked to the BGP routers. 
 
Fig. 8. Method architecture of detecting and 
preventing the hijack 
Moreover, if some routers try to omit the 
hijack intentionally (e.g. do not have the 
system), the other routers identify and 
publicise the anomaly. Each BGP router 
has to have a chance to suppress any 
suspicious routes to prevent itself from 
spreading hijacked routes out. 
B. The Effectiveness of the 
Architecture over the Algorithm 
  
The advantage of a collaborative 
architecture in the BGP context is that 
each router can only check its own 
received update packets so there is no load 
to the algorithm to find out the hijack. 
Another advantage of this collaboration is 
that the check will be periodic and timeslot 
variable. For example, if Router A cannot 
detect the hijack at 1:15 AM because it is 
not the time slot to do the check, there 
must be another copy of the algorithm in 
the neighbouring routers doing the check 
and detecting the hijack faster.  
VI. Conclusion and future work 
This paper proposed an IP prefix hijack 
detection method, using 24th of Feb 2008 
incident as a case study to build a 
trustworthy algorithm in order to detect 
new hijacks. However, a number of other 
national (regional) and international (out-
region) BGP announcement anomalies 
have been detected during the 
aforementioned period. From the results, it 
is clear that the algorithm can work 
accurately but could also omit some 
events. For instance, if an AS announces 
an IP prefix in the absence of the real 
origin AS, the algorithm will not be able to 
detect the impersonation when it works 
independently (non-collaboratively). We 
observed from the proposed architectural 
collaborative work how this issue could be 
addressed. In terms of router connections, 
some routers do not have a direct 
connection to the hijacker. In other words, 
the detection method is considered 
decentralised in order to collect direct 
information regarding the hijacker and 
detects the hijack faster. Another 
advantage of the decentralisation is that 
detection of anomalies can be done for 
various, partially overlapping timeslots. 
Another challenge of the algorithm is that 
the hijacker could impersonate one of the 
  
net-range IP prefixes (sub-prefixes) 
without the algorithm observation. As a 
consequence, the algorithm needs to be 
able to check the IP prefixes of an AS. In 
future, the proposed approach may provide 
further insight and refining of the rationale 
behind organisations announcing the same 
IP prefix with different ASN. This is 
needed in order to distinguish between 
normal BGP operations and malicious 
ones and address the false positive errors. 
The algorithm can detect the hijacks with 
69% and fail with 31%. These false 
positives will be investigated based on two 
suspicious factors, which might make the 
algorithm not very accurate. First factor is 
directly related to the BGP policy such as 
route aggregation and ASes confederation 
while the second factor regards to the 
management of providing ASNs and IP 
prefixes such as allowing to some 
organisation to have more than one AS or 
IP prefix. 
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Abstract—In spite of significant on-going 
research, the Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP) still encompasses conceptual 
vulnerability issues regarding impersonating 
the ownership of IP prefixes for ASes 
(Autonomous Systems). In this context, a 
number of research studies focused on 
securing BGP through historical-based and 
statistical-based behavioural models. This 
paper improves the earlier IP prefix hijack 
detection method presented in [1] by 
identifying false positives showing up due to 
the organisations that may use multiple 
ASNs (Autonomous System Numbers) to 
advertise their routes. To solve this issue, we 
link a Verification Database to the 
previously proposed detection method to 
improve the accuracy. The method extracts 
the organisation names (unique code) and 
associated ASNs from different ASN 
delegators and RIRs (Regional Internet 
Registries), more specifically the RIPE 
(Reseaux IP Europeans) dump database [2] 
in order to evaluate the method. Since the 
organisation name is not available in the 
BGP updates, the data are extracted and 
  
processed to produce a structured database 
(Verification DB). The algorithm excludes 
false positive IP prefix hijack detection 
events in the SFL (Suspicious Findings List) 
introduced in [1]. Finally, the algorithm is 
validated using the 2008 YouTube Pakistan 
hijack event and the Con-Edison hijack 
(2006); the analysis demonstrates that the 
improved algorithm qualitatively increases 
the accuracy of detecting the IP prefix 
hijacks, specifically reducing the false 
positives. 
Keywords—RIPE database; ASNs and IP 
prefix delegators; information correlation; 
false positives 
I. Introduction 
BGP remains the protocol of choice for 
core Internet interconnectivity. Although a 
number of BGP security issues have been 
identified for almost two decades, the 
protocol remains vulnerable to IP prefix 
attack [3]. These weaknesses cause serious 
attacks and open the door for attacker to 
perform spam attack [4], traffic interception 
and DDoS [5]. On Oct, 2014 Sharon 
Goldberg pointed out that the main reasons 
why BGP is taking so long to be secured is 
that, apart from the fact that the BGP 
security solutions are not deployable, BGP 
lacks a single centralised authority, each 
organisation deploys its own routing security 
solution autonomously, so a complete or 
mass deployment is unlikely to take place 
[3].  
Previous studies tried to detect IP prefix 
hijacks based on monitoring routers’ 
stability, but their methods could not reliably 
distinguish IP prefix hijacks from normal 
events, such as power cut-off and submarine 
cuts [6].  In addition, RPKI (Resource 
Publication Infrastructure) was put forward 
to detect BGP route hijacking, but the 
  
system had several false positives and 
negatives and need further refinements [7].  
Lastly, some methods propose analysing 
the routing tables in order to detect IP prefix 
hijacks, but they are likely to have a limited 
impact, as organisations may refuse to 
provide their routing tables or are unable to 
timely detect a hijack event [8]. In addition, 
previous solutions do not support 
collaboration among routers to detect the IP 
prefix hijacks, collaboration could limit the 
attack spreading out and affecting a large 
number of networks. 
This paper aims to address the false 
positives caused by the limitations of the 
algorithm in [1]. After investigating the 
main reasons we found that route 
aggregation and AS confederation or 
reflection BGP operations do not affect the 
accuracy of the IP prefix detection algorithm 
proposed previously [1] although they have 
a direct effect on the routes. 
 One of the factors affecting the 
algorithm is that big organisation can 
announce their routes with multiple different 
ASNs; to counteract this issue, a novel 
combination of RIRs and ASNs delegation 
database and BGP updates [9] is proposed in 
order to accurately and timely detect IP 
prefix hijacking events.  
In section II, the paper discusses the 
previous detection method and the 
limitations of its algorithm. Section III 
shows the creation of the Verification DB 
based on the RIPE database. In Section IV 
we describe the proposed improvements to 
the IP prefix detection method based on the 
information from the Verification DB, 
together with findings and algorithm 
challenges. Section V describes the 
collaboration between routers to detect the 
  
IP prefix hijacks before it spreads out. 
Section VI proposes a general structure of 
the detection method to be linked with the 
BGP routers so it can work efficiently. The 
paper finishes with the conclusion and future 
work in section VII.  
II. Previous detection method 
The detection method presented in [1] 
consists of three main parts: pre-processing, 
analysis and the algorithm, as shown in 
Figure 1. This section shows that the 
algorithm did not have a mechanism to 
validate the output. It makes decision 
directly and displays the result either benign 
or malicious.  
The next two subsections explain that by 
providing an overview of the algorithm 
functionality and highlight its limitations, 
specifically the shortcomings that we aim to 
improve in this paper. BGPdump is a tool 
used to convert updates from binary data to 
ASCII data. 
 
Fig1. Previous structure of the IP prefix hijack 
detection method 
A. Algorithm 
The algorithm has three objectives – 
firstly, associates the announcer (origin AS) 
with each advertised IP prefix. Secondly, 
removes duplications of associated origin 
ASes and IP prefixes. Finally, identifies any 
IP prefixes that were announced by more 
than one AS.  
The algorithm receives the origin ASes 
and their IP prefixes from two different data 
  
sources, every fifteen minutes. Origin ASes 
are mapped on their IP prefixes using a cell 
array in MatLab [1] allowing assignment of 
one ASN to multiple IP prefixes.  
Data reduction is then applied to the 
dataset by removing duplicated origin ASNs 
and IP prefixes, which allows the algorithm 
to categorise faster the input dataset in order 
to detect suspicious announcements. After 
computing unique origin ASes and their 
associated IP prefixes, the algorithm 
compares the IP prefix of each AS to the IP 
prefixes of all origin ASes reported during 
each time interval to find out IP prefixes that 
were advertised by multiple ASes.  
The analysis performs a comparison 
between individual AS-IP prefix rows in the 
cell array using the BSA (Binary Search 
Algorithm) [10] O(log N) due to its ability to 
execute array comparisons exponentially 
faster than linear search algorithm (LSA) 
[11]. The algorithm lists the detected 
incidents (suspicious hijacks) in a new 
matrix composed of two columns.  
Table 1 shows the format of the Mapping 
Cell Array for Origin ASes and IP prefixes. 
The comparison part shows the outputs as 
normal or suspicious routes. However, the 
algorithm in [1] has some false positives as 
it is going to be explained in the following 
subsection. 
TABLE.1 Example of Mapping Cell Array in quarter 
82 
B. Previous algorithm limitation  
The algorithm proposed in [1] has a 
significant limitation, as it cannot take into 
account organisations using multiple 
different ASNs to advertise their own routes. 
To address this limitation, this paper 
introduces a Verification database to be 
Origin ASes IP prefixes 
137 369760021 
151 369760021;369760023; 697600524 
174 139438524; 244296124 
  
included in the detection method in order to 
enhance the accuracy of the algorithm.  
Since BGP updates lack the organisation 
names (codes), we extract data from the 
RIRs and process them to produce a dataset 
that links the AS numbers to the unique 
codes for the organisations that own them. 
III. RIR-based mapping of AS 
numbers and organisations 
This section discusses the processing of 
RIR information (specifically the RIPE 
Whois database [2]) to enhance the BGP 
update fields used as input and support the 
algorithm described in [1] to reduce the false 
positives.  
A. Extracting and numerating 
organisations’ ASNs and their 
unique codes from RIPE dump 
database 
As part of the RIR registration, each 
organisation has a unique code to uniquely 
identify it. For instance, in RIPE, ORG-
YE1-RIPE field represents Yahoo in Europe 
but ORG-HBp1-RIPE represents HSBC 
Bank plc. The Verification DB is processed 
in three phases. 
1. PHASE 1 
This phase extracts the ASNs and 
organisation codes fields from the RIPE 
dump database and stores data into 
corresponding fields, aut-nums and orgs, 
such as autonomous system number 
AS20535 and its code ORG-IG12-RIPE.  
2. PHASE 2 
Since RIPE includes ASNs without an 
associated organisation code (name), the 
incomplete records are filtered out, 
which does inherently limit the 
capabilities of the presented method 
because they confuse the order of 
  
searching the ownership of specific IP 
prefix and mix them up.  
3. PHASE 3 
The organisation code (name) field is 
structured as an array and was created to 
include all organisations codes that 
facing every ASN in RIPE. Each 
organisation code (organisation name) is 
divided into three parts (ORG, IG12 and 
RIPE for example) and saved in an array 
called ORG. Second and third index in 
ORG array respectively represent the 
organisation name and data resource 
(e.g. RIPE). Currently, the most 
important part is the second field of the 
array because it uniquely identifies the 
organisations.  
The third field of the organisation 
code array represents the database (e.g. 
RIRs or ASN delegator) that provided 
the record; this helps to differentiate 
between multiple database source 
owners. To optimise the analysis, these 
two parts are converted to numeric data. 
Table 2 shows one record of the final 
structure format of the Verification DB. 
First column is used as a primary key to 
be linked to ASNs in the Suspicious 
Findings List [1]. 
TABLE.2 Example of the final format to the 
Verification DB 
ASNs ORG codes and sources 
200912 18191226 
B. Filtering organisations with one 
ASN 
Given the method focuses on 
organisations with more than one ASN in 
order to refine the results, all organisations 
that have only one ASN are filtered out, 
allowing the algorithm based on [1] to parse 
a significantly smaller dataset in order to 
  
determine whether suspicious IP prefix 
hijacks are real or not. 
In the case of RIPE database from 
February 2015 [9], the size of the 
Verification Database before filtering out 
organisations with only one ASN was 25580 
records, reduced to 6283 records through 
filtering. The improved detection method 
verifies its results (suspicious hijacks) based 
on the reduced Verification DB. The general 
structure of processing the Verification 
Database is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2 Structure of Verification DB of organisations 
that have multiple ASNs 
IV. Improved detection method 
This section discusses the use of the 
Verification DB in the IP hijack detection 
method [1]. The encompassing algorithm 
validates its outputs based on this database. 
It also demonstrates the results of the 
detection method after the improvement.  
In the previous work [1], the algorithm 
directly translates the results into two 
categories, normal and suspicious, but it 
does not verify the decision against 
organisations owning multiple ASes. To 
expand, if an organisation relocates a prefix 
between two of the ASes it owns, the 
algorithm would flag the change as a 
suspicious event; in fact, given both ASes 
are owned by the same organisation, it is 
likely that it is due to addressing and 
logistics ASes and IP prefixes management 
rather than a hijacking incident. In this 
paper, we introduce the Verification DB to 
check against the owners of the ASes 
involved in the suspicious events.  
  
The Verification DB maps the 
autonomous system numbers and the 
corresponding organisations owning them. 
The extended comparison allows us to verify 
if a suspicious event is due to an IP prefix 
being migrated between ASes owned by 
distinct organisations. If an IP prefix is 
indeed migrated between ASes owned by 
different organisations, the event is further 
flagged as suspicious; if however the 
migration is between ASes of the same 
owner, the algorithm concludes that the 
change is not a suspicious event and 
continues with the search.  
Figure 3 provides a block-diagram 
overview of the improved detection method, 
including input from RIRs into the decision 
process. In the diagram, the Extensional 
Block provides the required functionality for 
the RIR information and verification DB 
processing. 
 
Fig. 3 Improved Structure of the IP prefix hijack 
detection method [1] 
V. Validation of improved detection 
method 
The algorithm proposed in the previous 
section was applied to two incidents: the 
whole day of Pakistan and YouTube 
hijacking day (24/02/2008) and the day of 
the Con-Edison hijack (22/01/2006). In other 
words, before the algorithm takes a decision 
with the suspicious routes, it checks out if 
two suspicious routers that were 
impersonating the same IP prefix exist in the 
Verification DB with one organisation 
name; if so, they are ignored otherwise the 
  
advertisement will be flagged as a hijack. 
Pseudo code below explains the steps of the 
validation in details. The algorithm develops 
the accuracy of the suspicious results that 
were already caught by searching for the 
signature attack of IP prefix hijackings. It 
takes each two suspicious ASes in the list of 
Suspicious Finding List and searches for 
them in VerificationDB, which contains 
organisations that have more than one ASN; 
if they exist in the SFL, the ASes will be 
removed from suspicious list as they are not 
a real signature for the IP prefix hijackings.  
Suspicious = dlmread (Suspicious_Finding_List); 
suspiciouslen = length (suspicious); 
VerifDBLen = length(ORGsWithMultiASN); 
CASE = 1; 
ORGCODE = [1 0; 2 1]; 
WHILE CASE <= suspiciouslen 
    ASN1 = suspicious (CASE, 4); 
    ASN2 = suspicious (CASE+1,4); 
    CHECK = 1; 
    WHILE CHECK < VerifDBLen        
        ASN3=ORGsWithMultiASN (CHECK, 1); 
        IF (ASN1 == ASN3 OR ASN2 == ASN3) 
            IF (ASN1 == ASN3) 
              ORGCODE (1,1)=CASE;   
              ORGCODE (1,2)= . . .                                                         
              ORGsWithMultiASN (CHECK, 2); 
            ELSEIF (ASN2 == ASN3) 
              ORGCODE (2,1)= CASE; 
              ORGCODE (2,2)= . . .  
              ORGsWithMultiASN (CHECK, 2); 
            END                 
        END                 
        IF (ORGCODE (1,2) == ORGCODE (2,2) 
              ORGCODE (1,1) == ORGCODE (2,1)) 
       suspicious(CASE-1: CASE+1,:)=[]; 
              suspiciouslen= . . . 
              length(suspicious); 
           ORGCODE (1,2)=0; 
           ORGCODE (2,2)=1;           
        END                 
        CHECK= CHECK+1; 
    END                 
    CASE= CASE+3; 
END  
A. Findings 
The improved algorithm added 
functionality has two advantages: it can 
detect multiple occurrences of the same 
incident and allows the algorithm to identify 
organisations that announce their routes with 
more than one ASN. In the specific example 
of the YouTube hijack, the algorithm from 
[1] identifies 1767 incidents; following the 
analysis of repeated incidents, 975 unique 
incidents can be identified. Parsing the 
analysis through the Verification DB, the 
number of Suspicious hijacks drops to 969, 
due to the SLF suspicious hijack exclusions. 
Following a similar processing, the events 
from (the 22nd Jan 2006) do not show any 
  
improvement because the incidents took 
place outside RIPE, so the Suspicious 
Findings List from RIPE is empty (none of 
suspicious results in the findings list is in the 
RIPE database). Thus, the algorithm needs 
several sources such as AFRINIC (Africa 
Region), APNIC (Asia/Pacific Region) and 
ARIN (North America Region) to improve 
its accuracy.  
B. Algorithm challenges and solutions  
Since the Verification DB uses only the 
RIPE database as a case study, the results 
would still include false positives but with 
lower percentage. The algorithm would be 
more accurate if the number of different 
sources (RIRs’ and ASN delegators’ 
database) used for the Verification DB 
increases. This challenge can be addressed 
as described at the end of the previous sub-
section.  
Second challenge is that the RIRs and 
ASNs delegators’ databases need to be 
updated regularly and concurrently with the 
changes to ASNs and organisation names. 
Third difficulty is the algorithm detects IP 
prefix hijacks based on off-line analysis.  
Furthermore, some organisations do not 
include their code in their associated record 
in the RIPE database. In addition, some 
RIRs do not keep historical records of old 
Whois registrations details. Once a record is 
updated or deleted, the old record is not 
stored in an archived database. As a result, 
the algorithm cannot evaluate organisation 
names and ASNs changes when it compares 
past suspicious hijacks to the current 
Verification DB. 
Finally, prefix hijacks may be transparent 
for the algorithm on a subset of routers due 
to partially propagated prefix updates; 
therefore routers need to work 
  
collaboratively to compare and aggregate 
update information with their neighbours. 
The following section discusses the steps of 
this collaboration. 
VI. Proposed detection architecture 
This section describes a possible 
architecture that allows aggregating data 
collaboratively on several different routers. 
The aim of the architecture is to allow BGP 
routers to jointly benefit from the 
independently identified events on each 
router and, subsequently, lead to higher 
accuracy when detecting anomalous 
behaviour. 
A. Architecture method and the 
advantages 
Routers that run the hijack detection 
algorithm should work together in order to 
improve the reliability and timeliness of the 
information derived from the UPDATE 
messages. An IP prefix hijack might not 
significantly affect traffic exchanged with 
the impersonated AS until it spreads to 
multiple/different ASes; to alleviate the 
effect of the hijack, the algorithm has to 
work collaboratively to prevent the 
propagation of invalid routes. The detection 
algorithm operates independently from BGP 
and categorises network events, but may 
benefit from sharing and receiving data from 
other neighbouring routers in order to detect 
the effect of the attack rapidly. The BGP 
updates may be collected and aggregated by 
a router over a specific operational timeslot, 
while bearing in mind that anomaly 
detection becomes stale with higher 
aggregation slots. In case of detecting a 
suspicious route, an alarm of the invalid 
route would be sent to all neighbours.  
The algorithm should run in each router, 
based on the different information received. 
In addition to the use BSA (of Binary search 
algorithm), making the routers work 
  
collaboratively and independently would 
increase the detection speed and would not 
require any modifications of the 
infrastructure of the BGP routers. Figure 4 
shows the general structure of the improved 
detection method when linked to the BGP 
routers. 
 
Fig. 4 Improved detection method architecture of 
detecting and preventing the spread out of hijacks 
Moreover, if some routers do not actively 
run the detection system, the other routers 
may identify and publicise the anomaly. By 
doing so, each BGP router will have a 
chance to suppress any suspicious routes to 
prevent itself from further propagating the 
hijacked routes. 
B. The effectiveness of the architecture 
over the algorithm 
The advantage of a collaborative 
architecture in the BGP context is that each 
router can only check its own received 
update packets so there is no load to the 
algorithm to find out the hijack. Another 
advantage of this collaboration is that the 
check will be periodic, with timeslot starting 
times distributed over time. For example, if 
Router A cannot detect the hijack at 1:15 
AM because it is not the time slot to do the 
check, there may be another copy of the 
algorithm in the neighbouring routers doing 
the check and detecting the hijack faster.  
VII. Conclusion and future work 
A new framework was proposed to 
enhance the accuracy of a previously 
proposed method for IP prefix hijack 
detection. The framework extracts the 
  
unique code and associated ASNs of 
organisations from different RIRs; the 
algorithm then excludes previously detected 
IP prefix hijacks that are likely to be false 
positives. After proposing the framework, its 
efficiency is validated on the Pakistan IP 
hijacking event from 24th Feb 2008 and the 
Con-Edison hijack (22nd Jan 2006). The 
analysis used the RIPE dump database from 
the two respective dates as a case study to 
evaluate the proposed framework. In the 
evaluation, the algorithm was able to 
improve the accuracy of the IP prefix 
hijacks, reducing the false positives by 
0.61% (18 suspicious hijack) for the two 
events.  
From the results, it is clear that the 
algorithm can work accurately but also could 
omit some events; more specifically, several 
incidents from 22nd Jan 2006 were still false 
positives, since the analysis was based only 
on the RIPE database. Additionally, if an AS 
announces an IP prefix in the absence of the 
real origin AS, the algorithm will not be able 
to detect the impersonation when it works 
independently (non-collaboratively).  
In terms of router interconnectivity, some 
routers do not have a direct connection to the 
hijacker. In other words, the detection 
method ought to be decentralised in order to 
collect direct information regarding the 
hijacker and detect the hijack faster. Another 
advantage of the decentralisation is that 
detection of anomalies can be done for 
various, partially overlapping timeslots. 
Another challenge of the algorithm is that 
the hijacker could impersonate one of the 
net-range IP prefixes (sub-prefixes), event 
that may be transparent for the algorithm. 
Last, the period gap (synchronisation) 
between fetching BGP updates and the 
current status of the ASN of an organisation, 
together with the IP prefixes changes, could 
  
have a negative impact on the accuracy of 
the algorithm.  
In future, the proposed approach may 
provide further insight into and refine the 
rationale behind organisations announcing 
the same IP prefix with different ASN. This 
is needed in order to distinguish between 
normal BGP operations and malicious ones, 
and then address the false positive errors. 
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Abstract—In spite of significant on-going 
research, the Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP) still suffers vulnerability issues 
specially regarding impersonating the 
ownership of IP prefixes of ASes 
(Autonomous Systems). In this context, a 
number of research studies focused on 
securing the BGP through historical-based 
and statistical-based behavioural models. 
This paper proposes a novel method 
aiming to detect IP prefix hijacking 
incidents based on tracking the behaviour 
of suspicious ASes.  The detection method 
uses signature-based technique as a pre-
process phase to separate suspicious 
announces (BGP updates) from benign 
announces. From a processing perspective, 
the outputs of signature-based algorithm 
are used as inputs for the detection 
method. Nine features will be extracted 
from the ASpath attributes of potentially 
suspicious ASes. The features are 
considered a combination of the behavioral 
characteristics of the routers in relation to 
their connectivity. Based on these features 
and the best five supervised learning 
classifiers, we identify the hijacks. Under 
different learning algorithms, the detection 
  
method is able to detect the hijacks with a 
high accuracy especially with J48, which 
can detect the hijacks with 96%. 
 
Keywords—BGP4; Machine learning; 
ASN; IP prefix hijack signatures, features; 
RIRs Whois databases 
I. Introduction 
BGP remains the protocol of choice for 
core Internet interconnectivity. Although a 
number of BGP security issues have been 
identified and partially addressed for 
almost two decades, the protocol remains 
vulnerable to IP prefix attacks. This 
weakness leads to significant stability 
issues for the network, and may be used as 
a vehicle for blackhole traffic attackers [1], 
spamming [2], DDoS, and man-in-the-
middle attacks [3]. In addition, hijackers 
may exploit redirecting BGP traffic for 
hijacking cryptocurrecny transactions [4]. 
In a review of existing approaches, 
Goldberg indicated that the main reason 
BGP is taking so long to be secured is that, 
apart from its deployment challenges, the 
infrastructure lacks a central authority, as 
each organisation autonomously deploys 
its own solution, so a complete or mass 
deployment is unlikely to take place [5]. A 
traditional method employed by prior 
research to detect IP prefix hijacks based 
on anomaly detection and monitoring the 
stability of the encompassing routers. 
Nonetheless, such methods could not 
reliably distinguish IP prefix hijacks from 
normal events, such as power cut-off or 
submarine cable cuts [6]. Lastly, some 
detection methods analyse routing tables 
(table-based) in order to detect IP prefix 
hijacks, but organisations may refuse to 
provide their routing tables [7]. Vervier et 
al. noted that methods based on monitoring 
anomalies to detect IP prefix hijacks are 
still suffering from high false positive rates 
  
[3]. They also pointed out that prevention 
methods BGP IP prefix hijack are still 
facing large-scale and deployment issues 
[3]. Due to several reasons, such as 
performance issues on large routing 
systems or impracticability of approaches 
like S-BGP [8], the threats still exist 
nowadays [9]. Wubbeling et al. pointed 
out security based on origin authentication 
and asymmetric encryption are not feasible 
nowadays, because it is not yet 
implemented in broadly used hardware and 
business processes of ASes [9]. In 
addition, the RPKI (Resource Publication 
Infrastructure) system is one of IP prefix 
hijacking detection systems put in place to 
prevent BGP route hijacking. However the 
system had several false positives and 
negatives and needs further refinements. 
The system is based on tracing the 
hierarchical relationships of the address 
space were given by IANA, RIRs and big 
ISPs to customers. The Route Origin 
Authorizations (ROAs) is 
cryptographically signed and published in 
repositories. Routers can download these 
repositories using trusted tool and then 
upload them into [10]. 
Zhang et al. pointed out the importance 
of signature-based and anomaly-based in 
modern intrusion detection together with 
their inherent drawbacks – uncertainty for 
signature-based methods and inability to 
detect new attacks for anomaly-based 
analysis [11]. Furthermore, connectivity 
model is a new approach used recently to 
trace the behaviour of opportunistic 
networks. Kathiravelu argues that a 
paradigm shift from mobility models to 
connectivity model [12]. As a result, we 
decided to simulate these models wok and 
build our method based on the 
connectivity behaviour changes of 
suspicious ASes to detect BGP IP prefix 
hijacks.  
  
In this paper we propose a detection 
method that can trace the behaviour of 
suspicious ASes and detects the IP prefix 
hijacking. The detection method relies on 
the connectivity behaviour of suspicious 
ASes to their neighbours. Hijack 
signatures are checked to separate 
suspicious announces from benign 
announces. From this connectivity we can 
extract several parameters such as number 
of sender and receiver neighbours for 
suspicious ASes, the victim and the 
hijacker. In order to validate the accuracy 
of the method, a dataset of UPDATE 
messages was collected and used using the 
Route View project of University of 
Oregon, covering the 24hour period of the 
24th of February 2008; the day was chosen 
as it is the day when Pakistan Telecom 
intended to restrict local access to 
YouTube from their citizens. However, it 
advertised an IP prefix owned by YouTube 
and blocked access to YouTube [13] for 
approximately two hours [14]. For the 
detection method validation purposes, a 
number of supervised machine-learning 
classifiers based on Split Test option were 
used and resulted in accuracy rates of up to 
96%.  
This paper is organised as follows: in 
section II we present the components of 
the IP prefix hijacking detection method. 
The section also crosschecks the BGP 
updates for detecting ASes’ hijack 
footprint, while section III extracts some 
features based on the connectivity of 
suspicious ASes. Section IV discusses the 
methodology of the classification and 
testing the behaviour of suspicious ASes 
while V evaluates the accuracy of the 
detection method based on the results of 
learning algorithms. The conclusions and 
future work are outlined in the last section.  
II. Detection method 
  
In the last decade, Machine Learning 
started to be used to detect anomalies on 
the network traffic. We plan to use this 
subfield of computer science to detect IP 
prefix hijack in the BGP. The Machine 
Leaning has different learning approaches 
to mine data such as supervised learning, 
semi-supervised learning, unsupervised 
learning, reinforcement learning and deep 
learning. Because supervised-learning pre-
learns malicious and benign instances, it is 
considered more accurate than other 
learning types; therefore the datasets of 
suspicious ASes will be structured in 
supervised format.  The IP prefix hijack 
detection method is composed of four 
main components as it is shown in figure 
1: IP prefix hijack Parser, Feature 
Extractor (FE), Labeller and different ML 
(Machine Learning) classifiers. 
 
Fig 1. Detection method using signature-model-
based combination 
A. Parsing announcements   
The detection method is based on BGP 
announce update messages downloaded 
from the Route View project created by 
University of Oregon. The parser splits 
update messages into equal timeslots and 
identifies multiple ASes that announce the 
same IP prefix. Further, data reduction is 
applied to reduce the search area of BGP 
update messages. The Parser maps every 
AS to all its unique IP prefixes announced 
in the period the announces determined to 
be checked in. Mapped ASes and their 
  
prefixes are put in cell array. Table 1 
shows the ASes when they are mapped to 
their IP prefixes before they are parsed. 
TABLE 1. Mapped ASes with their prefixes 
Each record in the cell array, in table 1, 
is composed of pair data (suspicious 
unique AS, unique prefix/prefixes). Each 
record is compared to the whole list of the 
ASes and their prefixes to structure table 
2. This table has two columns, first one 
represents different ASes claiming the 
same IP prefix and the second column 
represents the prefix is announced by two 
different suspicious ASes, all duplicated 
suspicious incidents are removed. The 
algorithm employs binary search algorithm 
to trace prefix hijacks very quick. Binary 
search algorithm executes in algorithmic 
time and with Big O. This table represents 
data are saved in the SAL (Suspicious 
ASes List), which displays the output 
format of suspicious ASes. 
TABLE 2. Suspicious ASes 
Different ASes Same IP prefix 
AS1239 AS801 18.168.0.0/24 
AS801 AS1299 158.173.176.0/20 
AS37 AS27064 198.91.71.0/24 
AS100 AS14807 63.115.54.0/24 
Parser passes its outputs to the Feature 
Extractor, which is responsible for 
extracting nine features from candidate 
suspicious ASes connectivity to their 
direct neighbours. These features will be 
discussed in detail in section III. 
B. Labelling incidents   
The behaviours of suspicious ASes 
received from the Feature Extractor are 
labelled based on the RIRs (Regional 
Unique ASes Unique Prefixes  
AS37 '198.91.71.0/24' 
AS100 '63.115.54.0/24' 
 
AS801 
18.168.0.0/24 
158.173.176.0/20 
 
AS1239 
128.30.0.0/15 
18.168.0.0/24 
18.168.1.0/24 
AS1299 158.173.176.0/20 
AS14807 '63.115.54.0/24' 
AS27064 '198.91.71.0/24' 
  
Internet Registries) databases. Since AS 
numbers and prefixes are delegated by 
several organisations and the detection 
method only based on the RIRs for 
exploring the hijacker from the victim, 
there are some incidents cannot be labelled 
because some suspicious ASes or the 
impersonated prefixes are not available in 
the RIRs. The dataset in the table 2 is 
labelled into two classes either malicious 
or benign. The detection method needs to 
label the outputs of the Feature Extractor 
in order to specify the possible patterns of 
hijacking behaviors. Each nominated 
suspicious AS is investigated based on the 
five regional registries: AfriNIC, APNIC, 
ARIN, LACNIC and RIPE NCC. The 
strategy of labeling the events is based on 
three main rules: 
• If both of suspicious ASes own the 
route, they are both marked with 
OWNER, and the event is 
considered benign. 
• If one of suspicious ASes owns the 
prefix, it is marked with OWNER, 
while the other suspicious AS is 
marked as HIJACKER, and the 
event is considered malicious. 
• If neither of the suspicious ASes 
owns the prefix, we tag them with 
NOTSURE, and then the event is 
labeled as AMBIGUOUS. 
• If the suspicious ASes do not exist, 
they will be ignored.  
TABLE 3. Suspicious ASes investigator dataset 
AS
1 
AS
2 
AS1 
STATUS 
AS2 
STATU
S 
LABEL 
100 250 OWNER OWNE
R 
BENIGN 
200 10 ATTACK
ER 
OWNE
R 
MALICIOU
S 
300 50 NOT 
SURE 
NOT 
SURE 
AMBIGUO
US 
BENIGN represents semi-hijacks. 
Semi-hijacks means one organisation 
could own a block of ASes and announce a 
prefix with different ASNs (AS numbers). 
This operation gives the same signature of 
the real hijack but in reality it is benign. 
MALICIOUS represents the real hijacks. 
AMBIGUOUS events will be removed 
  
from the dataset and we only keep records 
are labeled as BENIGN or MALICIOUS 
as it shown in table 3. Labelled instances 
are passed as inputs to the ML (Machine 
Learning) component to be trained and 
then classified. The detection method uses 
the best learning algorithms had been used 
on previous applications to evaluate the 
proposed features. These algorithms were 
selected based on the most used 
supervised-learning classifiers in the last 
recent years. In our work, we use 
percentage-split test option for training and 
testing the datasets.  
III. Features extraction 
The majority of previous anomaly 
detection methods [6] [15] [16] extract 
features based on the stability of routers. 
However, these methods always fail to 
detect the IP prefix hijack or are rather 
poor at differentiating it from other 
anomalies because features are extracted 
based on the stability of routers are not 
feasible. There are lots of issues that can 
make routers not stable such as blackouts 
outages, worms. All features are going to 
be extracted in this work are new and 
extracted in a different way. Our extraction 
method is based on the connective 
structure (topology) of suspicious ASes to 
their direct neighbors. The detection 
method extracts features from the direct 
location to the issue, which is ASPATH 
attribute, to differentiate the behavior of 
the hijackers and victims. ASPATH 
attribute is one of attributes the BGP has in 
order to deal with its policy. In order to see 
affected routers in the Internet 
infrastructure and calculate the 
connectivity between routers when an edge 
router impersonates the ownership of a 
prefix is owned by another edge router 
(AS), we use Network Analysis and 
Visualization (NAV) toolbox [17]. The 
  
NAV toolbox can help to plot the topology 
of suspicious ASes and trace their 
connectivity to their neighbours. When the 
behaviors of the suspicious ASes are 
computed they will be stored in triple 
format, first two locations for suspicious 
ASes and third location for hijacked 
prefix, (AS1, AS2, Prefix).  
A. Feature computation  
The behavior of each suspicious AS 
will be calculated from its connectivity to 
the direct neighbors and the result of two 
the ASes are subtracted to give the 
relational behavior value of pair suspicious 
ASes. This relational behavior value of all 
features (instance) represents the pattern of 
the two ASes claiming the hijacked prefix. 
Since, the relational behavior between the 
two suspicious ASes can be negative, in 
some cases, we need to take the absolute 
value of the differences from equation 1. 
For example, we assume that we have four 
pair edge routers in two four different 
ASes, as in figure 2. Victim router is in 
AS1, Hijacker router in AS2, Owner router 
in AS3 and another Owner in AS4. Victim 
router and Hijacker represent real hijack 
whilst Owner routers are pair suspicious 
hijack. Victim receives some 
announcements but from two neighbors 
while Hijacker receives its announcements 
from one neighbor. This shows that upper 
pair routers in AS1 and AS2 have different 
number of sender neighbors. However, 
two pair suspicious routers in AS3 and 
AS4 have the same number of sender 
neighbors. . Owner in AS3 and 4 are 
considered suspicious because they carry 
the signature of the hijack; two different 
routers in two different ASes announce 
one prefix. The scenario of calculating the 
behavior of pair suspicious routers is 
applied to the remaining features. The 
results of each pair ASes are subtracted 
  
and put in a column vector to represent the 
behavior of pair suspicious ASes This 
column vector represents the relational 
behavior of two suspicious incidents. If the 
relational behavior value is negative, 
equation 1 will be applied to remove the 
sign. SAS1 represents the behavior of first 
suspicious AS while SAS1 reflects the 
behavior of second suspicious AS and Sr 
represents the relational behavior between 
two ASes. SAS1 and SAS2 could be both 
owner or one is victim and another is 
hijacker.  
𝑆! = 𝑆!!! − 𝑆!"!  (1) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Routers connectivity and routes travel 
TABLE 4. Features of suspicious ASes 
NO Type    Features 
1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connectivity 
# of repeated incidents 
2. # of receiver neighbors 
3.  # of sender neighbors 
4. # of first propagators of 
suspicious routes 
5. # of shared receiver 
neighbors 
6.  # of shared sender 
neighbors 
7. # of shared first 
propagators of suspicious 
routes 
8.  # of connections between 
suspicious ASes 
9. Are they neighbors? 
All features in table 4 are extracted 
from the ASPATH attribute. From the 
connectivity of suspicious ASes and their 
relational behavior we extract 9 features. 
Feature 1 is extracted based on the 
observation that says unintentional hijacks 
behavior, such as misconfiguration, do not 
impersonate more than one prefix whereas 
man-made prefix hijack often attack 
different ASes at same time. This feature 
has to distinguish between deliberate 
hijacks and unintentional hijacks. Features 
2-7 are based on the connections of the 
routers to suspicious ASes. Specifically, 
features 2-4 focus on the direct neighbors 
  
  
AS1  AS2  
AS3  AS4  
  
(routers) of suspicious ASes while features 
5-7 analyze shared direct neighbors 
between suspicious ASes and features 8 
and 9 identify direct and indirect 
connections between the suspicious ASes. 
These features should reveal the similar 
and different patterns of suspicious ASes 
behaviours. 
B. Sampling data 
Table 5 shows a snapshot of the 
instances calculated based on the proposed 
features appear in table 4. Based on the 
labeling method presented in section II, 
each instance is given either 0, if it is 
malicious or 1, if it is benign. Symbols F1-
F9 represent the number of features while 
C indicates whether the event is a hijack or 
not. Each feature is stored in a separate 
column vector. These column vectors are 
concatenated with the class column vector 
to give a dataset composed of 10 columns, 
including observation classes, and 340 
instances.  
TABLE 5. Features after labeling 
F
1 
F
2 
F
3 
F 
4 
F
5 
F
6 
F
7 
F
8 
F
9 
C 
2 2
2 
1 66
5 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 7 0 7 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1
0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
We collected 680 suspicious ASes, 
which represents pair of suspicious ASes 
behavior in one record. Instead of putting 
each suspicious incident in one record we 
put pair of suspicious ASes in one record 
because we already separated benign 
announces from suspicious announces in 
parsing phase. In the next phase we need 
to distinguish pair benign ASes’ behavior 
from one malicious and one benign ASes’ 
behavior from each other. Basically, the 
number of suspicious ASes is 640 but 
because of the mechanism of sampling the 
  
dataset, which based on the relational 
behavior of suspicious ASes instead of 
putting the patterns of the suspicious ASes 
in a separate record, this number is 
dropped down to 340.  
After sampling suspicious ASes in 340 
pair suspicious ASes records, we also 
ignore 133 records since the registration 
details of some suspicious ASes does not 
show by any of RIRs Whois. The reason is 
probably because the suspicious ASNs or 
the hijacked prefixes are delegated by 
another ISPs (Internet Service Providers). 
The new size of the dataset will be 
dropped to 207 instances.  
Another important thing has to be taken 
into account is getting rid of redundant 
instances, which means all duplicated 
records will be removed from the dataset 
because there is no need for similar events 
but this also makes the dataset decreasing. 
Although the size of the dataset is 
decreasing, the performance of detecting 
hijacks is increased because we only 
collect incidents what we are sure from. 
With removing duplicated patterns of 
suspicious ASes behavior will make the 
detection method goes over a large number 
of BGP updates very fast during live 
communication between BGP routers. It 
would be good idea if RIRs or interested 
originations keep the history of the 
hijacker and victim ASes in addition to 
collecting BGP update messages. That will 
help interested researchers to have a large 
dataset to work on. 
After labeling instances based on the 
RIRs Whois validation and removing 
repeated suspicious observations, the new 
size of the dataset will be 113 instances 
(suspicious ASes patterns) by 9 attributes 
(features). If proposed learning algorithms 
in the following section can differentiate 
  
the patterns for malicious and benign 
observations, that means the extracted 
features are useful and built in a high 
efficient way. Next section will determine 
the quality of the features and evaluate the 
detection method. 
IV. Classification and evaluation 
This section discusses the method is 
used to divide the dataset that already 
received by Feature Extractor and labelled 
by the Labeller into training and test 
datasets. The method is called Split Test; it 
is a simple way to use one dataset to both 
train and estimate the performance of the 
features on unseen data. The incidences 
are classified based on the following steps: 
• The dataset is split randomly into 
80% training dataset and 20% test 
dataset for each learning algorithm. 
• Picked classifiers start with 
building the models of different 
learning algorithms and test unseen 
instances of the suspicious ASes. 
• Every classifier’s parameters are 
adjusted repeatedly till we find the 
best parameters work efficiently 
with the features. 
• The best result of each classifier is 
registered to be compared with the 
other good classifiers can work 
with the dataset. 
• Based on the offset of the 
percentage of false positives and 
false negatives of the classifiers, 
the best result is picked. 
A. Best classifiers with different 
applications  
In 2008, Xindong Wu et al. had studded 
the best algorithms were used in data 
mining in the past decades. Based on the 
study it is found that the most influential 
data-mining algorithms are allocated in 10 
top algorithms.  The study was about the 
best learning algorithms among several 
methods such as classification, clustering, 
statistical learning, association analysis 
and link mining [18]. Table 6 shows the 
  
best 10 supervised learning algorithms that 
can be used in classification in different 
applications.  
TABLE 6. Top 10 algorithms in data mining [18] 
Algorith
m  
Category  Learning 
Types  
Families  
C4.5 
(J48) 
Classificati
on 
Supervised  Decision 
tree 
K-
Means 
Clustering  Unsupervis
ed  
Clusters  
SVM Statistical  Supervised  - 
Apriori Association  Unsupervis
ed  
Associatio
ns 
EM Clustering  Unsupervis
ed 
Clusters 
PageRan
k 
Link 
mining 
Unsupervis
ed 
- 
AdaBoo
st 
Classificati
on  
Supervised Ensemble  
KNN Classificati
on  
Supervised  Lazy 
Naive 
Bayes 
Classificati
on  
Supervised  Bayes 
CART Classificati
on  
Supervised  Decision 
tree 
Another study has taken place for 
investigating the best learning classifiers in 
2014. The study compared 179 classifiers 
for 17 families and over 121 different 
databases and found the best classifiers are 
Random Forest versions [19]. 
RandomForest belongs to rule-based 
family and categorised as supervised 
learning. In addition, In 2014 Kaur and 
Chhabra claimed that improved J48 used 
recently to increase the accuracy rate of 
classification [20].  
B. Classifiers selection  
We have two different deep studies of 
the best algorithms in data mining; first 
study [18] was based on the research 
community and how the best algorithms 
are used widely in different area in data 
mining while the second study [19] was 
empirical study performed by some 
experts in data mining. Both of studies are 
important because they cover each other 
limitations. The studies covered two types 
of learning but we only interested in 
classification supervised-learning 
algorithms as we can have a prior picture 
of the percentage of benign and malicious 
data and know them before they are given 
to the algorithms. Our dataset was 
  
prepared to suit the specifications of 
different algorithms. It is numeric, dose 
not has missing values, its attribute values 
are natural, discrete and its class is binary 
which makes the classification to classifier 
easier. According to the strongest two 
attribute evaluators, PCA (Principal 
Component Analysis) finds out that the 
dataset have only one redundant attribute 
and the remaining 8 attributes are relevant 
while SVM (Support Vector Machine) 
attribute evaluator is considered all 
attributes are useful.  
Based on the features of the algorithms 
such as accuracy, speed and offset of 
having false positive and negatives and the 
ability to deal with the structure of the 
dataset the classifiers are going to be used 
chosen. The detection method is going to 
use J48, which is considered the improved 
version of C4.5 and C5.0 since it has 
several advantages and can work with the 
structure of our dataset. Generally, 
decision tree is fast at classifying unknown 
instances and easy to interpret for small-
sized tree (dataset). In addition, decision 
tree can handle discrete attributes, work 
well in the presence of redundant attributes 
and robust to the effect of outliers 
therefore two classifiers, RandomForest 
and CART (SimpleCart), are going to be 
tried too. Furthermore, additional two 
supervised-learning classifiers will be used 
because of their solid makeup such as k-
NN (k-Nearest Neighbour) and NB (Naïve 
Bayes). Both NB and K-NN support 
complex decision function or non-linear 
decision boundary to isolate 
multidimensional data and different 
classes 
C. Testing The Detection Method  
Proposed algorithms are randomly fed 
with different percentage of training 
  
datasets. However the classifiers accuracy 
rises up when the training dataset is 80% 
as in table 7. According to the changing of 
algorithms parameters the accuracy of the 
classification is registered. All algorithms 
parameters values need to be changed 
continuously to suit the feature structure. 
However, SimpleCart (CART) classifier 
gives 95% under its default values of the 
parameters. Table 7 shows that J48 is the 
best algorithm can work with the detection 
method. However, the detection method 
put the classifiers error rate into account to 
pick the best algorithm. The computation 
of the error rate will be worked out in the 
next subsection.  
TABLE 7.  Results based on Rule and Tree 
machine learning algorithms 
Famil
y  
Algorith
m 
Training 
dataset 
Test 
dataset 
Accurac
y  
Percentage
-split 
Percentage
-split 
Trees  J48  
 
80 % 
 
 
20% 
 
96% 
Lazy KNN 91% 
Bayes NB 87% 
Trees  CART 95% 
Trees  RF 91% 
D. False Negatives Calculation  
A and B in table 8 represent correctly 
and incorrectly classified instances for 
both classes, benign and malicious. 0 
represents malicious class and 1 reflects 
the class of benign instances. It is notable 
from table 8 that algorithms have more 
difficulty to classify benign observations 
than malicious observations except in 
Naïve Bays and RandomForest but 
generally all algorithms work well with the 
features. J48 and CART classify the 
dataset and come up with 0 incorrectly 
classified malicious observations and 18 
correctly classified malicious observations 
while k-Nearest Neighbours and has 0 
Incorrectly classified malicious 
observations and 10 correctly classified 
observations. However, Naïve Bayes and 
RandomForest have 2 incorrectly 
  
classified malicious observations and 16 
correctly classified instances.  
In terms of benign observations 
classification, RandomForest is considered 
the best classifier among five algorithms 
because its incorrectly classification is 0. 
J48, NB and CART have the same 
accuracy rate of detecting benign data 
while KNN is considered the worst as it 
has 2 instances classified incorrectly.  
If the total number of choosing the 
classified observations is considered, we 
find that k-Nearest Neighbours is only 
classifying 15 instances picked out of 113 
observations but the remaining algorithms 
are all equal and classifying 23 instances 
are chosen randomly from 113 
observations. Based on these notes and the 
offset of false positives and false 
negatives, the best algorithm is elected. 
TABLE 8. Confusion matrix testing for best 
classifiers 
Algorithm  Train dataset A  B  Classified as  
J48 80 % 18 0 A=0 
1 4 B=1 
KNN  80 % 10 0 A=0 
2 3 B=1 
NB 80 % 16 2 A=0 
1 4 B=1 
CART 80 % 18 0 A=0 
1 5 B=1 
RF 80 % 16 2 A=0 
0 5 B=1 
From the two following equations 2 and 
3, we can compute the percentage error of 
the false positives and false negatives for 
each algorithm, where MFn represents 
malicious false negative while BFn 
represents benign false negative. Every 
algorithm selects a number of instances 
randomly. This number represents the 
classified dataset size.  
𝑀𝐹! =    𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦  𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑑  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒           (2) 
𝐵𝐹!   =    𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦  𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑑  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒         (3) 
  
For each algorithm the false negatives 
and false positives of two classes are 
calculated from equation 2 and 3. If we 
take the average of the result, it will give 
the percentage error of the whole 
algorithms to distinguish benign and 
malicious instances, which means the 
accuracy of the detection method 
according to the whole five algorithms. 
The calculation comes up with 0.03 false 
negative for malicious class and 0.05 false 
positives for benign class, as it is shown in 
table 9. The percentage error of detecting 
malicious patterns is less than the 
detection of benign patterns. 
TABLE 9. Error of detecting malicious and benign 
hijack signature 
Algorithms 
Malicious 
False negatives 
Benign 
False negatives 
J48 (80%) 0 0.04 
KNN (80%) 0 0.13 
NB (80%) 0.08 0.04 
CART (80%) 0 0.04 
RF (80%) 0.08 0 
AVG 0.03 0.05 
Figure 3 visualises the percentage error 
of classifying real hijacks and semi-hijacks 
that labelled in section II-b. It shows that 
the false negative is less than the false 
positive in three classifiers (J48, KNN and 
CART) and explores the best algorithm 
based on the trade-offs of the false 
positives and negatives of the classifiers. 
From the trade-off perspective, the graph 
shows that J48 and CART are the best two 
algorithms. 
 
Fig 3. Algorithms tried with the detection method 
Summarising, the detection method 
works in a good efficiency with the whole 
classifiers in figure 3. However, the best 
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two classifiers can work with extracted 
features are J48 and CART. Our 
experiment supports Kaur and Chhabra 
study, which held in 2014 and says J48 
increases the accuracy rate of the 
classification. However, as the J48, KNN 
and CART are good with detecting real 
hijacks and RF is considered the best of 
detecting semi-hijacks, the detection 
method would work better if we can 
combine RF with J48, KNN or CART. In 
other words, It is assumed that the 
detection method works better, if RF can 
be combined with one of the three 
classifiers has zero false positive during 
classifying benign observations. 
V. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper discussed a 
novel method to detect IP prefix hijacks in 
the BGP. The method uses the BGP 
updates as input and parses the AS origin 
of announcements. A Feature Extractor 
receives caught suspicious ASes an input 
and extract features based on the behavior 
of suspicious ASes connectivity. The 
feature values of the suspicious ASes are 
given to a Labeller to be labeled with two 
classes, benign and malicious. The labeller 
uses the information of RIRs registration 
details of the organizations to know the 
victim and the hijacker and to determine if 
the suspicious caught incident is benign or 
malicious. The outputs of the Labeller, 
which is the dataset, will be given to 
different supervised classifiers. We create 
our own accurate dataset by checking the 
ownership of ASes and IP prefixes via 
RIRs and omit ambiguous and not exit 
suspicious ASes. Different learning 
algorithms were used to choose the best 
classifier works with the features. 
Generally, the result of the method is 
encouraging and very good as the 
percentage of false positive and false 
  
negative is less that 10% and the accuracy 
of the best classifier (J48) is 96%.  
RERENCES 
[1] H. Ballani, P. Francis, and X. 
Zhang, “A study of prefix hijacking and 
interception in the internet,” ACM 
SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 
37, no. 4, p. 265, Oct. 2007. 
[2] P.-A. Vervier, Q. Jacquemart, J. 
Schlamp, O. Thonnard, G. Carle, G. 
Urvoy-Keller, E. Biersack, and M. Dacier, 
“Malicious BGP hijacks: Appearances can 
be deceiving,” in 2014 IEEE International 
Conference on Communications (ICC), 
2014, pp. 884–889. 
[3] P. Vervier, O. Thonnard, and M. 
Dacier, “Mind Your Blocks: On the 
Stealthiness of Malicious BGP Hijacks,” 
in Proceedings 2015 Network and 
Distributed System Security Symposium, 
2015, no. February, pp. 8–11. 
[4] G. Valadon and N. Vivet, 
“Detecting BGP hijacks in 2014 BGP 
Hijacking for Cryptocurrency Profit 
Reported by Dell SecureWorks on August 
7 2014,” 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nosuchcon.org/talks/2014/D3_
04_Guillaume_Valadon_Nicolas_Vivet_d
etecting_BGP_hijacks.pdf. 
[5] S. Goldberg, “Why is it taking so 
long to secure internet routing?,” Commun. 
ACM, vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 56–63, Sep. 
2014. 
[6] I. O. de Urbina Cazenave, E. 
Kosluk, and M. C. Ganiz, “An anomaly 
detection framework for BGP,” in 2011 
International Symposium on Innovations 
in Intelligent Systems and Applications, 
2011, pp. 107–111. 
  
[7] H. Cao, M. Wang, X. Wang, and P. 
Zhu, “A Packet-Based Anomaly Detection 
Model for Inter-domain Routing,” in 2009 
IEEE International Conference on 
Networking, Architecture, and Storage, 
2009, pp. 192–195. 
[8] S. Kent, C. Lynn, and K. Seo, 
“Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-
BGP),” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 
18, no. 4, pp. 582–592, 2000. 
[9] M. Wubbeling, T. Elsner, and M. 
Meier, “Inter-AS routing anomalies: 
Improved detection and classification,” in 
2014 6th International Conference On 
Cyber Conflict (CyCon 2014), 2014, pp. 
223–238. 
[10] M. Wählisch, O. Maennel, and T. 
C. Schmidt, “Towards detecting BGP 
route hijacking using the RPKI,” ACM 
SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 
42, no. 4, p. 103, Sep. 2012. 
[11] K. Zhang, A. Yen, X. Zhao, D. 
Massey, S. Felix Wu, and L. Zhang, “On 
Detection of Anomalous Routing 
Dynamics in BGP,” in Proceedings of the 
International IFIP-TC6 Networking 
Conference 2004, vol. 5, 2004, pp. 259–
270. 
[12] T. Kathiravelu, A. Pears, and N. 
Ranasinghe, “Connectivity Models  : A 
New Approach to Modeling Contacts in 
Opportunistic Networks,” Proc. Eighth Int. 
Inf. Technol. Conf. 2006, p. 185, 2006. 
[13] H. Balakrishnan, “How YouTube 
was Hijacked,” 2009. [Online]. Available: 
http://web.mit.edu/6.02/www/s2012/hando
uts/youtube-pt.pdf. 
[14] C. D. Marsan, “Six worst Internet 
routing attacks.” [Online]. Available: 
  
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/
011509-bgp-attacks.html. [Accessed: 28-
Jan-2014]. 
[15] J. D. Gardiner, “Multiple Markov 
Models for Detecting Internet Anomalies 
from BGP Data,” in 2009 DoD High 
Performance Computing Modernization 
Program Users Group Conference, 2009, 
pp. 374–377. 
[16] N. Al-Rousan, S. Haeri, and L. 
Trajkovic, “Feature selection for 
classification of BGP anomalies using 
Bayesian models,” in 2012 International 
Conference on Machine Learning and 
Cybernetics, 2012, pp. 140–147. 
[17] MathWorks, “Network Analysis 
and Visualisation,” 2015. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://uk.mathworks.com/help/bioinfo/net
work-analysis-and-visualization.html. 
[Accessed: 10-Nov-2015]. 
[18] X. Wu, V. Kumar, J. Ross Quinlan, 
J. Ghosh, Q. Yang, H. Motoda, G. J. 
McLachlan, A. Ng, B. Liu, P. S. Yu, Z.-H. 
Zhou, M. Steinbach, D. J. Hand, and D. 
Steinberg, “Top 10 algorithms in data 
mining,” Knowl. Inf. Syst., vol. 14, no. 1, 
pp. 1–37, Jan. 2008. 
[19] M. Fernández-Delgado, E. 
Cernadas, S. Barro, and D. Amorim, “Do 
we Need Hundreds of Classifiers to Solve 
Real World Classification Problems?,” J. 
Mach. Learn. Res., vol. 15, pp. 3133–
3181, 2014. 
[20] G. Kaur and A. Chhabra, 
“Improved J48 Classification Algorithm 
for the Prediction of Diabetes,” Int. J. 
Comput. Appl., vol. 98, no. 22, pp. 13–17, 
2014. 
  
  
  
IP Prefix Hijack detection using BGP 
connectivity monitoring 
Hussain Alshamrani 
Centre for security, Communications and 
Network Research (CSCAN) Plymouth 
University 
Plymouth, UK 
hussain.alshamrani@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Bogdan Ghita 
Centre for security, Communications and 
Network Research (CSCAN) Plymouth 
University 
Plymouth, UK 
bogdan.ghita@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Abstract—In spite of significant on-
going research, the Border gateway 
protocol (BGP) still encompasses 
conceptual vulnerability issues regarding 
impersonating the ownership of IP prefixes 
for ASes (Autonomous Systems). In this 
context, a number of research studies 
focused on securing BGP through 
historical-based and statistical-based 
behavioural models. This paper suggests a 
novel method based on tracking the 
connectivity of suspicious ASes, which are 
received from a program tracing IP prefix 
hijacking signature. The paper uses Full 
Cross-Validation test to investigate the 
accuracy of the invented method and 
studies the similarity and differences 
between malicious and benign 
observations before they are classified. 
Classification might not be the appropriate 
technique to deal with IP prefix hijack 
detection on its own; therefore we propose 
to combine the two methods (signature and 
classification-based) in order to cover the 
limitations of both techniques. From a 
processing perspective, the outputs from 
signature-based method are used as inputs 
for the classification-based. The main 
features are extracted from the ASpath 
attributes of potentially suspicious ASes. 
  
The features are considered a mixture of 
the behavioural characteristics of 
connectivity among routers. The best five 
supervised classifiers were used in the 
previous researches and go with the 
characteristics of dataset will be used in 
this paper to evaluate the detection 
method. Under different learning 
algorithms, Random Forest and J48 
classifiers, the detection method is able to 
detect the hijacks with 81% accuracy.  
Keywords—BGP4; Machine learning; 
ASN; IP prefix hijack; features; RIRs 
Whois databases, route, MOAS, routes  
I. Introduction 
BGP remains the protocol of choice for 
core Internet interconnectivity. Although a 
number of BGP security issues have been 
identified for almost two decades, the 
protocol remains vulnerable to IP prefix 
attacks. This weakness leads to significant 
stability issues for the network, and may 
be used as a vehicle for black-hole traffic 
attackers [1], spamming [2], DDoS, and 
man-in-the-middle attacks [3]. In addition, 
hijackers may exploit redirecting BGP 
traffic for hijacking cryptocurrency 
transactions [4]. On April 2015 Schlamp 
pointed out to the reason that leads to 
hijacking of routes. For example, the main 
reason threatens the BGP security is 
emerging from abandoned Internet 
resources such as address blocks or AS 
numbers. In other words, when the DNS 
names expire, the attacker reregister 
domain names which are referenced by 
corresponding RIR (Regional Internet 
Registries) database objects [5]. 20% of 
the whole IPv4 address space is presently 
allocated but not above-board announced; 
this unused space is the ideal environment 
for such malicious BGP hijack events [3]. 
To solve this issue, our methods require 
  
organisations to announce their IP prefix at 
least once in order to advertise their 
ownership to the IP prefix block.  
In a review of existing approaches, 
Goldberg indicated that the main reason 
BGP is taking so long to be secured is that, 
apart from its deployment challenges, the 
infrastructure lacks a central authority, as 
each organisation autonomously deploys 
its own solution, so a complete or mass 
deployment is unlikely to take place [6].  
A traditional method employed by prior 
research has been to detect IP prefix 
hijacks based on anomaly detection and 
monitoring the stability of the 
encompassing routers. Nonetheless, such 
methods could not reliably distinguish IP 
prefix hijacks from normal events, such as 
power cut-off or submarine cable cuts [7]. 
Lastly, some detection methods analyse 
routing tables (table-based) in order to 
detect IP prefix hijacks, but organisations 
may refuse to provide their routing tables 
[8]. Vervier et al. noted that methods based 
on monitoring anomalies to detect IP 
prefix hijacks are still suffering from high 
false positive rates [3]. 
They also pointed out that prevention 
BGP hijack methods are still facing large-
scale and deployment issues [3]. Due to 
several reasons, such as performance 
issues on large routing systems or 
impracticability of approaches like S-BGP 
[9], the threats still exist nowadays [10]. 
Wubbeling et al. pointed out security 
based on origin authentication and 
asymmetric encryption are not feasible 
nowadays, because it is not yet 
implemented in broadly used hardware and 
business processes of ASes [10]. In 
addition, RPKI (Resource Publication 
Infrastructure) system is one of IP prefix 
hijacking detection systems put in place to 
  
prevent BGP route hijacking. However the 
system had several false positives and 
negatives and needs further refinements. 
The system is based on tracing the 
hierarchical relationships of the address 
space were given by IANA, RIRs and big 
ISPs to customers. The Route Origin 
Authorizations (ROAs) is 
cryptographically signed and published in 
repositories. Every router has to upload the 
information [11]. 
As a case study, UPDATE messages 
were collected from the 24th of February 
2008, using the Route View project of 
University of Oregon, when Pakistan 
Telecom intended to restrict local access to 
YouTube, but the advertised UPDATE 
messages blocked access to YouTube [12] 
for approximately two hours [13].  
In this paper we implement a program 
to search for suspicious ASes and pass the 
result to another program to trace the 
behaviour of routers through their 
connectivity. From the behaviour we can 
extract several parameters such as direct 
and indirect neighbours, number of sender 
and receiver neighbours for both the 
victim and hijacker. These two programs 
form the structure of the detection method, 
which is a combination of signature and 
connectivity-based. Zhang et al. pointed 
out the importance of signature-based and 
anomaly-based in modern intrusion 
detection together with their inherent 
drawbacks – uncertainty for signature-
based methods and inability to detect new 
attacks for anomaly-based analysis [14]. 
Furthermore, connectivity model is a new 
approach used recently to trace the 
behaviour of opportunistic networks. 
Kathiravelu argues that a paradigm shift 
from mobility models connectivity model 
[15]. As a result, we decided to combine 
signature-based and anomaly-detection-
  
based techniques to avoid their limitations 
when they work separately.  
For the detection method validation 
purposes, we are going to use a number of 
supervised machine learning classifiers 
based on full cross-validation test 
technique. The highest accuracy of the 
hijack detection was achieved using J48 
and RandomForest classifier where the 
accuracy reached 81%. 
This paper is organised as follows: in 
section II we present the detection method 
of the IP prefix hijack. In section III we 
crosscheck the RIR Whois database with 
the outputs of validator to label incidents 
while in section IV we extract features 
based on the connectivity behaviour of 
suspicious routers. In section V we explore 
the similarity between suspicious and 
malicious observations before they are 
classified. Section VI discusses the 
methodology of the classification and 
testing the behaviour of suspicious ASes 
while VII evaluates the accuracy of the 
detection method based on the results of 
learning algorithms. The conclusions and 
future work are outlined in section VIII.  
II. Detection method 
In this section, we talk about how to 
connect the detection method of new parts 
to the previous work. The detection 
method is going to add a novel features are 
proposed to use supervised machine 
learning algorithms to detect IP prefix 
hijacking. Thus, we need a supportive part 
to do labelling for data. Tracer and 
validator blocks are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
Machine leaning has different learning 
approaches to mine data such as 
supervised learning, semi-supervised 
  
learning, unsupervised learning, 
reinforcement learning and deep learning. 
However, the supervised-learning 
approach is more accurate and appropriate 
to the issue of impersonating others’ IP 
prefixes issue; therefore, the dataset will 
be structured in supervised format.   
The IP prefix hijack detection method 
is composed of five main parts as it is 
shown in figure 1: IP prefix hijack 
signature tracer, suspicious ASes validator, 
Labeller, Dataset Extractor and Organiser 
(DEO) and ML. However, this paper 
concern to only three blocks: the Model, 
ML and labeller part. Figure 1 shows the 
general structure of the detection method. 
 
Fig 1. Detection method using combination of 
signature-based and connectivity-based 
 Tracer is signature-based algorithm 
receives update messages for specific 
period of time (15-minutes) and check 
them based on the IP prefix hijack 
signature. The algorithm uses two useful 
techniques data reduction and binary 
search algorithm to reduce search area of 
BGP messages. Table 1 shows the 
suspicious outputs the tracer caught. This 
table represents data were saved in the 
SFL (Suspicious Findings List), which 
exposes the output format of detected 
abnormal and suspicious routes. 
  
TABLE 1. Suspicious finding list 
Announcers Neighbours Routes  
 
AS3 
 
AS1239 
128.30.0.0/15 
18.168.0.0/24 
18.168.1.0/24 
 
AS3292 
AS1299  
158.173.176.0/20 AS3549 
AS8001 
Validator receives suspicious ASes as 
inputs and verifies them based on the 
database generated from RIRs Whois [16] 
and ASNs (Autonomous System Numbers) 
and IP prefixes delegators. We do that 
because BGP updates do not support 
organisation name data and the same 
signature of the hijack is showing up in the 
normal behaviours of routers, this conflict 
is called MOAS (Multiple Origin 
Autonomous System).  
In case of the ASes and IP addresses 
ownership are not updated regularly in 
RIRs and their delegators, Labeller 
receives the inputs from validator and 
labels the outputs of the validator because 
the detection method is based on 
supervised learning approach. Since the 
RIRs operators do not save their old 
subscribers records, finding out the 
ownership history of some nominated 
suspicious routers make it very difficult to 
label some ASes. This method helps to 
decide and collect behaviour only from 
known ASes and ensure from and separate 
the benign and malicious ASes.  
DEO is responsible for extracting 
anomaly detection features, organising 
data and classifying the behaviour of 
nominated benign and suspicious ASes. 
The DEO has 9 features extracted based on 
the suspicious routers connectivity. It 
categorises suspicious routes into two 
classes either normal or abnormal. The 
outputs of the DEO are passed as inputs to 
the ML (Machine Learning) block. 
  
In ML (Machine Learning) we use five 
learning algorithms to evaluate the 
proposed features. In this part we use full-
cross validation test option for training and 
testing dataset. The ML will give the final 
result accuracy of the detection method 
and use the detection model for detection 
new hijacks. 
III. Labelling incidents 
Sine RIRs (Regional Internet 
Registries) do not keep records of old 
Whois registrations details, this section 
intends to label the outputs of the validator 
in order to specify the ASes we are going 
to trace their behaviour during the 
hijacking history and then structure a very 
high accurate supervised learning dataset. 
Labeller still uses RIRs to build the dataset 
but it needs to filter confusing events that 
appear in the up to date Whois RIRs 
databases. Based on that, some nominated 
ASes were received from hijack signature 
tracer will be excluded from the outputs of 
the Validator as their ownership to the 
victim routes are ambiguous. Table 2 
describes validator outputs before they are 
labelled. 
TABLE 2. Validator outputs before labelling 
AS1 AS2 IP prefix 
3 27930 '190.14.196.0/24' 
3 27930 '190.14.197.0/24' 
37 27064 '198.91.71.0/24' 
100 14807 '63.115.54.0/24' 
100 14807 '65.204.11.0/24' 
209 7018 '24.32.114.0/24' 
209 2711 '64.53.21.0/24' 
209 2711 '64.53.40.0/22' 
209 6395 '66.212.81.0/24' 
Each nominated suspicious AS is 
investigated based on the five regional 
registries: AfriNIC, APNIC, ARIN, 
LACNIC and RIPE NCC. The strategy of 
labelling the events is based on three main 
aspects: 
• If both of suspicious ASes own the 
route, we mark them with 
OWNER, and then the event is 
benign. 
  
• If one of suspicious ASes owns the 
route, it marks with ONER and 
HIJACKER, and then the event is 
malicious. 
• If none of suspicious AS origins 
owns the route, we tag them with 
NOTSURE, and then the event is 
not labelled. 
TABLE 3. Suspicious ASes investigator dataset 
AS
1 
AS
2 
AS1 
STATUS 
AS2 
STATU
S 
LABEL 
100 250 OWNER OWNE
R 
BENIGN 
200 10 ATTACKE
R 
OWNE
R 
MALICIOU
S 
300 50 NOT 
SURE 
NOT 
SURE 
AMBIGUO
US 
AMBIGUOS events will be removed 
from the dataset and we only keep records 
were labelled as BENIGN or 
MALICIOUS as it shown in table 3. After 
extracting features as it is going to be in 
next section, each feature pattern will be 
given the class of its ASes event label.  
IV. Features extraction 
In order to see the pollution of the 
internet when an edge router impersonates 
the ownership of a route is possessed by 
another router, and the connectivity 
between suspicious routers during the 
hijacking, we use Network Analysis and 
Visualization [17] to plot the topology of 
suspicious ASes. Based on the behaviour 
of suspicious ASes we extract 9 features 
from their connectivity. The behaviour of 
each suspicious AS can be calculated 
separately. However, we interested in the 
event of two suspicious ASes 
impersonating same IP prefix; therefore 
we need to take the absolute value of the 
differences between calculated suspicious 
ASes behaviours from equation 1. For 
example, finding the number of receiving 
neighbours is calculated in two separate 
column vectors, one for AS1 and another 
for AS2, and we need to apply the 
equation 1 in order to put them in one 
vector column. This vector column 
  
represents the behaviour of both ASes 
whether the event is malicious or benign. 
SAS1 and SAS2 indicate two sates either 
benign with benign or benign with 
malicious. 
𝑆! = 𝑆!"! − 𝑆!"!  (1) 
All features in table 4 were extracted 
from the behaviour of suspicious ASes 
(edge routers) are hidden in the ASPATH 
attribute. We briefly explain the purposes 
of these features. Since the innocent hijack 
does not occur for multiple different ASes, 
we extract the number of repeated incident 
in order to detect unintentional hijacks 
such as hijacks that occurred due to 
misconfiguration.  
TABLE 4. Features of suspicious ASes 
NO Features 
1. # of repeated incidents 
2. # of receiver neighbours 
3.  # of sender neighbours 
4. # of first propagators of 
suspicious routes 
5. # of shared receiver 
neighbours 
6.  # of shared sender neighbours 
7. #of shared first propagators of 
suspicious routes 
8.  # of connections between 
suspicious ASes 
9. Are they neighbours? 
Generally, features 2-7 are based on the 
neighbourhood connectivity of suspicious 
ASes. Specifically, Features 2-4 concern 
about the direct neighbours of suspicious 
ASes while features 5-7 interests with 
shared direct neighbours between 
suspicious ASes. Feature eight and nine 
focus on direct and indirect connections 
between the suspicious ASes themselves. 
These features should reveal the similar 
and different patterns of suspicious ASes 
behaviours. 
 Table 5 shows a sample of the values 
of proposed features with their classes to 
detect the IP prefix hijacks. Each instance 
is labelled either with 0 if it is suspicious 
or 1 if it is benign. The type of pattern is 
  
represented by the whole of the features. 
F1-F9 represents features and C represents 
the two categorical classes of the 
behaviour. In terms of feature organization 
and calculation, each feature is saved in a 
separate column vector after being 
calculating based on the connectivity of 
suspicious edge routers. These column 
vectors are concatenated to give a dataset 
composed of 10 columns, including 
classes, and 340 examples. Since the 
registration details of some suspicious 
ASes are not recorded and are not given in 
any of RIRs, we omit about 133 instances 
from the main dataset including malicious 
and benign samples. The dataset is built 
based on the rule explained in section III. 
The new size of the dataset will be 
dropped to have only 207 instances. 
TABLE 5. Features after labelling 
F
1 
F
2 
F
3 
F4 F
5 
F
6 
F
7 
F
8 
F
9 
C 
2 2
2 
1 66
5 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1
2 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Another important rule has to be taken 
into account is that getting rid of redundant 
instances, which means all repeated 
hijacks will be removed from the dataset 
because there is no need to similar events 
it. We observe that the size of the dataset 
is decreasing but with an increase in the 
accuracy of the data we are working on 
and getting rid of the redundancy. After 
labelling instances based on the RIRs 
Whois and removing repeated suspicious 
observation rules, the new size of the 
dataset will be limited to 113 instances. If 
the learning algorithms can distinguish the 
patterns of malicious and benign 
observations that mean the detection 
method was built in a high efficient way. 
Based on the results of the classifications 
we will evaluate the method. 
  
V. Calculate data similarity 
In this section we calculate the 
percentage of similarity and differences 
among benign and malicious observations. 
We invented our own algorithm to 
compute the similarity and differences of 
benign and malicious route patterns, which 
based on the XOR logical operator 
concept; the output is true if inputs are not 
alike otherwise the output is false.  
Malicious and benign patterns are 
previously saved in one matrix. Malicious 
row observations are compared bit-by-bit 
against every benign sequence. Xb 
represents benign matrix row vectors and 
Ym represents malicious matrix row 
vectors in formula 1 and 2.  
𝑋! = 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3, 𝑓4, 𝑓5, 𝑓6, 𝑓7, 𝑓8, 𝑓9   (2) 
𝑌! = 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3, 𝑓4, 𝑓5, 𝑓6, 𝑓7, 𝑓8, 𝑓9   (3) 
Based on these two vectors formulas 
we compare the behaviour of benign and 
malicious observations. The output of this 
comparison is stored in a matrix with 
either zero or one, zeroes represent 
similarity and ones represent differences. 
We calculate every benign pattern and by 
the end we come up with several matrices 
for one benign vector, the number of 
matrices is as same as the size of malicious 
dataset.  
Formula 4 show the general 
computation of similarity and difference of 
each benign pattern to all malicious 
patterns, where for is the loop starts from 
the first observation in the benign dataset 
and ends at the size of it.  𝑋!!  is benign 
observations and 𝑌!  is the malicious 
observations. 0  is the summation of 
similar cases and 1 is the summation of 
different cases. 
  
𝑓𝑜𝑟!!!! 𝑋!!   𝑥𝑜𝑟  𝑌! !!       (4)     
We calculate similarities and 
differences means of benign and malicious 
patterns from below two formulas 5 and 6, 
where n is the number of number of 
similarities and differences, Si represents 
the similarities and Di represents the 
differences of every benign observation to 
all malicious observations in the dataset. 𝑆 
gives the mean of similarity for all benign 
observations and 𝐷 returns with the  mean 
of differences of all benign observations. 
Both similarity and differences patterns of 
malicious and benign patterns are 
calculated to only ensure that the quality of 
data has been calculated correctly. In other 
words, one operation either calculating the 
behavioural similarity or difference 
between benign and malicious is enough to 
show the quality of data. Symmetric graph 
of similarity and differences shows that the 
calculation of one operation is carried out 
properly as it shown in figure 3. Based on 
observation of the calculation we either 
use similarity or difference calculation for 
studying the quality of the dataset. This 
dataset has malicious and benign 
announcement patterns. 
𝑆 = 𝑆!!!!!𝑛   (5) 
𝐷 = 𝐷!!!!!𝑛   (6) 
From the graph in figure 3 we realise 
that the range of differences of malicious 
and benign observations is limited between 
4.9 and 8.9. Correspondingly, the 
similarity among malicious and benign 
observations is limited between 2.9 and 
6.1. If the value of both calculations is 
subtracted, the result will equal 4, which 
represents the range of similarities and 
differences. This value is probably is not 
very big but enough to differentiate 
between malicious and benign behaviours.  
  
 
Fig 3. Similarity and differences between benign 
and malicious observations 
Formula 7 computes the similarity 
percentage between malicious and benign 
behaviour, where total observations is 
equal to malicious observations plus 
benign observations. NS is the number of 
similarity was found in the whole dataset 
of benign and malicious observations. TO 
is the total observation of the dataset, 
which is 113. According to the formula, 
the percentage of the similarity is 0.07. 
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦  percentage   = 𝑁𝑆  𝑇𝑂    7   
The more similarity behaviours are 
greater than the difference behaviours, the 
more confusion could happen to learning 
classifiers. Since the similarity between 
malicious and benign datasets is good, we 
can use different classifiers in section IX 
to differentiate two patterns.   
VI. Classification 
In this section we discuss the method is 
going to be used to apply machine learning 
with cross-validation test to detect the IP 
prefix hijacks. After building the dataset, 
which is based on the connectivity of the 
routers, we are going to classify suspicious 
ASes based on the following steps: 
a) The detection method firstly 
determines the appropriate method 
of Cross-Validation test is going to 
be used.  
b) Since data is few we use Full 
Cross-Validation with all proposed 
learning algorithms as in figure 2. 
c) Each algorithm repeats the 
classification with different 
parameters for many times in order 
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to observe the efficiency of the 
features and then the classifiers. 
d) The best result of each classifier is 
saved to be compared to other 
classifiers’ results. 
e) Based on the offset of the number 
of false positives and false 
negatives, the best result among 
tried classifiers is determined. 
 
Fig 2. Full cross-validation technique  
In 2008, Xindong Wu et al. had studded 
the best algorithms are using in data 
mining. Based on the research community 
it is found that the most influential data-
mining algorithms are allocated in 10 top 
algorithms [18]. The study was about 
general types of learning algorithms such 
as classification, clustering, statistical 
learning, association analysis and link 
mining. However, we only interested in 
supervised-learning algorithms as we can 
have a prior picture of the percentage of 
benign and malicious data before they are 
given to the algorithms. On the other hand, 
another study has taken place for 
investigating the best learning classifiers in 
2014. The study compared 179 classifiers 
for 17 families and over 121 different 
databases and found the best classifiers are 
Random Forest versions. RandomForest 
belongs to rule-based family and is 
considered supervised learning [19]. In 
addition, In 2014 Kaur and Chhabra 
claimed that improved J48 used recently to 
increase the accuracy rate of classification 
[20]. We have different deep studies of the 
best algorithms in data mining; first study 
was based on the research community and 
which the best algorithms were used 
widely in different area in data mining 
while the second study was empirical 
study performed by some experts in data 
mining. Both of studies are important 
  
because they cover each other limitations. 
Based on these studies we are going to test 
the detection method using five supervised 
learning algorithms: J48 which is the 
improved version of C4.5 and C5.0, k-NN 
(k-Nearest Neighbour), NB (Naïve Bayes), 
CART and RF (Random Forest); and 
based on the features of the algorithms 
such as accuracy, fastness and offset of 
false positive and negatives, the classifier 
is chosen. We also can observe that the 
most of the best classifiers belong to 
supervised not unsupervised learning. 
Although Adaboost is a supervised 
classifier one of the best learning 
algorithms, it is going to be excluded 
because of its dependability on other 
classifier. Adaboost strength is acquired 
from other classifiers, which means the 
algorithm gives the same accuracy result 
of the classifier it based on therefore it will 
be ignored.  
A. Testing  
Proposed algorithms use full cross-
validation technique, which also called 
leave one out cross-validation. In full 
cross-validation, we choose the largest 
fold (113), which is the size of the dataset, 
in order to enlarge training dataset and 
minimize the size of the testing dataset, as 
the original dataset is not big. Every single 
instance will be used as a test set and 
remaining data as training dataset. This 
idea helps to avoid the possibility that 
folds (testing datasets) have one or more 
instances have not been trained in other 
folds (training datasets).  
For instance, suppose we have 100 
instances and we use 10 cross-validation, 
the dataset will be divided into 10 chunks 
because 100 divided by 10 is equal 10; so 
each one has 10 instances but probably the 
tested route malicious behaviour in the 
  
same fold of testing dataset. That means 
we might omit some hijacks if we do not 
maximize training dataset and minimize 
the test data set as much as we can. The 
smallest testing dataset and the largest 
training dataset we have, the more accurate 
evaluation of the detection method we 
receive. According to the changing of 
algorithms parameters the accuracy of the 
classification is registered as it shown in 
table 6. All algorithms parameters need to 
be adopted to suit the aim of the extracted 
features.  
TABLE 6.  Results based on Rule and Tree 
machine learning algorithms 
Algorithm  Training dataset Accuracy  
J48  
 
Full cross-validation  
81% 
KNN 79% 
NB 76% 
CART 81% 
RF 81% 
A. Error False Positive and 
Negatives Calculation  
Confusion matrix in table 7 shows the 
accuracy of the detection method for both 
classes, malicious and benign. A and B 
represent correctly and incorrectly 
instances. Zero is the class of malicious 
instances and one is the class of benign 
instances. It is notable that the algorithms 
have difficulty to classify benign 
observations more than classifying 
malicious observations in the whole 
algorithms with slightly better in k-Nearest 
Neighbours and Random forest.  
For instance, for malicious 
classification, J48 classified data and came 
up with 3 incorrectly classified malicious 
observations and 73 correctly classified 
observations. The case repeats itself in k-
Nearest Neighbours, Naïve Bayes and 
Classification and Regression Tree 
algorithms. However, Random Forest has 
7 incorrectly classified malicious instances 
and 69 correctly classified malicious 
  
instances. In terms of benign classification, 
Random Forest is considered the best 
algorithm of detecting benign instances 
because it detected 23 benign instances 
correctly among 37 unique cases and the 
worst one is Naïve Bayes. Based on these 
notes and the offset of false positives and 
false negatives, the best algorithm will be 
elected.  
TABLE 7. Confusion matrix testing for best 
classifiers 
Algorithm  Train dataset A  B  Classified 
as  
J48  
 
 
 
Full cross-
validation  
73 3 A=0 
18 19 B=1 
KNN  73 3 A=0 
21 16 B=1 
NB 73 3 A=0 
24 13 B=1 
CART 73 3 A=0 
19 18 B=1 
RF 69 7 A=0 
14 23 B=1 
From two following equations, 8 and 9, 
we can compute the percentage error of the 
false positives and false negatives for the 
whole algorithms. NCp Stands for 
Abnormal Confusion Percentage while 
ACP represents Normal Confusion 
percentage.  
𝑁𝐶! =    𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦  𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦  𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠         (8) 
𝐴𝐶!   =    𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦  𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦  𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡n𝑐𝑒𝑠         (9) 
If we take the percentage of false 
negatives and false positives for each 
algorithm and then the average of the 
whole algorithms, we come up 0.05 false 
negative and 1.15 false positives. Figure 3 
shows that the false negative is less than 
the false positive in total but that does not 
explore the best algorithm; therefore, we 
judge the best algorithm based on taking 
the less false negative among malicious 
confusion computations and the less false 
positive in benign confusion. 
  
 
Fig 3. The best algorithm findings 
From that rule we find the J48 is the 
best algorithm in terms of having less false 
negatives, if we take false positives of 
equal algorithms in to account. On the 
other hand, Random Forest is considered 
the best algorithm of detecting benign 
observations. If we take the offset of false 
positive and false negative of all classifiers 
results, Random Forest would be the best 
algorithm works with the features. 
However, the detection method would 
work better if we can combine these two 
algorithms to avoid learning implications 
for both algorithms. Formula 10 and 11 
can compute the highest accuracy of the 
detection method when J48 and RF are 
combined, where HAMm represents the 
highest accuracy of detecting malicious 
observations and HAMb for detecting 
benign observations while ICMOJ48 and 
ICBORF represent the incorrectly classified 
malicious and benign observations. 
𝐻𝐴𝑀! = !"#!!!"  !  !"#!!"!"#$%#  !"#$      (10) 
𝐻𝐴𝑀! = !"#!!!"  !  !"#!!"!"#$%#  !"#$      (11) 
VII. Results and evaluation 
Initially, the detection method was 
consisted of 12 features; these features are 
mixed of stability and connectivity 
observations of suspicious ASes were 
caught in tracing hijack signature phase. 
However, features were extracted based on 
the stability of edge routers are deleted as 
they make the detection very bad. As a 
result, the total number of features 
becomes 9. BGP packets are going to be 
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classified and evaluated based on the 
remaining 9 features. Generally, the five 
classifiers are suggested to be used can 
work with the extracted features in a high 
efficiency although all of them have false 
positives and false negatives but in low 
percentage.  
The detection method result supports 
the studies that have been investigated in 
2014, and said that the Random Forest 
versions and J48 are the best algorithms 
among classifiers [19] [20]. The false 
negative if we use J48 is 0.02 while the 
false positive is 0.15. On the other hand, if 
we use Random Forest as the classifier of 
the detection method, the false negative 
will be 0.06 and false positive 0.12, which 
means J48 is better than Random Forest 
since the number of false negative in J48 is 
less than the number of false negative in 
RF. If we want the detection method to be 
in the highest efficiency, it needs to work 
with J48 and RF integrally. For example, 
based on equation 10 and 11, false 
negative will be 0.04 and 0.03 false 
positive accuracy, which means its 
accuracy will be increased from 81% to 
93%. 
VIII. Conclusion and future work 
In conclusion, this paper discussed a 
novel method to detect IP prefix hijacks in 
BGP. The method uses the extracted 
behaviour of suspicious ASes as inputs to 
the connectivity-based method, which in 
turn classify new BGP updates. Based on 
the suspicious ASes detected by the IP 
prefix hijacks Tracer data are classified 
into two classes, benign and malicious. 
Usually, researchers concern about the 
amount of data in their datasets. However, 
we interest in the uniqueness of suspicious 
and abnormal patterns, therefore the 
amount of data was few. Another reason 
  
for making dataset small is that the 
algorithm excludes obvious normal 
observations from the dataset is going to 
be used for tracing routers connectivity. 
Moreover, there is no tool to give labelled 
accurate data of the historical incidents. As 
a result, we created our own accurate 
dataset by checking the ownership of 
suspicious ASes and IP prefixes through 
RIRs. Full Cross-Validation test method 
solves the issue of the size of the dataset 
because it is small. Five different learning 
algorithms and the best classifier works 
with the extracted features are picked. The 
result of the detection method is 
encouraging and very good as the 
percentage of false positive and false 
negative is less than 20% and the detection 
accuracy of the IP prefix hijacks is 81%.  
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